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Abstract 
The present study is an attempt to investigate the use of discourse markers in 
English and Arabic. The study uses Relevance Theory as a theoretical framework 
for the analysis of discourse markers in both Syrian and Standard Arabic. It 
benefits from Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) account of procedural meaning, in which 
she argues that discourse markers encode procedural meaning that constrains the 
inferential phase of the interpretation of the utterance in which they occur. 
According to Blakemore, the procedural meaning encoded by discourse markers 
controls the hearer’s choice of context under which the utterance is relevant. 
The study concentrates on ten discourse markers, five of which are only 
used in Standard Arabic. These are lakinna, bainama, lakin, bal and fa. The other 
five (bass, la-heik, la-ha-sabab, ma‘nāt-o and bi-ittalī) are only used in Syrian 
Arabic. The choice of these discourse markers has been motivated by the fact that 
they can be compared and contrasted with Blakemore’s two favoured discourse 
markers, but and so. The claim is that like so and but, such discourse markers 
encode procedural meaning that constrains the interpretation of the utterance in 
which they occur. 
The study argues that like but in English, bass in Syrian Arabic encodes a 
general procedure that can be implemented to derive different meanings such as 
‘denial of expectation’, ‘contrast’, ‘correction’ and ‘cancellation’. The four 
discourse markers (lakinna, bainama, lakin and bal) used in Standard Arabic are 
analysed as lexical representations of these different implementations. 
The discourse marker fa, in this study, has also been analysed as encoding 
a general procedure that can be implemented to derive different meanings such as 
‘sequentiality’, ‘immediacy’, ‘non-intervention’ and ‘causality’. It has also been 
argued that the procedure encoded by fa can put constraints on either the explicit 
or the implicit side of the interpretation of the utterance in which it occurs.  
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Introduction 
In every language, there are linguistic expressions whose meaning does not 
contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterances in which they occur. 
Prominent among such expressions are discourse markers. Discourse markers 
have been studied by different researchers and within different frameworks. They 
are referred to as cue phrases (Knott and Dale, 1994), discourse connectives 
(Blakemore, 1987, 1992, 2002), discourse operators (Redeker, 1990, 1991), 
particles (Schourup 1985), discourse signalling devices (Polanyi and Scha, 1983), 
pragmatic expressions (Erman, 1987), phatic connectives (Bazanella, 1990), 
pragmatic formatives (Fraser, 1996), pragmatic connectives (van Dijk, 1979; 
Stubbs, 1983), pragmatic operators (Ariel, 1994), pragmatic particles (Östman, 
1995), pragmatic markers (Fraser 1988,1990; Schiffrin, 1987), conjuncts (Quirk 
and Greenbaum et al., 1985) and sentence connectives (Halliday and Hasan, 1976). 
Schiffrin (1987) and Fraser (1988, 1990) study discourse markers within 
the Coherence framework. They argue that discourse markers are lexical 
expressions that relate discourse units and play a major role in the interpretation 
of discourse by signalling coherence relations between discourse units. Other 
researchers study discourse markers within the Conversation Analysis framework. 
They argue that discourse markers play an important role in conversation, for 
example, marking topic shift and turn taking, summing up ideas, requesting 
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explanation and expressing conclusions (Heritage 1988, 1989, 1995 and Al-Khalil 
2005). 
Blakemore (1987, 2002), Blass (1990), Iten (1998) and others study 
discourse markers from a relevance-theoretic point of view. They argue that 
discourse markers encode procedural meanings that constrain the inferential part 
of the interpretation of the utterances in which they occur. Such expressions 
control the hearer’s choice of context by guiding him to reach the interpretation of 
an utterance by constraining the context under which the utterance is relevant. 
According to them, discourse markers are linguistic devices used to maximize 
contextual effects and minimise processing effort in assessing the relevance of a 
given utterance. Blakemore’s relevance-theoretic account of discourse markers 
will be compared and contrasted with Schiffrin’s coherence-based one. 
The current study is concerned with the analysis of some discourse 
markers within the latter framework, i.e. Relevance Theory, where discourse 
markers are analysed as elements that encode procedural meanings. A broad 
outline of the framework will be presented in this study, as well as how discourse 
markers are accounted for in this framework in comparison with the Coherence 
framework. The conceptual/procedural distinction and its relation to the analysis 
of discourse markers will be also discussed. 
The main aim of this study is to investigate the use of some discourse 
markers in Arabic within the relevance-theoretic framework. Few researchers 
have studied the use of discourse markers in Arabic. These were Al-Batal (1994) 
and Al-Khalil (2005), who adopted the Conversation Analysis and Coherence 
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frameworks in analysing them. But there is no single study that investigates 
discourse markers in Arabic within Relevance Theory. It is hoped that this study 
paves the way for applying relevance-theoretic pragmatics to Arabic and 
contributes to the broadening of Arabic linguistics, which is mainly concerned 
with gender issues, syntax, phonology, phonetics, dialectology and diglossia (e.g., 
Blanc 1960, Holes 1983, Bakir 1986, Ibrahim 1986, Abdel-Jawad 1987 and 1990, 
Al-Wer 1991, Daher 1998). 
The study does not aim to analyse every single discourse marker in Arabic 
(standard and non-standard). Such an enterprise would be impracticable given the 
vast number of discourse markers in Arabic. The concentration will be on ten 
discourse markers, five of which (lakinna, bainama, lakin, bal and fa) are only 
used in Standard Arabic and the other five (bass, la-heik, la-ha-sabab, ma‘nāt-o 
and bi-ittālī) are only used in Syrian Arabic as a representative of the non-
standard form of Arabic1. I have chosen these ten discourse markers for the sake 
of comparison with Blakemore’s analysis of so and but in English on the one hand 
and the intricate differences between discourse markers in Standard Arabic and 
Syrian Arabic on the on the other. 
Data in this study come from different sources. As far as the Standard 
Arabic is concerned, data are collected from the Holy Quran and from novels and 
newspapers. As for the data from Syrian Arabic, they are collected from TV 
programmes, soap operas and some extracts from conversations with friends and 
                                                 
1
 I have chosen to discuss the use of discourse markers in Syrian Arabic because I am a native 
speaker of Syrian Arabic. In addition, there is a good number of my colleagues in the School of 
English in Newcastle University who are also native speakers of Syrian Arabic. This was a great 
chance to discuss the data with them.  
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colleagues. Composed examples and scenarios are also used for illustration in 
both Standard Arabic and Syrian Arabic. Most data and examples used in this 
study have been glossed and translated by me into English. Some interesting 
translation problems have been faced. This was, in particular, the case with fa 
which does not easily lend itself to a proper translation in English, due to the 
vagueness of its meaning. 
Chapter 1 provides a broad outline of the theoretical framework of this 
thesis, namely Relevance Theory. It starts by offering a historical background of 
this theory and the development it has undergone. I discuss Grice’s theory of 
communication and show how Relevance Theory is considered as a development 
of it. I go further to highlight the main points of difference between Grice’s theory 
and Sperber & Wilson’s Relevance Theory regarding utterance interpretation. 
Grice can be seen as offering a theory of the distinction between   
‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’. According to him, ‘explicit’ is equal to ‘what is said’— 
semantically determined by the literal meaning of the conventional words used in 
the utterance, while ‘implicit’ is pragmatically derived by exploiting one or more 
of the conversational maxims. In other words, the distinction between explicit and 
implicit is mutually exclusive in Grice’s theory. The proposition explicitly 
expressed in a certain utterance is an outcome of linguistic decoding and any other 
communicated aspect is considered as an implicature, pragmatically derived. This 
is questioned in Relevance Theory, which argues, against Grice, that the 
explicit/implicit distinction does not align with the distinction between linguistic 
encoding and inference. There are cases where what is explicitly communicated 
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(what is said, for Grice) is not determined by the literal meaning of words in the 
sentence but is rather pragmatically derived, as is the case of ‘reference 
assignment’ and ‘disambiguation’. Furthermore, in other cases, what is implicated 
(for Grice) is not pragmatically determined, but encoded, as in Grice’s notion of 
‘conventional implicature’. Relevance Theory treats the explicit/implicit 
distinction differently, in terms of explicature vs. implicature. The important point 
here is that pragmatic inference is involved not only in deriving the implicature, 
but also in deriving the explicature.  
The explicature/implicature distinction (and the problems associated with 
it) is discussed in some detail due to its close relation to the notion of procedural 
meaning discussed in this thesis. We know that Grice’s notion of ‘conventional 
implicature’ has been replaced by the notion of ‘procedural meaning’ in 
Relevance Theory. The notion of ‘conventional implicature’ has been criticised by 
many pragmatists (Rieber 1997; Bach 1994, 1999; Wilson and Sperber 1993 and 
Blakemore 1987, 2002; Levinson 1983; Kempson 1975 and Carston 2002). 
Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) notion of procedural meaning tries to account for the 
meaning of discourse markers without appeal to quote ‘conventional implicature’. 
The investigation shows that the procedural meaning encoded by discourse 
markers can constrain either the explicit or the implicit side of the utterance 
interpretation. In some cases, such as the case of fa, it can constrain both the 
explicit and the implicit side of the utterance interpretation. The notions of 
cognitive effect, context and processing effort are also discussed in this thesis 
because Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) account of procedural meaning revolves 
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around these very notions. According to Blakemore, a procedure encoded by a 
certain discourse marker controls the utterance interpretation in the sense that it 
guides the hearer to the context under which the utterance is relevant. In other 
words, the use of a linguistic expression with encoded procedural meaning 
maximises cognitive effects by directing the hearer to the choice of context 
needed in the utterance interpretation and thereby, it saves the hearer processing 
effort in interpreting the utterance. 
Chapter 2 reviews some of the core distinctions in semantics and 
pragmatics namely the truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional and the 
conceptual/procedural distinctions and highlights some possible confusion in 
literature. It starts by discussing the relationship between linguistic meaning and 
truth conditions by reference to Strawson’s (1971) and Davidson’s (1967, 1984) 
truth-conditional theories of linguistic meaning, in which they argue that there is a 
pairing up between natural language and the real world. 
The chapter, then, moves to discuss some linguistic expressions whose 
encoded meaning does not contribute to truth-conditional content of utterance in 
which they occur such as personal pronouns (I, he, she etc.), sentence adverbials 
(seriously, sadly), focus adverbs (even, too, also) and discourse markers (so, after 
all, but etc.). 
The second half of the chapter concentrates on the analysis of linguistic 
meaning and its relation to truth conditions in Relevance Theory. In this concern, 
(Blakemore 1987) assumes that the meaning encoded by linguistic expressions is 
either conceptual or procedural. Conceptual encoding contributes to the truth 
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conditions of utterances while procedural encoding does not. This claim has been 
revisited by Wilson and Sperber (1993) and Blakemore (2002), who recognise 
that such parallelism does not hold. 
In general, the chapter offers arguments suggesting that the parallelism 
between these two distinctions does indeed not hold. There are some linguistic 
expressions whose meanings both contribute truth-conditional content and 
constrain the inferential part of the interpretation of the utterance in which they 
occur. It also claims that the conceptual/procedural distinction is not mutually 
exclusive; there are some linguistic expressions which encode both conceptual 
and procedural meanings and others with conceptual encoding but used 
procedurally. Given that, and as far as this distinction is concerned, this chapter 
classifies linguistic expressions into three categories: i) linguistic expressions that 
encode purely conceptual meaning, such as ‘nouns’, ‘verbs’, ‘adjectives’ and 
‘manner adverbs’, ii) linguistic expressions that encode conceptuo-procedural 
meaning, such as ‘pronouns,’ the definite article ‘the’ and ‘sentence adverbials’, 
iii) linguistic expressions that encode purely procedural meaning. These are 
discourse markers such as so, but, therefore and after all. 
Chapter 3 investigates the semantics and pragmatics of discourse markers 
in English. It discusses the different views researchers have on the analysis of 
discourse markers. These views are classified into two main approaches. The first 
approach analyses discourse markers as linguistic devices that contribute to the 
interpretation of discourse by signalling coherence relations in discourse. 
According to this approach, text interpretation is highly dependable on the 
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identification of certain coherence relations between discourse units. This 
approach is called the coherence-based approach and its main proponents are 
Schiffrin (1987) and Fraser (1988). 
The second, relevance-theoretic, approach considers discourse markers as 
pragmatic devices that encode procedural meanings which constrain the 
inferential part of the utterance interpretation by guiding the hearer/reader to reach 
the interpretation, consistent with the principle of relevance. Proponents of this 
approach argue that the use of some discourse markers controls the hearer’s 
choice of context against which, he should interpret the utterance as relevant and 
thus saves him effort in the process of utterance interpretation (Blakemore 1987, 
2002, Blass1990; Iten 1998 and Wilson & Sperber 1993).  
The chapter gives a theoretical evaluation of both approaches, discusses 
the points of differences and similarities between them and concludes by claiming 
that the relevance-based approach is a more reliable theoretical framework for 
studying discourse markers than the coherence-based one. 
Chapter 4 offers a relevance-theoretic procedural analysis of some 
linguistic expressions in Standard Arabic. The chapter starts by reviewing some 
literature written on discourse markers in Arabic, mainly by Al-Batal (1994) and 
Al-Khalil (2005). The first part of this chapter argues against Al-Khalil’s two 
claims that discourse markers in Arabic are only used in the non-standard form 
and that Conversation Analysis is the only framework that can account for the use 
of discourse markers in Arabic. 
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Regarding the first claim, this chapter argues that discourse markers can be 
used in both standard and non-standard from of Arabic due to the diglossic nature 
of this language. However, the discourse markers used in the standard form have 
different counterparts used in the non-standard form. For example, lakinna, 
bainama, lakin and bal which are used in Standard Arabic, cannot be used in 
Syrian Arabic, where bass is used instead. As for the second claim, the chapter 
argues that Relevance Theory provides a more appropriate and ideal account for 
analysing discourse markers in both Standard Arabic and Syrian Arabic.  
The second part of this chapter discusses the procedural meaning encoded 
by four discourse markers used in Standard Arabic namely lakinna, bainama, 
lakin and bal which are equivalent to but in English. The argument is that each 
one of these discourse markers stands for one of the four different 
implementations of the general procedure encoded by but in English, i.e. lakinna 
stands for  the denial but, bainama (= contrastive but), lakin (= cancellation but) 
and bal (= correction but). This leads to the claim that but in English encodes a 
general procedure that can be implemented to derive different meanings that can 
be represented by different lexical expressions in other languages as data from 
Standard Arabic show. 
The third and last part of this chapter investigates the procedural meaning 
encoded by one of the most interesting discourse markers in Standard Arabic, 
namely fa. This chapter claims that fa encodes a general procedure that can be 
implemented by the hearer/reader to derive different meanings: ‘sequentiality’, 
‘immediacy’, ‘non-intervention’ and ‘causality’. 
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Chapter 5 discusses the procedural meanings encoded by some discourse 
markers used in Syrian Arabic. The scope of discussion has been limited to five 
discourse markers: bass, la-heik, la-ha-sabab, ma‘nāto and bi-ittālī. The chapter 
argues that, like but in English, bass in Syrian Arabic encodes a general procedure 
that can be implemented to derive four different meanings: ‘denial of expectation’, 
‘contrast’, ‘correction’ and ‘cancellation’. These four different meanings are 
represented by four different lexical expressions in Standard Arabic. The chapter 
claims that bass can also encode conceptual meanings such as ‘enough’, ‘stop it’ 
and ‘only’. Given that, bass is listed under the conceptuo-procedural linguistic 
expressions discussed in chapter 2. 
As regards the other four discourse markers, this chapter argues that they 
are all equivalent to fa in Standard Arabic and so in English. The first two la-heik 
and la-ha-sabab are analysed as an implementation (causality) of the general 
procedure encoded by fa, while the second two ma‘nāt-o and bi-ittālī encode 
logical (inferential) consequence. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
1. Relevance Theory and Linguistic Communication  
1.1. Introduction 
Relevance Theory is a theory of communication grounded in psychology and 
cognition. The theory treats utterance interpretation as a cognitive process. 
According to relevance theorists, utterances are linguistically encoded inputs to 
inferential processes which affect the cognitive environment of the hearer. By the 
same token, utterances are verbal stimuli decoded by hearers to derive an 
assumption or set of assumptions treated as the representations of the actual world 
and/or thoughts (Sperber and Wilson 1995:2). 
The whole theory is based on what is called the ‘principle of relevance’ 
and the balance of the two notions of ‘contextual effect’ and ‘processing effort’. 
This will be discussed in more detail in section 1.3.6:  
 
Principle of relevance: 
Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its 
own optimal relevance. 
 
                                                                                 (Sperber and Wilson 1995:158) 
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By saying that a certain utterance is relevant, we mean that it achieves some 
contextual effect (Sperber and Wilson 1995:108). The strength or weakness of the 
contextual effect determines the degree of relevance an utterance has. Thus, 
utterances can be more relevant or less relevant depending on the contextual effect 
they achieve. According to the principle of relevance, when addressing someone, 
the speaker creates an expectation that her 2  utterance will achieve enough 
contextual effects to be worth processing on the one hand, and will not cause him 
any unnecessary processing effort on the other hand. This is known in Relevance 
Theory (RT henceforth) as ‘optimal relevance’ (Sperber and Wilson 1995:144). 
The hearer’s task, in this respect, is to assess what contextual effect could have 
been intended by the speaker. To put it differently, the hearer starts by making 
assumptions about the context under which the utterance is worth processing. 
Given this, relevance can be seen as a result of trade-off between contextual effect 
and processing effort, and the expectation of optimal relevance is seen as 
automatically created by utterances. 
RT has developed in several stages. It starts with Wilson and Sperber’s 
(1981) paper “On Grice’s theory of conversation”. In this paper, Wilson and 
Sperber acknowledge their debt to Grice’s theory of conversation and indicate that 
most recent theories of utterance interpretation are a direct result of Grice’s 
William James Lectures (Wilson and Sperber 1981:155). However, they identify 
three areas of dissatisfaction with this theory. Firstly, they argue that the 
distinction between saying and implicating is not as simple as Grice suggests. 
                                                 
2
 In this thesis, I refer to speaker as ‘she’ and hearer as ‘he’. 
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Grice’s maxims, they suggest, are not used only in deriving the implicature but 
also in deriving the proposition explicitly communicated by the utterance. This 
will be the focus of section 1.2.3. Secondly, there is more to the interpretation of 
‘metaphor’ and ‘irony’ than the mere knowledge of the maxims of conversation as 
Grice assumes. Thirdly, not all Grice’s conversational maxims are necessary for 
the derivation of implicatures. Sperber and Wilson argue that the maxims can be 
reduced into one general principle, the principle of relevance—a ‘principle’ rather 
than a ‘maxim’. More detail on this will be given in section 1.2.1. The full 
presentation of relevance theory has been published in ‘Relevance: 
Communication and Cognition’ (Sperber and Wilson 1986) and updated in 
(Sperber and Wilson 1995), (Sperber and Wilson 1998), (Wilson and Sperber 
2002), (Wilson and Sperber 2004), and (Carston 2002). 
This chapter is structured as follows: in section 1.2, I discuss Grice’s 
theory of conversation and show how this theory constitutes the main base of 
Sperber and Wilson’s RT. I also investigate some problems in Grice’s theory and 
highlight the points of disagreement between Grice and Sperber & Wilson on 
utterance interpretation. In section 1.3, I discuss the cognitive nature of RT, 
investigate its mechanisms and discuss some crucial ideas such as ‘ostension’, 
‘inference’, ‘context’ and ‘cognitive effect’. Section 1.4 investigates the role 
relevance plays in verbal communication. This section also tackles some problems 
in RT such as the explicature/implicature distinction and the idea of ‘development 
of logical form’. Section 1.5 is a conclusion.  
  
 
26 
1.2. Grice’s Theory of Conversation 
1.2.1. The Cooperative Principle and conversational maxims 
Grice’s theory of conversation aims to highlight the fact that there is no one-to-
one mapping between linguistic form and utterance meaning. This is clearly 
shown in Grice’s (1967) distinction between ‘saying’ and ‘implicating’ as we will 
see in section 1.2.2. In this concern, Grice analyses how speakers are able to 
deliver their implicit messages and how hearers are able to understand these 
messages. In order to explain this process, Grice (1967) introduces what he calls 
the Cooperative Principle and its four dependent conversational maxims:  
 
The Cooperative Principle: 
“Make your contribution such as required, at the stage at which it occurs, 
by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged.”                                              
 
The Maxims: 
Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required. 
                Do not make your contribution more informative than is 
                required. 
Quality:   Do not say what you believe to be false. 
                Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
 Relation: Be relevant 
 Manner:  Avoid obscurity of expression. 
      Avoid ambiguity. 
      Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
      Be orderly.     
                                                                           Grice (1967:45-46) 
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Grice (1967) assumes that there is an accepted way of verbal 
communication between speakers and hearers who look at it as ‘standard 
behaviour’. Accordingly, when we produce our utterances, we as hearers are 
entitled to assume that a speaker’s utterances express what she believes to be true, 
that they offer the right amount of information, no more no less; that they are 
relevant and that they are produced in clear and understandable way. If it is the 
case that a certain utterance does not on the surface conform to the way presented 
by Grice, this does not mean that the utterance is nonsense and that the speaker is 
not being cooperative or deceptive, but rather there is an implied meaning to be 
inferred by the hearer. This is known as ‘maxim flouting’ in Grice’s terms.  
It can be noted that Grice establishes a clear link between the Cooperative 
Principle (and the maxims) on the one hand and the derivation of conversational 
implicature on the other hand. He (1967) points out that sometimes the 
participants are unable to fulfil the maxims. The unfulfilment of the maxims can 
take different forms: the participant might violate a maxim, and in this case he 
might be liable to mislead. He might opt out from the Cooperative Principle and 
its maxims and show his unwillingness to be cooperative in the way the maxims 
require. He might face a clash; he might not be able to fulfil the first maxim of 
Quantity (be as informative as required) without violating the second maxim of 
Quality (have adequate evidence for what you say). Finally, the participant might 
flout a maxim. That is, he blatantly fails to fulfil the maxim. In this case, the 
hearer may feel that the speaker is being misleading and uncooperative on the 
assumption that she is not fulfilling some maxims just to avoid violating others. If 
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the hearer is aware of this minor problem, he will be able to understand that the 
speaker is not misleading but rather wanting him to derive some intended meaning 
of her utterance.  
What Grice argues here is that maxim flouting gives rise to cases of 
conversational implicature. Once the maxims are flouted in such a way, it is better 
to say that the maxims are exploited. To demonstrate the role conversational 
maxims and principle play in generating conversational implicature, see the 
following example: 
 
A:    When is he travelling? 
B:    Some time next week.     
 
In this dialogue, A is asking B about their mutual friend C who is planning to go 
back home for the Christmas vacation. Prima facie, B’s answer violates the first 
maxim of Quantity since it is less informative that what is required by A’s 
question. However, B’s answer should not be considered as opting out because the 
violation of this maxim can be explained by the fact that if B’s answer is more 
informative than it is, it will clash with the second maxim of Quality (don’t say 
what you lack adequate evidence for). So the implicature communicated by B’s 
utterance is:  
 
(1)       I don’t know exactly when he is travelling.  
 
Consider, by contrast, Grice’s (1967) example in which the maxim of Quantity is 
flouted. A teacher is writing a letter of reference to his student who is applying  
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for a philosophy job. The teacher’s letter reads as follows: 
 
(2)       Dear Sir, Mr. X’s command of English is excellent and his attendance at 
              tutorials has been regular.  
 
This letter seems to be less informative than what is required as reference for a job. 
However, it cannot be said that the teacher is opting out or being uncooperative. 
The teacher actually has more information about the student than what he wrote in 
the reference letter but he does not want to include any information that he is 
reluctant to write since the student is his own. Given that, the implicit message of 
the teacher’s letter is (3): 
 
(3)       The student is not good at philosophy.    
 
Wilson and Sperber (1981) argue against Grice’s claim that any case of 
conversational implicature is a direct result of flouting one or more of the 
conversational maxims. They maintain that there are cases in which the maxim is 
flouted without leading to a conversational implicature. Consider their example 
(1981:173): 
 
(4)       a. Mary ate peanut.   
            b. Mary put a peanut in her mouth, chewed and swallowed it. 
 
According to Grice’s sub-maxim of Manner (be brief), (4-a) is more appropriate 
than (4-b). If the speaker uses (4-b) rather than (4-a), then she violates the maxim 
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of brevity and thus the result should be a conversational implicature. But as can be 
noticed, there is nothing implicated by the speaker of (4-b). 
1.2.2. What is said vs. what is implicated  
In his pragmatic theory of conversation, Grice aims at providing a framework in 
which every aspect of utterance interpretation can be fitted. He draws a distinction 
between what is ‘actually said’ and what is ‘tacitly implicated’. According to 
Grice, ‘what is said’ is determined by semantics. What is meant by ‘semantics’ 
here is ‘linguistic semantics’ or the semantics of linguistic expressions, i.e. 
‘linguistically encoded meaning’, which is assumed to be truth-conditional. By 
contrast, ‘what is implicated’ is determined by pragmatic inference (social and 
contextual factors and conversational maxims). Implicature covers all aspects of 
meaning that are not linguistically encoded and thus not semantic. Let us take one 
of Grice’s examples and see how this distinction between ‘what is said’ and ‘what 
is implicated’ is drawn. Suppose that A asks B how C is getting in his job and B 
utters (5) as a reply to A’s question (Grice 1967): 
 
(5)       Oh, quite well, I think: he likes his colleagues, and has not been to prison 
            yet. 
 
According to Grice, what is said in (5) is determined by the conventional meaning 
of the words used in the utterance. As far as Grice’s theory of conversation is 
concerned, this is true in most cases. However, Grice (1967) refers to some cases 
in which the conventional meaning of the words used in the utterance takes part in 
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determining what is implicated rather than what is said. He labels  these cases as 
‘conventional implicatures’. This will be discussed in more detail in section 1.4.3.  
Now, on the assumption that the hearer of (5)  knows English and that he 
is not provided with any previous knowldege of the circumstances under which 
this sentence is uttered, he will be able to understand the following: some 
particular person X is expressing a certain thought about a particular person Y at 
the time of the utterance. The thought is that Y has good relations with the people 
he works with, and that Y has not yet been imprisoned. In fact, this is the literal 
meaning encoded by the linguistic expressions in (5). Grice argues that what is 
communicated is not just what is said (the literal meaing of words) but a mixture 
of what is said and what is implicated. Given the circumstances and the context 
under which (5) is uttered, the hearer will recgonise that the speaker’s 
communicative intention goes beyond the encoded message that there is some 
male person who has got good relations with his colleagues and that this person 
has not been to prison yet. He will recognise that the speaker is suggesting (or 
implying) that the person is dishonest. 
This aspect of what is meant by the speaker (the utterance meaning) is not 
linguistically encoded by the linguistic expressions used in the utterance. Or, to 
put it in Grice’s terms, what is communicated (in this case) is not a part of the 
conventional meaning of the words used in the utterance, but rather implicated 
(pragmmatically inferred). The derivation of implicature in Grice’s framework is 
related to a set of conversational maxims and the Cooperative Principle. Grice 
argues that, whenever one or more of the conversational maxims is exploited, it 
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will lead to an implicature3, as we will see in section 1.2.3 which focuses on the 
role conversational maxims play in generating conversational implicatures.  
As can be noticed, the Gricean distinction between ‘what is said’ and 
‘what is implicated’ appears to be simple and straightforward: what is 
(linguistically) semantically encoded is actually said and what is pragmatically 
derived is tacitly implicated. However relevance theorists argue that there are 
cases, and perhaps quite pervasively, where Grice’s distinction between ‘what is 
said’ and ‘what is implicated’ does not hold. These are the cases where ‘what is 
said’ (as understood by Grice) is not determined by the conventional meaning of 
the sentence but rather pragmatically determined as we will see in the next section.   
1.2.3. Explicit vs. implicit 
The Gricean distinction between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’ is 
mutually exclusive. On the one hand, Grice argues that any proposition actually 
expressed by an utterance is the outcome of decoding the linguistic expressions 
used in this utterance. This is assumed to construct the explicit side of the 
utterance interpretation. By contrast, he claims that any implicature 
communicated by the utterance would be considered pragmatically derived using 
the conversational maxims. This is assumed to construct the implicit side of the 
utterance interpretation. A general rule in Grice’s theory is that what is explicit is 
determined by linguistically encoded semantics and what is implicit is determined 
by pragmatics. Pragmatics, in Grice’s terms, is ‘post-semantic’. In other words, 
                                                 
3
 The term ‘implicature’ is used here to refer to ‘conversational implicature’. 
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implicature is not said but conveyed by the saying of what is said (so we need to 
have ‘what is said’ before we can get ‘what is implicated’). 
Wilson and Sperber (1981) disagree with Grice in his correlation of the 
explicit/implicit distinction with the distinction between ‘linguistically encoded’ 
and ‘pragmatically derived’. This correlation cannot account for cases where the 
proposition explicitly communicated is not determined by semantics but rather 
pragmatically inferred. Wilson and Sperber (1981) suggest that Grice’s correlation 
should be reviewed to take account of such cases, which they maintain are quite 
pervasive in communication.  
In some (perhaps many) cases, what is communicated by an utterance is 
not linguistically encoded but rather pragmatically derived. This is particularly the 
case of ‘disambiguation’ and ‘reference assignment’. Other cases are when 
conversational maxims such as ‘relation’ or ‘informativeness’ are observed. 
Consider Wilson and Sperber’s (1981:159) example: 
 
(6)       Refuse to admit them.   
 
The above utterance can have different interpretations in different contexts due to 
the ambiguity of the word ‘admit’ on the one hand, and the reference of the 
pronoun ‘them’ on the other. If (6) is uttered in a context where it is an answer to 
(7), then ‘admit’ would mean ‘confess’ and the exact referent to the pronoun 
‘them’ would be ‘mistakes’: 
 
(7)       What should I do when I make mistakes?   
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However, if it is uttered in a different context where it is an answer to (8), then 
‘admit’ would mean ‘let in’ and the exact referent to the pronoun ‘them’ would be 
‘people whose tickets have expired’. 
 
(8)       What should I do with people whose tickets have expired?   
 
In this case, the two different interpretations of (6) are (9) and (10): 
 
(9)       Refuse to confess your mistakes.  
(10)     Refuse to let people in.  
 
As can be noticed, there are three factors that play a role in the interpretation of 
(6). Firstly, Grice’s maxim of ‘relation’, i.e. the utterance of (6) can have two 
different interpretations in relation to two different contexts. Secondly, 
‘disambiguation’: (6) can have two different interpretations depending on the two 
different meanings of the word ‘admit’. Thirdly, ‘reference assignment’: (6) can 
have two different interpretations due to the fact that two different referents can be 
assigned to the pronoun ‘them’. The second and third factors were first referred to 
by Grice (1967:25).  
If Grice’s account of the explicit/implicit distinction is true, then the 
different meanings of (6) represented by (9) and (10) should be implicatures 
simply because pragmatics is involved in deriving them, in the sense that the 
maxim of relation, disambiguation and reference assignment play a role in 
constructing these two meanings. However, (9) and (10) are not implicatures of (6) 
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but rather are explicitly communicated by (6). For RT, in other words, they 
contribute to the ‘explicature’.  
Consider another example in which, in addition to ‘disambiguation’ and 
‘reference assignment’, the maxim of ‘informativeness’ is involved in deriving 
what is explicitly communicated: 
 
(11)       He plays well.   
 
After disambiguating ‘play’ and assigning reference to the pronoun ‘he’ (which 
refers to John rather than Mike or Peter), what is explicitly communicated by the 
utterance of (11) could be the following: 
 
(12)       John plays football well.  
 
Now, if Grice’s claim that what is explicitly communicated by a certain utterance 
is only determined by semantic decoding then what is proposed by (11) should be 
(13):  
 
(13)       Some human male person plays something well.  
 
But since (12) entails (13), i.e. whenever (12) is true, (13) is true and given the 
fact that (12) is more informative than (13), then (12) would be what is explicitly 
communicated by (11) and not (13). 
This undermines Grice’s claim that any proposition explicitly 
communicated by a certain utterance should be semantically decodable because 
some aspects of what is explicitly communicated are pragmatically determined, as 
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we have seen in (11) where the maxim of informativeness has been exploited to 
determine the proposition explicitly communicated.  
In fact, this is an attempt by Wilson and Sperber (1981) to criticise Grice’s 
said/implicated distinction which was considered as a central axis in the theory of 
pragmatics for quite few years. In short, they seek to point out (contra Grice) that 
what is ‘explicitly communicated’ cannot be equated with what is ‘linguistically 
encoded’.  
1.3. Relevance and cognition 
1.3.1. Relevance: communication, ostension and inference  
Sperber and Wilson (1995:23) point out that there are two different methods of 
conveying information: a) by giving direct evidence of the information to be 
conveyed; b) by giving direct evidence of the communicator’s intention to convey 
the information. As far as the notion of communication is concerned, Sperber and 
Wilson do not consider the first way of conveying information as a form of 
communication because according to them, any state of affairs provides direct 
evidence for a certain assumption without communicating this assumption. They 
also argue that this method is only used with information for which direct 
evidence can be provided. What counts as a form of communication, for RT, is 
the second method because it involves the communicator’s intention on the one 
hand and the audience’s recognition of this intention on the other hand. This 
method can be used for any information whatsoever, as long as direct evidence of 
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the communicator’s intention can be given. Sperber and Wilson call this method 
‘inferential communication’ or ‘ostensive-inferential communication’. 
Now consider the two following scenarios to demonstrate the difference 
between the two methods of conveying information: 
 
(i) First method: John and Clare are sitting in a restaurant and having a 
chat before the waiter serves their lunch. Clare wants to inform John that 
she has cut her hand. She can simply do that by raising her bandaged hand 
to be seen by John. By that, she is providing him with direct evidence that 
she has cut her hand. In this case, Clare’s intention is fulfilled whether or 
not John is aware of it. He is able to realise that Clare has cut her hand 
without realising that she intends him to realise that she has done so. 
 
(ii) Second method: John and Clare have just finished their syntax class. 
John would like to have some recreation. He asks Clare for a tennis game 
in the university sport centre. Clare raises her bandaged hand to show that 
she has cut her hand. By raising her bandaged hand, Clare is providing 
direct evidence of her intention that she will be unable to go with John to 
the tennis game because she has cut her hand. John will recognise Clare’s 
intention and infer that she will not be able to go for this tennis game. 
Clare’s behaviour, in this case, is ostensive behaviour or simply ostension.     
  
As can be noticed, the second method describes the process of communication in 
terms of intention and inference. The intention is represented by the ostensive 
behaviour the communicator provides the audience4 with, while the inference is 
the set of routes the audience follows to recognise the meaning (or the implication) 
of the communicator’s ostension. To find out how this process of communication 
                                                 
4
 For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to communicator and audience as speaker and hearer. 
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is achieved and how relevance plays a major role in it, let us consider the 
following scenario given by (Sperber and Wilson 1995:48): Mary and Peter are 
sitting on a park bench. Peter leans back deliberately to show Mary something. By 
this movement, Peter tries to modify Mary’s cognitive environment through 
making an assumption manifest to her. Mary pays attention to Peter’s deliberate 
movement because individuals usually pay attention to assumptions and 
phenomena which are relevant to them. She is aware that Peter’s action is to draw 
her attention to new important and worth processing information that can change 
her expectation of the world. 
Sperber and Wilson (1995) point out that human beings are very complex 
information-processing devices and that human cognition always aims to improve 
the individual’s knowledge of the world by adding new information which is more 
accurate and easily retrievable and capable of changing the cognitive environment 
of the individual. They look at relevance as the single property that makes 
information worth processing for human beings. As far as the idea of relevance is 
concerned, they identify three types of information: 
 
Some information is old: it is already presented in the individual’s 
representation of the world. Unless it is needed for the performance 
of a particular cognitive task, and easier to access from the 
environment than from memory, such information is not worth 
processing at all. Other information is not only new but entirely 
unconnected with any thing in the individual’s representation of 
the world. It can only be added to this representation as isolated 
bits and pieces, and this usually means too much processing cost 
for too little benefit. Still other information is new but connected 
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with old information. When these interconnected new and old 
items of information are used together as premises in an inference 
process, further new information can be derived: information 
which could not have been inferred without this combination of old 
and new premises. When the processing of new information gives 
rise to such a multiplication effect, we call it relevant. The greater 
the multiplication effect, the greater the relevance. 
 
                                                                        (Sperber and Wilson 1995:48) 
 
Suppose that as a result of Peter’s leaning back, Mary can see the following: an 
ice cream vendor, an ordinary stroller and her acquaintance William. These three 
objects among others are more or less manifest to Mary. 
As far as Sperber and Wilson’s classification of information is concerned, 
the ice cream vendor is old information because she has already noticed him when 
she entered the park. This does not affect her cognitive environment at all. The 
stroller is new information because she has not seen him before but this does not 
change her views of the world too since this is unconnected to any old information 
in her cognitive environment. The arrival of William is the new information that 
affects Mary’s cognitive environment because it is connected to some old 
information that this person is very silly and boring. This would count as the most 
relevant information to Mary among the three and thus it is worth processing. 
Mary does not consider processing the other two pieces of information because 
they do not seem relevant enough to her. 
Sperber and Wilson argue that it is the guarantee of relevance that makes it 
possible for Mary to infer that Peter’s behaviour is ostensive, i.e. the assumption 
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has been intentionally made manifest by him. The inference process might go as 
follows: Mary notices Peter’s behaviour and recognises that this behaviour has 
been made deliberately to draw her attention to some new information relevant to 
her in one way or another. She looks at the area that has become visible as a result 
of Peter’s leaning back and sees the ice vendor, the stroller and the dreadful 
William. She ignores the ice vendor and the stroller because no assumptions can 
follow from them and concentrates on William’s arrival through which she can 
draw many conclusions. Given this, Mary becomes confident that Peter’s 
intention was to draw her attention to William’s arrival which she considers the 
most relevant information that is worth her attention.   
In this section, I have presented a short analysis of the cognitive nature of 
RT and concentrated on certain notions such as information processing, ostension 
and inference. The next section discusses the difference between informative 
intention and cognitive intention in RT.     
1.3.2. Informative and communicative intention   
Sperber and Wilson (1995:54) emphasise that any account of communication is 
based on two questions: ‘what is communicated?’ and ‘how is communication 
achieved?’. A generally accepted answer to the first question is that meaning is 
what is communicated. Though there has been some disagreement on a unified 
definition of meaning. 
Sperber and Wilson (1995) argue that limiting communication in general 
to linguistic communication can lead to some distortions and misperceptions. 
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Suppose that Clare visits John on a cold winter day, she knocks at the door and 
John lets her in and asks her to have a seat in the living room opposite to an open 
window. While they are having a chat, Clare starts to tremble ostensively. John 
recognises that Clare’s behaviour is ostensive, i.e. Clare wants to make some 
assumptions manifest to him or draw his attention to some relevant information. 
John looks around and sees that the window is open. In this scenario, a part of 
what is communicated by Clare’s non-linguistic behaviour could be linguistically, 
explicitly expressed simply by uttering the following ‘It is cold over here. Could 
you please close the window?’ In other words, Clare can achieve the same 
communicative intention by putting it into words. 
As can be noticed in the above situation, what is non-verbally 
communicated can be communicated by linguistic means through paraphrasing 
the situation and putting it into words, but this does not seem to be always the 
case. Imagine that after Clare’s behaviour, John closes the window, serves Clare a 
cup of tea and goes on chatting. Clare recalls her last birthday and sighs in an 
ostensive way intending to draw John’s attention to some events related to her 
past birthday. John is aware of this ostension and recognises that it carries some 
relevant information to him. It reminds him of some miserable events associated 
with Clare’s last birthday such as that she failed her syntax exam, her dad died, 
John had a car accident and had his left hand broken, etc. All these memories, in 
addition to others, are raised by Clare’s sigh. Unlike the previous case, Clare’s 
communicative intention could not be paraphrased in one single explicitly 
expressed linguistic utterance. 
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The distortions and misperceptions resulted in limiting communication to 
what is linguistically explicitly expressed is also felt at the level of verbal 
communication. Pragmatists argue that what is communicated by a linguistic 
utterance is a set of assumptions (speaker’s meaning). One of these assumptions is 
explicitly expressed, i.e. the content of this assumption is linguistically decoded. 
The other assumptions are implicitly conveyed through pragmatic inference. 
Consider the following example: 
 
(14)       John: Are you free this evening? 
             Clare: My syntax exam is tomorrow. 
 
Clare’s explicit assumption is that she has a syntax exam on the following day and 
this can be decoded through the linguistic expressions of her utterance. However, 
this is not all that is communicated by the utterance. There are assumptions which 
are pragmatically inferred such as ‘Clare will not go out with John’, ‘she will 
study very hard to pass the exam’, and ‘she will be under pressure and might not 
see John again until she has taken the exam’. 
What Sperber and Wilson seek to demonstrate is that the informative 
intention is not limited to what is linguistically expressed; it could be a thought, 
attitude, feeling or even an impression. Whatever it is, the main function of the 
speakers’ informative intention is to modify the hearer’s cognitive environment: 
 
Informative intention: to make manifest or more manifest to the audience 
as set of assumptions I.           
                                                                                   (Sperber and Wilson 1995:58) 
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For example, in (14) Clare’s informative intention in uttering ‘my syntax exam is 
tomorrow’ could be described in the following lines: Clare intends to make 
manifest to John the assumption that she has a syntax exam on the following day 
in addition to any further assumption that is required to make this utterance 
relevant to John such as those implicitly conveyed by (14). 
The second question Sperber and Wilson aim to reply is ‘how is 
communication achieved?’. To answer this question, Sperber and Wilson 
introduce their notion of communicative intention. They argue that, for 
communication to be successful, the speaker’s informative intention should be 
recognised by the hearer. Once it is recognised, the speaker’s communicative 
intention is fulfilled and the communication is achieved: 
 
Communicative intention: to inform the audience of one’s informative 
intention. 
                                                                                   (Sperber and Wilson 1995:29) 
  
In normal situations, the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s informative 
intention will lead to the fulfilment of the communicative intention as is the case 
in (14): Clare intends to inform John that she has a syntax exam and once John 
recognises this intention, he will go through some inferences, relate it to his 
question and come up with the assumption that Clare will not be able to go with 
him. However, in some situations, the communicative intention can be fulfilled 
without the fulfilment of the informative intention. Suppose that Clare, who is not 
that good at math, wants John to help her in some problems of her math 
homework. She does not want to ask him openly to do that for her. Instead, she 
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brings her math book and starts scratching her head. At this stage, she does not 
expect him to come and help her, since she has not asked him directly to do that. 
But if he comes and offers his help, then Clare’s communicative intention will be 
achieved without Johns’ recognition of her original informative intention.5 
In fact, this type of communication is not considered as true by Strawson 
(1964) and Schiffer (1972) who argue that the speaker’s communicative intention 
should be wholly overt. Schiffer points out that the communicative intention can 
be made overt by the notion of mutual knowledge, i.e. being mutually manifest to 
the speaker and hearer. What we have in the above situation is that Clare intends 
to inform John that she needs help without even asking for that, thus her intention 
is not made manifest to John. Given that, Sperber and Wilson found it necessary 
to reformulate their notion of communicative intention:   
 
Communicative intention: to make mutually manifest to audience and 
communicator that the communicator has this informative intention. 
 
                                                                                   (Sperber and Wilson 1995:61) 
1.3.3. The principle of relevance  
The ostensive-inferential communication does not explain how ostension works, 
i.e. how the ostensive stimulus makes the speaker’s informative intention manifest 
or more manifest to the hearer. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 155) suggest that the 
best way to explain ostension is through the principle of relevance and this will be 
the focus of this section. 
                                                 
5
 Burton-Roberts (PC) disagrees with Sperber and Wilson in this regard. He pointed out to me that 
Clare, in this case, has an informative intention and NOT a communicative one. However, she 
does not want John to recognise this informative intention.  
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An act of ostensive communication will not achieve its effect without 
attracting the hearer’s attention. Thus, the speaker’s ostensive stimulus can be 
seen as a request for the hearer’s attention. If the speaker requests the hearer to 
behave in a certain way, then she has good reasons to think that it would be in the 
hearer’s interest as well as hers to comply with the request. Ostensive 
communication requires the involvement of the hearer in the form of ‘appropriate 
cognitive behaviour’ (attention), as Sperber and Wilson (1995) put it. For instance, 
if Clare wants to request John’s attention by pointing to something, lifting up 
something or even talking about something, then John is entitled to think that the 
stimulus Clare is trying to draw his attention to is relevant to him or at least he has 
the reasons to think that it is. 
Sperber and Wilson (1995) argue that an ostensive stimulus comes with 
precise expectations of relevance. Thus, it would not achieve its effect if the 
hearer does not pay attention to it. It is known that human beings pay attention to 
phenomena that are relevant to them. Given that, the speaker, when producing her 
stimulus, must intend to make it manifest to the hearer and herself that the 
stimulus is relevant to the hearer. The speaker’s intention to make mutually 
manifest that the ostensive stimulus is relevant to the hearer constitutes the basis 
of the principle of relevance:  
 
An act of ostensive communication automatically communicates a 
presumption of relevance.                                                                 
                                                                                 (Sperber and Wilson 1995:156)   
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The overall conclusion that can be drawn from our discussion so far is that 
the presumption of relevance communicated by the act of ostensive 
communication means that the ostensive stimulus should be relevant enough to be 
worth the hearer’s attention. However, the presumption of relevance is more 
specific than that. The relevance of a stimulus is determined by two factors: the 
effort needed to process the stimulus optimally and the cognitive effect achieved 
by the optimal processing (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 156). On this basis, to 
achieve the optimal relevance of a stimulus, the presumption of relevance should 
never be less than what is required to make the stimulus worth processing and 
never be more than it is needed to achieve the cognitive effect. If the balance is 
not kept between these two lines, the relevance of the stimulus will be affected as 
we will see in section 1.3.6. 
In ostensive-inferential communication, the speaker intends to 
communicate a set of assumptions to the hearer. It is the hearer’s interest to 
assume that the set of assumptions communicated by the speaker is the most 
relevant information available to the speaker when producing the ostensive 
stimulus. This set of assumptions creates cognitive effect in the sense that it 
modifies the cognitive environment of the hearer and thus is it is worth processing. 
However, to achieve her communicative intention, the speaker has to choose one 
of several possible stimuli to make her informative intention manifest to the 
hearer. She has to drop out any stimulus that requires more processing effort on 
the part of the hearer. If these issues, related to effect and effort, are made 
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mutually manifest to the speaker and hearer, then it could be said that, we have a 
presumption of optimal relevance:  
 
Presumption of optimal relevance 
(a) The set of assumptions I which the communicator intends to make 
      manifest to the addressee is relevant enough to make it worth the 
      addressee’s while to process the ostensive stimulus.  
 
(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the communicator 
      could have used to communicate I.          
                           
                                                           (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 158) 
 
And on the basis of this presumption of optimal relevance, Sperber and Wilson 
redefine their principle of relevance: 
 
Principle of relevance 
Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its 
own optimal relevance 
                                                     
                                                                    (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 158) 
 
Before we move to the next section, let us review some of Sperber and 
Wilson’s comments on the principle of relevance. They argue that this principle is 
not suitable for all types of communication. It can only be used to account for 
ostensive communication6. It can never account for straightforward encoded types 
                                                 
6
 Burton-Roberts (PC) disagrees with Sperber and Wilson in defining ‘communicative’ as 
‘ostensive’. He allows that non-ostensive stimuli, such as indexical signs, can be communicative. 
For examples ‘black clouds’, though not ostensive’ communicate that ‘it is going to rain’ 
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of communication in which the communicator communicates through encoding 
direct messages rather than producing relevant information. 
They also argue that the principle of relevance does not necessarily 
guarantee that the communicator always produces optimally relevant stimuli. It 
only claims that they intend to make the addressees believe that they do that. 
Given that, the presumption of relevance communicated by an utterance does not 
have to be accepted as true. There are cases in which the communicator fails to 
achieve optimal relevance. In such cases, it could be said that the presumption of 
relevance has been only attempted by the communicator. A communicator who 
fails to make manifest to her audience that she is being optimally relevant may 
succeed in making it manifest to her audience that she is attempting to be 
optimally relevant. However, in ostensive communication, the presumption of 
relevance should not only be attempted but rather achieved by making manifest to 
the addressee that the communicator is trying her best to make her stimulus 
relevant enough to her audience. 
It does not follow from the principle of relevance that all the types of 
ostensive communication should necessarily be at the level of optimal relevance. 
There are situations in which, a communicator can communicate her assumption 
in a bad faith. What follows from the principle of relevance is that if the 
satisfactory level of relevance is not achieved, then it is the assumption that the 
communicator has tried to be optimally relevant. 
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1.3.4. The notion of context 
Sperber and Wilson (1995:131) define context as the subset of the individual’s old 
assumptions combine with new assumptions to yield a variety of contextual 
effects. But the issue for them was whether context is chosen or given. In this 
regard, they assume that much of the literature assumes that the context for the 
comprehension of a given utterance is not a matter of choice but rather determined 
or given before the process of comprehension starts or at an early stage of it. They 
claim that the assumptions explicitly expressed by an utterance combine with the 
hearer’s old assumptions at the start of the utterance comprehension. This, in fact, 
leads to Sperber and Wilson’s first hypothesis about the notion of context in RT:  
 
The context for the comprehension of a given utterance is the set of 
assumptions explicitly expressed by the preceding utterance in the same 
dialogue or discourse. 
 
                                                                    (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 133) 
    
This could be demonstrated in the following dialogue: 
 
(15)       a. Clare: I have an appointment with the dentist. 
              b. John: If you have an appointment with the dentist, I will do the 
                  housework in your absence.  
 
It can be clearly noted that John’s utterance in the above dialogue is intuitively 
relevant. Given the context in which Clare’s assumption is explicitly expressed, 
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John’s answer in (15) implies that he is willing to do the housework in Clare’s 
absence. 
Let us now consider the second dialogue which is a modified version of (15): 
  
(16)       a. Clare: I have an appointment with the dentist. 
              b. John: I will do the housework in your absence. 
 
It seems that there is a slight difference between John’s response in the first 
dialogue and his response in current one. However, they are roughly relevant in 
the same way though the second is more optimally relevant. Now, if Sperber and 
Wilson’s first hypothesis about context is right, i.e. the context for the 
comprehension of an utterance is only the assumptions explicitly expressed by the 
speaker in the preceding utterance, then John’s two answers must be treated 
differently. In other words, John’s answer in (16b), unlike his answer in (15b), 
does not carry any contextual effect whatsoever and for this very reason, it should 
be irrelevant while in fact it is. This made Sperber and Wilson review their first 
hypothesis of context and come up with a modified one: the context for the 
comprehension of a certain utterance contains not only all assumptions explicitly 
expressed by the speaker in the preceding utterance, but also all implicatures 
associated with this utterance. Given the second modified version of the first 
hypothesis of context, it can be seen that Clare’s assumption in (16) would be 
relevant because it can implicate something like (17): 
 
(17)       Clare wishes John to do the housework in her absence. 
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Eventually, both (16a) and (16b) would be relevant in the above dialogue which 
contextually implies (18): 
 
(18)       John does what Clare wishes him to do.  
 
Consider now a third dialogue which is a modified version of the second one: 
 
(19)       a. Clare: I have an appointment with the dentist. 
              b. John: The washing is in the drier, the bedroom is tidy and the dinner is   
                  cooked. I will look after the kids. 
               
Roughly speaking, John’s answer in this dialogue is almost relevant in the same 
way as his answers in the first two dialogues (15b) and (16b). However, the 
relevance of John’s answer in (19b) is not accounted for by the first and second 
hypotheses. (19b) could not have any contextual effect whatsoever in a context of 
either the assumption explicitly expressed in the preceding utterance or the 
assumption expressed via any of the implicatures associated with the preceding 
discourse. (19b) can only be relevant if the following premise has been introduced: 
 
(20)      Doing the housework involves (among other things) tidying up the 
             bedrooms, doing the washing, cooking and looking after the kids. 
 
With this premise added to the context, the following contextual implication could 
be derived: 
 
(21)       John will do the housework in Clare’s absence. 
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This, in fact, has led Sperber and Wilson to apply another modification on their 
notion of context to come with a third version of their original hypothesis. In this 
version, they assume that the context needed for the comprehension of an 
utterance is not only the assumptions explicitly expressed or implicated by the 
preceding utterance but also the encyclopaedic entries attached to every concept 
of these assumptions. After several modifications on the notion of context, 
Sperber and Wilson eventually settle on the final version:  
 
The context for the comprehension of an utterance consists of the 
assumptions expressed and implicated by preceding utterances, 
plus the encyclopaedic entries attached to any concepts used in 
these assumptions and in the utterance itself, plus the 
encyclopaedic entries attached to any concepts used in the 
assumptions contained in the encyclopaedic entries already added 
to the context. 
 
                                                   (Sperber and Wilson 1995:136) 
 
What has been presented so far is evidence that the context for the 
comprehension of an utterance is determined as given either before the process of 
comprehension gets started or at early stages of it. Let us now consider the other 
claim that the context is chosen. Sperber and Wilson (1982:76) argue that the 
context for the comprehension of an utterance is not given but rather chosen by 
the hearer during the process of comprehension. In other words, the pre-existing 
context is not a prerequisite for information processing but rather an outcome of 
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communication. This is an argument against the original hypotheses about context 
being given.  
In much of the pragmatics literature, it is assumed that context is given 
independently of the utterance, comprehension takes place and then relevance is 
established. However, from a psychological point of view, this does not seem to 
be a reasonable model of comprehension. When communicating, people are not 
interested in establishing the relevance of new information, but rather obtaining as 
many contextual effects as possible for the least processing effort. Thus, the goal 
of comprehension is not the establishment of relevance but maximising the 
relevance of the information being processed. Given that, the order of priorities in 
the process of comprehension must be changed. Relevance should come first, then 
context simply because people hope that the assumption being processed is 
relevant then they go and search for suitable context that maximises the relevance 
of that assumption. 
It seems to me that Sperber and Wilson try to strike a balance between the 
two different hypotheses of context. When the context is determined as given, this 
means that we have the initial context being immediately used before or at the 
start of the comprehension process. This initial context undertakes some 
modifications or more precisely some extensions. According to Sperber and 
Wilson, context can be extended either cognitively7 by going back in time and 
adding some assumptions derived in the previous deductive process or 
environmentally by adding some assumptions and encyclopaedic entries and 
                                                 
7
 In this sense, context is ‘cognitive environment’ (set of assumptions. Given that, ‘contextual 
effect’ = ‘cognitive effect’).  
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information taken from the physical environment. Such extensions demonstrate 
that context is partly chosen. And the choice of the appropriate context out of the 
range of initial and extended contexts is motivated by the search for relevance. 
The next section will be discussing the notion of relevance to an individual and 
relevance of phenomena. 
1.3.5. Relevance to an individual and relevance of phenomena 
In the previous section, the notion of relevance in a context has been discussed. It 
has been concluded that the context for processing an item of information is partly 
given and partly chosen. What is given is actually the initial minimal context, 
whereas what is chosen can be any accessible context resulted from the extension 
of the main initial context. The section was concluded by highlighting the fact that 
the choice of any accessible context is motivated by the search for relevance. In 
this section, the notion of relevance will be discussed, but this time, in relation to 
an individual and phenomenon. Let us start with ‘relevance to an individual’. 
1.3.5.1. Relevance to an individual 
During the deduction process, an individual is faced with a particular set of 
accessible contexts ordered according to an inclusion relation, i.e. each context, 
apart from the initial context includes one or more smaller contexts, and each 
context, apart from the maximal context is included in a larger context. Sperber 
and Wilson (1995: 142) claim that this inclusion order of contexts corresponds 
psychologically to what they call the ‘order of context accessibility’. That is to say, 
the context that includes only the initial (minimal context) as a sub-part is 
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immediately given and thus it is the most accessible context, where as the context 
which includes the initial context in addition to one or more extensions of this 
context as a sub-part is not immediately given but rather generated through the 
extension of the initial context and thus, it is the next most accessible context. If 
one step is needed to access the first type of context, then, two steps are required 
to access the second. It is known in RT that a certain amount of effort is required 
for processing an item of information in a given context. However, effort is 
needed not just for information processing but also for accessing context. Thus, 
the less accessible the context the greater the effort needed in accessing such 
context and vice versa. 
To demonstrate the relevance of a certain assumption to an individual in a 
given context, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 143) present the following six cases:  
 
(i) An assumption is irrelevant to an individual in all accessible contexts if 
that assumption is already contained in the initial context. It will be useless 
to search for relevance beyond the initial context. 
 
(ii) An assumption is irrelevant to an individual in all accessible contexts if 
that assumption is not contained or has no contextual effects in these 
contexts. In this case, there will be no point in extending the initial context 
for searching for relevance. 
 
(iii) An assumption is relevant to an individual in initial and accessible 
contexts if that assumption is already contained in the initial and the 
accessible contexts. The search for relevance in this case is justified by the 
extension of the initial context for the sake of getting more contextual 
effect for less processing effort. 
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(iv) An assumption is relevant to an individual in all accessible contexts if 
it is not already contained in any of these contexts but has some contextual 
implications in the initial context. Here, the justification for context 
extension is getting more contextual effect. 
(v) An assumption is relevant to an individual in some accessible contexts 
if the assumption is contained in none of these contexts and it has no 
contextual effect in the initial context, but has some contextual effect in 
the extensions of the initial context. No relevance will be achieved if the 
initial context is not extended. The extension of the initial context in this 
case is similar to the extension of initial contexts in the case (iii) and (iv). 
 
(vi) An assumption is relevant to an individual if it is not contained in the 
initial context but rather in the maximal context. The assumption has no 
contextual effects in the context in which it is not contained in. In this case, 
the relevance will be considered as of reminder, the main function of 
which, as Sperber and Wilson claim, is to make the information accessible 
for less processing effort than extending the context.  
 
On the basis of these six cases of relevance of a certain assumption to an 
individual in a given context, Sperber and Wilson provide their classificatory 
definition of relevance to an individual. 
 
Relevance to an individual (classificatory) 
An assumption is relevant to an individual at given time if and only if it is 
relevant in one or more of the contexts accessible to that individual at that 
time.  
 
                                                                           (Sperber and Wilson 1986.95: 144) 
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It does seem that Sperber and Wilson are not only interested in a 
classificatory definition of relevance to an individual but in a comparative one as 
well. Their comparative definition of relevance to an individual is based on the 
‘effect’ and ‘effort’ involved when searching for the relevance of an assumption. 
On the effort side, what is considered when processing a certain assumption in a 
given context is not only the effort needed for processing this assumption, but also 
the effort involved to access the context. On the effect side, processing a certain 
assumption in a given context yields contextual effect that changes the cognitive 
environment of an individual and thereby, relevance is achieved. The degree of 
relevance is measured against the amount of effort required and contextual effect 
yielded through the whole process. If a balance is kept between ‘effect’ and 
‘effort’ in the deductive process, then the assumption has been optimally 
processed. This results in achieving the maximal relevance. Sperber and Wilson 
put that as follows: 
 
Relevance to an individual (comparative) 
Extent condition 1: an assumption is relevant to an individual to the extent 
that the contextual effects achieved when it is optimally processed are 
large. 
 
Extent condition 2: an assumption is relevant to an individual to the extent 
the effort required to process it optimally is small.  
 
                                                                                (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 145) 
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1.3.5.2. Relevance of phenomena 
In RT, phenomena affect the cognitive environment of an individual by making 
some assumptions manifest or more manifest to this individual at a given time. A 
certain phenomenon, whether it is an acoustic, auditory input, verbal stimulus, or 
even bare silence can make manifest to an individual a large number of 
assumptions at a given time. However, the individual is not going to construct (or 
pay attention to) all these assumptions altogether. 
Let us take Sperber and Wilson’s (1995:151) example for demonstration. 
The house has its own usual smells which we do not pay attention to in our 
normal life. But when a distinct smell such as the smell of gas is felt, assumptions 
such as (22) and (23) will be certainly made: 
 
(22)       There is a smell of gas.  
(23)       There is a gas leak somewhere in the house.  
 
However, an assumption such as (24) is less likely to be made in this situation: 
 
(24)       The gas company is not on strike.  
 
It can be noticed that the assumption in (23) is a contextual implication of the 
assumption expressed in (22) in a context that contains the encyclopaedic entries 
of the household users of gas. The assumption in (23) is constructed as an attempt 
to maximise the relevance of (22) by yielding some contextual effects in this 
given context. Now, since processing the assumption expressed in (22) is 
governed by the search for relevance, an assumption such as (24) is less likely to 
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occur simply because the effort needed for processing this assumption will 
outcome the contextual effect it yields. 
The question that arises now is: why do we, as individuals, pay attention to 
some assumptions and not to others? A simple answer to this question can be the 
following: if an assumption can make a change in the individual’s cognitive 
environment, then it is worth our attention. If it does not, then it is not. Take for 
example the auditory perception; it functions as a filtering system that allows 
certain items of acoustic information to reach to the level of attention where they 
become conceptual representations that undertake some central thought processes. 
Some other acoustic information is kept at the sub-attentive level for the reason 
that they do not give rise to any assumption of relevance at the conceptual level. 
Again, as individuals, we are exposed to different types of noise in our normal life. 
At a household level, parents do not pay attention to the noise coming from the 
TV, the washing-machine or the water pipes. However, they will be preoccupied 
with any particular crying coming form their little baby since this does affect their 
cognitive environment and maximises their cognitive efficiency. 
This leads us to say that a certain phenomenon can be more or less 
efficiently processed depending on whether the assumption (or set of assumptions) 
it makes can be actually constructed. For some phenomena, the assumption can be 
filtered out at the conceptual level. For others, they have to be presented 
conceptually and processed in a rich encyclopaedic context. Given that, the 
relevance of a phenomenon is: 
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Relevance of a phenomenon (classificatory) 
A phenomenon is relevant to an individual if and only if one or more of 
the assumptions it makes manifest is relevant to him. 
 
                                                                                  (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 152) 
 
Similar to what we have in the definition of relevance to an individual, Sperber 
and Wilson pay more attention to the comparative definition of relevance of a 
phenomenon than the classificatory one. Not only the effort needed to access the 
context and process the assumption within this context should be taken into 
account, but also the effort required for the construction of the assumption being 
processed. By the same criterion, the less effort required for constructing an 
assumption the more contextual effect this assumption yields and vice versa. By 
this, Sperber and Wilson construct their comparative definition of relevance of 
phenomena: 
 
Relevance of a phenomenon (comparative) 
Extent condition 1: a phenomenon is relevant to an individual to the extent 
that the contextual effects achieved when it is optimally processed are 
large. 
 
Extent condition 2: a phenomenon is relevant to an individual to the extent 
that the effort required to process it optimally is small. 
                                                               
                                                                           (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 153) 
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As can be noticed, the comparative definition of relevance to an individual and 
relevance of phenomena are based on the notion of balance between contextual 
effect and processing effort which will be the focus of the next section.  
1.3.6. Cognitive effects and degrees of relevance 
According to Sperber and Wilson (1995: 123), relevance is a matter of degree. It 
is not only the fact that some phenomena are relevant and some are not, but also 
how more or less some phenomena are relevant to an individual. The concept of 
relevance is compared by Sperber and Wilson to the concepts productivity and 
yield in a commercial company, which are based on the cost-benefit analysis. A 
certain commercial company is considered to be productive if it has an output 
value, no matter how small it is. However the output value is not the only factor 
that determines the degree of productivity in a certain commercial company. 
Another factor, to be taken into consideration, is the input—the production cost 
needed to produce the output. Thus, if two commercial companies have the same 
output value this does not mean that they are productive in the same degree. The 
production cost each company needs affects the degree of productivity. In this 
case, the commercial company which is more productive will be the one that has 
less production cost. By the same token, a certain assumption with some cognitive 
effect, no matter how small they are, would be considered relevant. If two 
assumptions have the same amount of cognitive effect, then input cost for yielding 
this cognitive effect will be taken into consideration to assess the degree of 
relevance this assumption achieves. The input cost in relevance theory is 
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represented by the mental processing effort required to achieve the cognitive 
effect. In this case, the assumption that requires less processing effort for 
achieving the cognitive effects would be the more relevant and vice versa. 
Consider Sperber and Wilson’s comparative notion of relevance: 
 
Relevance 
Extent condition 1: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that 
its contextual effects in this context are large. 
 
Extent condition 2: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that 
effort required to process it in this context is small.  
 
                                                                                (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 125) 
 
Before giving an example to demonstrate the relativity of relevance, let us 
spend some lines explaining the notion of cognitive effect. The notion of 
relevance is mainly based on the cognitive effect that a processed assumption 
yields in order to change the cognitive environment of the individual. Sperber and 
Wilson (1995: 132) suggest that “the context used to process a new assumption is, 
essentially, a subset of individual’s old assumption with which the new 
assumptions combine to yield a variety of contextual effects”. Since human 
cognitive system is geared towards the maximization of relevance, as Sperber and 
Wilson propose, human beings will undertake a process of maximal improvement 
to their old assumptions (representation of the world) through integrating new 
assumptions. Sperber and Wilson (1995) propose that there are three ways in 
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which new information can improve the person’s old assumption or create 
cognitive effect in the person’s cognitive environment:  
 
(i) New information P might yield a contextual implication. In other words, an 
assumption is derived from the synthesis of P and an old assumption (information) 
C. I will use Blakemore’s (2002:61) example for illustration. Suppose we have a 
context which includes the assumption that if somebody is carrying a bus-pass, 
s/he is going to take a bus. In this situation, the bus-driver will derive the 
contextual implication that the person carrying the bus-pass will get on the bus. 
The derivation of the contextual implication goes as follows: 
 
(a) If somebody is carrying a bus-pass, s/he is going to take the bus. 
           (Old assumption C) 
 
(b) A person is carrying a bus-pass. 
           (New assumption P) 
 
(c) This person is going to take the bus 
           (Contextual implication derived by the synthesis of P and C) 
 
(ii) New information might strengthen an existing assumption. In the same context, 
the bus-driver’s assumption of a person holding a bus-pass might be strengthened 
if that person is crossing the road in a hurry. 
 
(iii) New information might contradict an existing assumption and eliminate that 
assumption. The driver’s assumption that a person who is carrying a bus-pass 
wants to travel on the bus might be contradicted and eliminated if that person 
gives this bus-pass to another person waiting at the bus stop. 
 
It should be taken into account that the derivation of cognitive effects in 
processing relevance is measured against the processing effort required for the 
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derivation of these effects. Thus, the more processing effort required for deriving 
the cognitive effects the less relevant the information will be and vice versa. 
From what has been discussed, it can be observed that the assessment of 
relevance is mainly based on the notion of balance between the input and the 
output—the cognitive effect and mental processing effort. If the assumption 
processed yields greater contextual effects for small processing effort, then it is 
more relevant and if it yields small contextual effects for great processing effort, 
then it is less relevant. Consider Sperber and Wilson’s (1995:125-6) example 
repeated here as (25):   
 
(25)       a. People who are getting married should consult a doctor about possible 
                 hereditary risks to their children.  
             b. Two people both of whom have thalassemia should be warned against 
                 having children . 
             c. Susan has thalassemia. 
 
Processed in the context of (25) the following two assumptions of (26) and (27) 
would be relevant because they both yield some contextual effects in this context: 
 
(26)       Susan, who has thalassemia, is getting married to Bill.  
(27)       Bill, who has thalassemia, is getting married to Susan.  
 
The contextual effect yielded by the assumptions of (26) and (27) in the context of  
(25) is represented by the contextual implication in (28): 
 
(28)      Susan and Bill should consult a doctor about possible hereditary risks to 
             their  children. 
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However, (27) is more relevant than (26) because (27) has contextual effects 
which (26) lacks. This is represented by (29): 
 
(29)       Susan and Bill should be warned against having children. 
 
Sperber and Wilson argue that since both (26) and (27) have the same conceptual 
structure then they require the same amount of mental effort to be processed in the 
context of (25). Since processing the contextual implication of (28) requires some 
mental effort, this effort should be made in processing the assumption (27) which 
carries the contextual implication, and not in (26) which does not. 
To consider how processing effort can affect the degree of relevance, 
compare (27) and (30): 
 
(27)      Bill, who has thalassemia, is getting married to Susan. 
(30)      Bill, who has thalassemia, is getting married to Susan, and 1967 was great 
             year for French wine. 
 
When processed in the context of (25), both (27) and (30) have the same 
contextual effect. The extra information in (30) is not related to the context and 
hence it has no contextual effects in this context. However, processing the extra 
information in (30) requires some processing effort, thus according to the 
comparative definition of relevance, (30) would be less relevant than (26) because 
it achieves the same contextual effects but with more processing effort. 
This section has been an attempt to investigate the cognitive nature of 
relevance theory and the role this theory plays in linguistic communication. The 
last section of this chapter will be devoted to tackle some problems in RT such the 
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explicature/implicature distinction, the idea of conventional implicature and the 
‘development of logical form’. This section also introduces Blakemore’s (1987, 
2002) notion of procedural meanings and the conceptual/procedural distinction 
which will be the main focus of the next chapter.  
1.4. Relevance Theory and verbal communication 
1.4.1. Explicature and implicature in Relevance Theory 
Carston (1991) tackles the problem of distinguishing the proposition explicitly 
communicated (explicature) from what is implicitly conveyed by a certain 
utterance (implicature). In Grice’s theory of conversation, the proposition 
explicitly communicated by the utterance is equivalent to ‘what is said’ 
(linguistically encoded) and any other implicit interpretation would count as ‘what 
is implicated’. It seems that the picture of communicated assumptions in Grice’s 
theory is as follows: 
 
                                     what is communicated 
 
 
                                        
                                   said                         implicated 
 
                      linguistically                         not linguistically  
                      encoded                                 encoded     
 
                         explicit                                        implicit  
 
Figure 1: Kinds of communicational content in Grice’s theory. 
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Carston (1988:33) argues, contrary to the above picture presented by Grice, that 
what is explicitly communicated by an utterance is not ‘what is said’. Consider the 
following example that demonstrates Carston’s point: 
 
(31)       a. How does John feel about his new job? 
              b. He did not pass his probationary period.  
 
It can be noticed that the following set of assumptions can be communicated by 
the utterance of (31b): 
 
(32)       a. John did not do well in his new job. 
              b. John failed his preliminary phase of his job. 
              c. The manager is not satisfied with John’s work experience. 
              d. John cannot continue in his new job. 
              e. John is not happy.   
 
Given the above set of assumptions (32a-e), the question that arises now is what 
assumptions of that set contribute to the explicature of the utterance and what 
assumptions contribute the implicature. There is no doubt (32e) is the implicature 
communicated by (31b) since it is neither linguistically encoded nor part of what 
is explicitly communicated. 
Grice assumes that the explicit meaning of an utterance is a result of 
accessing the conventional meaning of the linguistic expressions used in the 
utterance. But as can be noticed, (32a-b) are not part of that conventional meaning 
referred to by Grice. They are worked out through applying pragmatic principles: 
disambiguating the word ‘pass’ and assigning a referent to the pronoun ‘he’. 
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According to Carston (1991), (32a-b) could not be implicatures of (31b) but rather 
part of the explicit content.  
Carston (1991) aims to establish a criterion that distinguishes implicatures 
from explicatures—to specify which aspects of utterance interpretation contribute 
to what is explicitly conveyed and which aspects contribute to what is implicated. 
The criterion, introduced by Carston, is called the Functional Independence 
Principle (FIP). According the to FIP, Carston argues that the explicature of an 
utterance does not have to be arbitrarily confined to linguistic encoding plus 
disambiguation and reference assignment, but needs to go beyond that to the 
process of free enrichment of what is linguistically encoded to reach what is 
explicated. Consider the following example: 
 
(33)       He is ready.   
 
Knowing the conventional meaning of the word ‘ready’ and assigning a referent 
to the pronoun ‘he’ in (33) will not be enough for the hearer/reader to decide the 
proposition communicated by (33). The hearer/reader has to do some enrichment 
to the logical form by going beyond what is linguistically encoded. 
Carston (1991) claims that implicatures are distinct from explicatures; they 
do not overlap. Implicatures have distinct propositional form and truth conditions 
different from those of explicatures. According to Carston, implicatures function 
independently of explicatures as premises and conclusions. Consider the 
following example:  
 
  
 
69 
(34)       a. What about osso bucco for lunch?  
              b. I am vegetarian.   
 
              a. Implicated premise: Osso bucco is not a vegetarian dish. 
              b. Implicated conclusion: The speaker of (34b) does not eat osso bucco.  
 
In fact, Carston rejects the Gricean claim that any pragmatically 
determined aspect of the utterance interpretation apart from disambiguation and 
reference assignment is an implicature. She disagrees with the Gricean argument 
that the domain of grammar/sentences and the domain of truth-conditional 
semantics and propositions are the same. She rather argues that pragmatics does 
much more in establishing what is explicated than reference assignment and 
disambiguation. Consider Carston’s (1988:39) example:   
   
(35)       a. The park is some distance from where I live. 
              b. It will take us some time to get there.  
 
For the logical form of (35a) to be fully propositional, a referent should be 
assigned to the pronoun ‘I’ and the word ‘park’ should be disambiguated. In 
Grice’s terms, the explicit meaning of (35a) is (36): 
 
(36)      There is distance of some length between the speaker’s home and the park 
             referred to in the utterance.  
 
But it seems that the utterance of (36) is not what is explicated by (35a). Carston 
argues that to know what is explicated by (35a), the hearer has to use some other 
pragmatic principles such as context, relevance and informativeness. Once such 
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pragmatic principles are utilized, the hearer will be able to know what is exactly 
explicated by (35a) and this can be the following: 
 
(37)       The park is some considerable distance from where I live. 
            
According to Grice, (36) is what is explicitly communicated by (35a) because it 
stands for the logical form of the utterance, while (37) is an implicature 
communicated by (35a) because it is derived through pragmatic inference. This 
does not seem to conform to Carston’s FIP simply because the implicature 
communicated by (37) (according to Grice) entails (35). Implicature and 
explicature should function independently and never overlap (FIP). What is 
implicated can never entail the logical form of the sentence uttered. Accordingly, 
(37) is an explicature rather than implicature. 
The problem of explicature/implicature distinction can also be faced in the 
interpretation of conjoined utterances and utterances that require free enrichment. 
Consider the following examples: 
 
(38)       a. I gave her the pen and she signed the contract. 
              b. She handed me the key and I opened the door. 
              c. I gave her the pen and she signed the contract (with the pen I gave her). 
              d. She handed me the key and I opened the door (with the key she gave 
                   me).   
 
(39)       a. He entered the office and sat down on the chair. 
              b. He ate the poisoned food and he died. 
              c. He entered the office and then sat down on the chair. 
              d. He ate the poisonous food and so he died. 
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It is noticeable that the propositional form of (38 c-d) with the added phrases 
entails the propositional form of (38a-b). Accordingly, the enriched forms of (38a-
b) represented by (38: c-d) could not be considered as implicatures but rather 
explicatures because they entail what is linguistically encoded. By the same token, 
and contrary to what Grice assumes, the enriched forms represented by (39 c-d) 
are explicatures rather than implicatures because they entail what is said in (39a) 
and (39b) respectively. Grice’s justification for considering (39c-d) as 
implicatures is based on the observation of the sub-maxim of manner (be orderly) 
as can be noticed in the figure below: 
 
 
Grice: (P & then Q) ⊃ (P & Q)   implicature                         be orderly 
 
Carston:  (P & then Q) |- (P & Q)   explicature                           FIP 
 
 
Figure 2: Grice and Carston on the explicature/implicature distinction. 
 
1.4.2. Cancellable explicatures and uncancellable implicatures  
One of the major problems in RT is the absence of a clear criterion that 
distinguishes explicated from implicated assumptions. Carston (1991) introduced 
the ‘entailment test’ to distinguish explicatures from implicatures. According to 
that test, explicatures are the only communicated assumptions that can entail the 
logical form of the sentence uttered. Implicatures do not entail the logical form. 
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Implicatures, according to Carston, can be distinguishable through the 
defeasibility and calculability features since they are the outcome of pragmatic 
inference which is cancellable and defeasible. As noted, she also introduced the 
FIP which claims that implicatures and explicatures function independently 
without any overlapping. 
Carston (2002) introduces a counter argument that turns the whole analysis 
of explicature/implicature distinction upside down. She argues that entailment is 
not a necessary condition to distinguish explicatures from implicatures, and 
furthermore, that cancellability is not a necessary condition to distinguish 
implicatures form explicatures. 
Let us begin with explicatures and see how this counter argument is 
developed. Carston (2002:117) argues that an explicature is an assumption 
(proposition) explicitly expressed and communicated by an utterance. She makes 
a distinction between the propositions expressed and the explicature intended by 
the speaker. The proposition expressed by the speaker may or may not be 
communicated. It is considered an explicature of the utterance only when it is 
communicated.  
Burton-Roberts (2005) distinguishes two types of ‘what is said’: ‘what is 
a-said’ and ‘what is b-said’. What is ‘a-said’ is equivalent to the conventional 
meaning of linguistic expressions used in a certain utterance (what is linguistically 
encoded). Burton-Roberts points out that what is ‘a-said’ stands for linguistic 
semantics. What is ‘b-said’ is equivalent to the proposition explicitly 
communicated by an utterance (explicature). This is reached by linguistic 
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decoding plus some pragmatic principles such as disambiguation and reference 
assignment. According to Burton-Roberts, this stands for RT’s ‘real semantics’ as 
opposed to RT’s ‘linguistic semantics’.  
According the entailment test, an explicature should entail what is said 
because it is the development of the logical (linguistically encoded) form of what 
is said. It is assumed in RT that what is said could not be cancelled, because the 
speaker is committed to what she says or expresses. This means that explicature 
could not be cancelled either. 
However Carston (2002:138) launches her big claim that ‘explicatures are 
cancellable’. Her claim is based on her linguistic ‘underdeterminacy thesis’ that 
pragmatic inference plays role in the derivation of explicatures as well as 
uncommunicated propositions. Pragmatic inference is characterized by 
‘cancellability’ and ‘defeasibility’ (Levinson 1983:115, Carston 2002:135-36). 
Thus, explicatures are cancellable too: 
 
(40)       a. John is tall. 
              b. John is tall enough to be a basketball player. 
              c. John is tall, but he is not tall enough to be a basketball player. 
 
Carston (2002:138) points out that a sentence such as (40a), if uttered in an 
appropriate context, explicates the proposition in (40b). But, she claims that this 
proposition (pragmatically inferred) through free enrichment is cancelled in (40c). 
The same goes for her own example repeated here as (41): 
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(41)       a. He ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped. 
              b. Lionel ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped over the edge of the cliff. 
              c. He ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped (up and down) but he stayed 
                  on the top of the cliff. 
 
Similarly, the proposition in (41b) is an explicature of (41a). This proposition, 
explicated via free enrichment, is cancelled as can be seen in (41c), even though it 
entails the logical form of what is said, i.e. (41b) entails (41a).  
Burton-Roberts (2005:401) argues against Carston’s notion of ‘cancellable 
explicatures’ and describes it as a logical impossibility in Carston’s own terms. 
Burton-Roberts (2005) points out that RT claims that explicatures are the domain 
of ‘real’ (truth-conditional, entailment-based) and propositional semantics that can 
never be cancelled because, according to Carston herself, speakers are committed 
to and endorse the proposition(s) they express. 
Burton-Roberts (2005) suggests two possible solutions to this problem: we 
either withdraw the cancellability claim proposed by Carston or drop the 
‘commitment’ or ‘endorsement’ factor from the informal explanation of 
explicature. He comments on Carston’s example (77), used in this thesis as (41), 
and concludes that there is a misapplication of the term ‘cancellability’ by Carston. 
His evidence is that there are two verbs jump in English: (i) prepositional 
(directional) verb and (ii) intransitive verb. Burton-Roberts points out the verb 
jump in (41a) could be either (i) prepositional or (ii) intransitive. (41b) could be 
the explicature of (41a) if and only if the verb jump is prepositional. Given that, 
(41c) is a clarification as to which was the intended logical form. It seems that 
there is no explicature in (41-b) to be cancelled. (41c) itself (up to but) could be 
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an explicature of (41a) simply because it is what is intended to be communicated 
by the speaker. 
On the implicature side, Carston (2002:139) argues that some implicatures 
are uncancellable. Consider the following example adapted from Carston’s 
examples (79): 
 
(42)       Peter: Does John drink vodka? 
              Mary: He does not drink alcohol. 
            a. Vodka is alcohol. 
            b. John doesn’t drink vodka. 
            c. Whisky is alcohol. 
           d. John doesn’t drink whisky. 
 
As can be noticed, (42a) and (42c) are implicated premises of Mary’s main 
utterance while (42b) and (42d) are implicated conclusions. Carston refers to 
Vicente (1998), who claims that (b) and (d) are entailed by the proposition 
expressed by Mary’s utterance and thus they should be explicatures of that 
utterance because what is usually explicated is the truth-conditional content of the 
utterance, i.e. its entailment. Given the negative definition of implicature (a 
communicated assumption is an implicature if it is not an explicature) Carston 
argues that (b) and (d) could not be explicatures of Mary’s utterance because there 
is no logical form (or sentential subpart of logical form) in Mary’s utterance from 
which they can be developed. So they are implicatures. The same goes for (43): 
 
(43)       a. The prime minister is John’s mother. 
              b. The prime minister is a woman. 
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(43b) is not explicature because it is not the development of the logical form of 
(43a) so it is an implicature. This implicature cannot be cancelled because it is 
entailed by (43a). 
I strongly agree with Burton-Roberts (2005:399) that Carston’s claim of 
uncancellable implicature is counter-intuitive (in Gricean terms) and inconsistent 
with the rest of her proposal concerning the explicature/implicature distinction. 
Carston (2002), in several places of her proposal, argues that pragmatic inference 
is ‘cancellable’ and ‘defeasible’. Building on that, implicatures are cancellable 
since they are the outcome of pragmatic inference. 
Carston’s claim of entailed implicatures, given an argument in her own 
terms, is very strange. It turns the traditional explicature/implicature distinction 
upside down. Entailments should be explicated not implicated, but Carston insists 
that there are entailed implicatures. This, I think, will make her FIP sound less 
reasonable and reliable. If implicature and entailment are mutually unexclusive, 
then they will function dependently (they will overlap). The implicature should 
not entail or be entailed by the explicature. But as can be noticed, all Carston’s 
examples of uncancellable implicatures are entailed by the logical form of the 
utterance. 
Given that, the explicature/implicature distinction offered by Carston 
sounds very controversial. The line that separates between explicatures and 
implicatures in some situations is very thin. To get out of this controversy, I 
suggest that we either abandon the explicature/implicature distinction or we keep 
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things in their logical status by emphasising that what is implicated must  never be 
entailed and what is explicated should never be cancelled. 
1.4.3. Grice’s notion of conventional implicature 
When Grice (1967) first introduced the notion of implicature, the notion referred 
to cases of ‘conversational implicature’ where certain non-truth conditional 
inferences are calculated on the basis of the conversational maxims. Afterwards, 
Grice envisaged a totally different type of non-truth conditional inference which 
he calls ‘conventional implicature’. This type of inference is not derived via 
pragmatic principles such as the maxims but rather generated through the 
conventional meaning of some lexical expressions. Grice mentions cases of few 
linguistic expressions such as but, therefore and moreover. However, the list 
could be extended to include expressions such as although, nevertheless, however 
anyway, moreover, whereas, even, after all, still, yet, besides, since and while 
(Carston: 2002:53). Consider Grice’s (1967:44) famous example on conventional 
implicature: 
 
(44)       He is English; he is, therefore, brave.  
 
Grice claims that (44) implicates that his ‘being brave’ is a consequence of ‘his 
being English’. This implicature is not derived via any pragmatic principle or 
previous contextual knowledge but rather generated through the conventional 
meaning of the word therefore. The conventional import of the word therefore 
does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterance in which it is 
used. If therefore is replaced by and, the truth conditions of the utterance will 
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remain the same, but the conventional implicature generated by therefore will be 
lost. In other words, therefore does not affect the truth or falsity of the utterance in 
which it occurs. 
Carston (2002:107-8) comments briefly on Grice’s notion of conventional 
implicature; she points out that this proposal is strong evidence that not all 
encoded meaning determines ‘what is said’. There are cases where encoded 
meaning does not contribute to ‘what is said’. Such cases are referred to by Grice 
as conventional implicatures. 
Carston gives an alternative analysis of Grice’s cases of conventional 
implicature. She claims that ‘what is said’ in an utterance is the propositional 
component of the basic (ground-level) speech acts. Conventional implicature is 
generated by the conventional meaning of certain linguistic expressions that relate 
between the ground-level speech acts. This relation will lead to less central 
(higher level) speech acts such as ‘explaining’, ‘contrast’ or ‘adding’. Consider 
but in (45): 
 
(45)       a. John failed his syntax exam but he is clever. 
              b. John failed his syntax exam.      
              c. John is clever. 
              d. There is a contrast between (b) and (c).  
 
As can be noticed, (b) and (c) are two ground-level speech acts of assertion. They 
stand for ‘what is said’ in the utterance of (45a), whereas (d) is a higher-level 
speech act that defines the type of relation between (b) and (c) which is here 
‘contrast’.  
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Levinson (1983:128), too, argues that Grice’s conventional implicature is 
not an interesting concept. He considers it as an admission that the truth-
conditional semantics has failed to capture all the conventional meaning of natural 
language expressions. Kempson (1975) also resists (the acceptance of) the notion 
of conventional implicature and points out that all Grice’s examples of 
conventional implicature can be reanalysed as entailments, conversational 
implicatures or presuppositions. 
There are other pragmatists who deny the existence of conventional 
implicature (Rieber 1997; Bach 1994, 1999; Wilson and Sperber 1993 and 
Blakemore 1987, 2002) .These pragmatists have offered their alternative accounts 
of conventional implicature. 
Rieber (1997: 51-54) reanalyses Grice’s examples of conventional 
implicature as ‘tacit performatives’. He argues that linguistic expressions such as 
but, therefore and even are used by the speaker to imply or suggest something 
without actually saying it. Rieber agrees with Grice that such expressions do not 
contribute to the truth conditions of the utterances in which they occur. However, 
he disagrees with him in that such expressions do not generate conventional 
implicature, but rather suggest or imply something by means of ‘performatives’. 
Consider the following example: 
 
(46)       a. John is a pragmatist but he is happy. 
              b. John is a pragmatist (I suggest this contrasts) or (I am pointing out that 
                  this contrasts) or ( I ask you to notice that this contrasts) he is happy.  
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The analysis offered by (Rieber 1997) explains how utterances with such 
linguistic expressions involve two types of speech act: a) primary speech act, such 
as ‘assertion’, ‘telling’ or ‘asking’ made by the speaker of the utterance; b) 
secondary speech act, which is used as a comment on the primary speech act 
(what has been asserted, told or asked by the speaker). Rieber considers the 
secondary speech act as the vehicle of the performative function. Given that, 
Rieber would analyse (46b) as follows:   
 
  he is a pragmatist                           ‘but’                                 he is happy 
  
   
primary speech act 1            secondary speech act         primary speech act 2 
                           
       assertion 1                              ‘contrast’                            assertion 2    
                                             (tacit performative) 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Rieber’s (1997) reanalysis of Grice’s conventional implicature. 
 
Bach (1994, 1999) has also developed his own alternative account of 
conventional implicature in which he argues that there is nothing called 
conventional implicature in pragmatics. The phenomena described as such by 
Grice are simply instances of second-order speech acts. According to Bach, 
expressions such as but, therefore and even do not generate conventional 
implicature as Grice assumes, but rather perform ‘second-order speech acts’.  
Bach (1999:333) calls such expressions alleged conventional implicature devices 
(ACIDs). 
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Contrary to what Grice assumes, Bach (1999:340-1) claims that most of 
the linguistic expressions referred to as generating conventional implicature 
(ACIDs), contribute to what is said because they pass the IQ test: 
 
(IQ test): An element of a sentence contributes to what is said in an 
utterance of that sentence if and only if there can be an accurate 
and complete indirect quotation of an utterance (in the same 
language) which includes that element, or a corresponding element, 
in the ‘that’-clause that specifies what is said. 
 
Consider the following examples which illustrate that but, even and too contribute 
to the truth-conditional content of their utterances, which can be used as complete 
indirect quotations in that-clauses as can be noticed in (47), (48) and (49) 
respectively: 
 
(47)       a. John failed his syntax exam but he is clever 
              b. Clare said that John failed his syntax exam but he is clever. (8 IQ) 
 
(48)       a. Even John can fail his syntax exam. 
              b. Clare said that even John can fail his syntax exam. ( IQ) 
 
(49)       a. John has failed his syntax exam too 
              b. Claire said that John failed his syntax exam too. ( IQ) 
 
However, Bach (1999:341) points out that not all ACIDs comply with the IQ test, 
i.e. some ACIDs do not contribute to what is said. But, to Bach, this does not 
                                                 
8
 The tick sign indicates that the utterance passes the IQ test. 
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mean that such devices give rise to conventional implicature as assumed by Grice. 
Consider moreover and in other words in the examples below: 
 
(50)       a. Moreover, John failed his syntax exam. 
              b. * Clare said that moreover, John failed his syntax exam. (9X IQ) 
 
(51)       a. In other words, John is a plagiarist.  
              b. * Clare said that in other words, John is a plagiarist. (X IQ) 
 
It is true that moreover and in other words in the above utterances fail the IQ test, 
but this does not mean that they generate a conventional implicature. What Bach 
seeks to argue here is that this type of ACIDs should be treated as vehicles for the 
performance of second-order speech act. When ACIDs such as moreover and in 
other words are used by the speaker at the beginning of a sentence, the utterance 
of which adds something to what is previously said, the speaker does not 
implicate but rather explicitly indicates that she is adding something. 
ACIDs that fail the IQ test are called utterance modifiers by Bach. They 
are used to comment on the main part of the utterance in which they occur. They 
are usually used at the beginning of the sentence, but they can occur elsewhere. 
They are set off by commas in writing and pause in speech. They are not 
semantically coordinate with the rest of the sentence which is why they do not 
contribute to truth conditions. 
I suggest that neither Rieber (1997) nor Bach (1999) offer a genuine 
alternative to Grice’s conventional implicature. Rieber’s account of tacit 
                                                 
9
 The cross sign indicates the utterance fails the IQ test. 
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performatives is built on ‘suggestion’. It is unreliable because there is no unique 
performative with which a discourse connective is synonymous. Consider again 
example (46) repeated here as (52): 
 
(52)       a. John is a pragmatist but he is happy. 
              b. John is a pragmatist (I suggest this contrasts) or (I am pointing out that 
                  this contrasts) or ( I ask you to notice that this contrasts) he is happy.  
 
As can be noticed, there is no specific performative associated with but. The 
performative can be one of the following (the list could be endless): 
 
(a)       I suggest that this contrasts. 
(b)       I am pointing out that this contrasts. 
(c)       I ask you to notice that this contrasts. 
(d)       I draw your attention that this contrast. 
(e)       I let you know that this contrasts. 
(f)       I make it clear that this contrasts. 
 
Bach’s (1999) alternative account does not seem to be complete either. On the one 
hand, he divides ACIDs in to two types: ACIDs that pass the IQ and ACIDs that 
fail it. On the other hand, he argues all ACIDs encode conceptual meaning 
whether or not they contribute to what is said. According to him, an ACID such as 
but encodes conceptual information and contributes to the truth-conditions of the 
utterance in which it is used. I believe this is far from being true; but neither 
encodes a conceptual meaning nor does it contribute to truth-conditions. For 
instance, the contrast between ‘he is a thief’ and ‘he is good-hearted’ in (53) is not 
a second-order speech act carried by the device but. The relation between the two 
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propositions can be figured out without the presence of but. A hearer/reader will 
be able to judge that the relation between (a) and (b) is contrastive without making 
use of the linguistic encoding of but: 
 
(53)       a. He is a thief.  
              b. He is good-hearted. 
 
What seems to me a more explanatory account of conventional implicature is 
Wilson and Sperber’s (1993) and Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) notion of ‘procedural 
meaning’. This notion has been developed within a relevance-theoretic framework. 
It argues that linguistic expressions such as but, therefore and so (analysed by 
Grice as cases of conventional implicature) encode procedures that constrain the 
relevance of the utterance in which they occur. The procedures encoded by such 
expressions offer guidance to the hearer/reader in searching for the optimal 
relevance of the utterance through maximizing the contextual effects and 
minimizing the processing effort and finally reaching the most accessible 
interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance. Such expressions do not 
contribute to the truth conditions of utterance, but rather put constraints on the 
inferential phase of the utterance interpretation. A full discussion of Blakemore’s 
notion of procedural meaning will be given in the next chapter  
1.5. Conclusion  
This chapter offered a broad outline of the theoretical framework, Relevance 
Theory, within which some linguistic expressions (including discourse markers) 
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are analysed as encoding procedural meanings that constrain the inferential part of 
the interpretation of the utterances in which they occur. The attention was focused 
on some basic notions, the discussion of which is crucial to the analysis of 
procedural expressions. This includes the notions of ‘context’, ‘inference’, 
‘cognitive effect’ and ‘processing effort’. It will become clear that Relevance 
Theory, despite controversies that arise within it (e.g. the explicature/implicature 
distinction discussed in section 1.4.1) provides an ideal and reliable framework 
for the analysis of discourse markers.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. Linguistic Meaning and Truth Conditions 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the relationship between linguistic meaning and truth 
conditions. It points out that there are two types of distinction: the truth-
conditional/non-truth-conditional distinction and the conceptual/procedural 
distinction. The chapter investigates the relationship between these two 
distinctions. 
There are two main arguments in this chapter. Firstly, the alleged 
parallelism between the truth-conditional/conceptual and the non-truth-
conditional/procedural meanings must be questioned. This is because there are 
linguistic expressions whose meaning both contributes to the truth conditions of 
the utterance and constrains the inferential part of the interpretation of the 
utterances in which they occur. Secondly, the relation between conceptual and 
procedural is not mutually exclusive; we will see that some linguistic expressions 
encode both conceptual and procedural meanings and others encode conceptual 
meanings but can be procedurally used as is the case with because. Such 
expressions will be called conceptuo-procedural expressions. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the relation 
between natural language and the world, investigates the difference between truth-
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conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning and analyses some linguistic 
expressions whose meaning does not contribute to truth conditions. Section 2.3 
investigates the conceptual/procedural distinction and its relation with the 
explicature/implicature distinction. Section 2.4 discusses how linguistic meaning 
is analysed in RT in terms of concepts and procedures and gives a new 
classification of linguistic expressions as 1) purely conceptual, 2) purely 
procedural or 3) conceptuo-procedural expressions. Section 2.5 is a conclusion. 
2.2. Language and the world 
Theorists and ordinary language users consider language as a medium of 
exchanging information about the world. In the fields of linguistics and the 
philosophy of language, this is captured in terms of the relation between natural 
language expressions and truth conditions. Strawson (1971) points out that the 
notions of truth and truth conditions can account for linguistic meaning, as he puts 
it: 
 
It is a truth implicitly acknowledged by communication theorists-
themselves that in almost all the things we should count as 
sentences there is a substantial central core of meaning which is 
explicable either in terms of truth conditions or in terms of some 
related notions… 
 
                                                                                      (Strawson 1971:178) 
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As the above quote indicates, speakers use language to say something about the 
world or describe a state of affairs. They relate between ‘sentences’ and ‘states of 
affairs’. The relation between the two entities is truth-conditional—judged as 
either true or false. 
The most prominent truth-based approach of linguistic meaning is 
undeniably Davidson’s (1967, 1984) truth-conditional theory of linguistic 
meaning. This approach is based on the pairing up between natural language 
sentences and the real world, in the sense that the meaning of a sentence is given 
by its truth conditions—the conditions that have to obtain for the utterance to be 
true. Consider the following example:  
 
(1)      The table has four legs. 
 
According to the truth-based approach of linguistic meaning by Davidson, the 
utterance of (1) is true if and only if ‘the table referred to in this utterance has four 
legs’. This is captured by a T-sentence, (2), where s stands for the utterance and p 
stands for a state of affairs.  
 
(2)      s is true iff p. 
 
It seems the truth-conditional account of linguistic meaning constructed by 
theorists such as Strawson (1971) and Davidson (1967, 1984) cannot account for 
linguistic elements whose meaning does not contribute to the truth conditions of 
utterances in which they occur. These elements include pronouns, requests and 
questions, sentence adverbials, focus adverbs and discourse markers. I will not go 
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through a detailed analysis of the non-truth-conditional nature of these linguistic 
elements here but rather introduce them briefly in section 2.2.2. The attention will 
be focused on non-truth-conditional nature of discourse markers and the 
procedural role they play in the process of utterance interpretation. 
Before I move to the next section, I would like to point out that the notion 
of truth-conditional meaning adopted in this thesis is specific to RT. The meaning 
of a word is captured by the contribution it makes to the truth conditions of the 
sentence in which it occurs. Relevance theorists such as Wilson and Sperber 
(1993), Blakemore (1987, 2002) and Iten (2005) focus on the existence of some 
linguistic expressions (so, therefore, but, after all, etc.) whose meanings cannot be 
captured in truth-conditional terms. However, there are other approaches to truth-
conditional meaning which argue that the meaning encoded by such expressions 
can be truth conditional (Recanati 2004, Bach 2001, and Ariel 2002).  
2.2.1. Semantic vs. pragmatic non-truth-conditional meaning 
Before moving to the analysis of the non-truth-conditional nature of the relevant 
linguistic expressions, let us specify what type of non-truth-conditional meaning 
is meant here. To do this, please consider the following example given by Iten 
(2005:2):  
 
(3)      [Susan and Mary are talking about Mary’s boyfriend Peter] 
           Susan: Is he good at buying you presents? 
           Mary: For my last birthday he bought me a pink scarf, even though I told  
           him that I hate pink.  
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Iten (2005:3) points out that the utterance in (3) is true if and only if Peter bought 
Mary a pink scarf on her last birthday and (before that) the speaker told Peter that 
she hates pink. But Mary means (intends to communicate) more than that by 
uttering (3). There are two pieces of extra information communicated by Mary’s 
utterance: (i) there is a contrast between Peter buying Mary a pink scarf on her last 
birthday and her telling him that she hates pink, (ii) Peter is not good at buying 
presents. The first piece of information is linguistically encoded by the linguistic 
expression even though and not contextually derived. For this reason, I will call 
this phenomenon, following Iten (2005), ‘semantic non-truth-conditional 
meaning’. The second piece of information arises because Mary made her 
utterance in a particular conversational context. I will call this ‘pragmatic non-
truth-conditional meaning’. Neither meaning communicated by Mary’s utterance 
affects the truth conditions of the utterance.  
This distinction between semantic and pragmatic non-truth-conditional 
meaning has been introduced to show that the conventional meaning encoded by 
some linguistic expressions does not have to contribute to the truth conditions of 
the utterance in which such expressions are used. And this is one of the main 
themes in this chapter.  
2.2.2. Non-truth-conditional linguistic elements 
2.2.2.1 Pronouns 
Among the expressions whose linguistic meaning is not truth-conditional are 
‘pronouns’. It is obvious that the linguistic meaning encoded by pronouns cannot 
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be captured in terms of the contribution to the truth conditions of utterances 
containing them. However, such expressions constrain the interpretation of the 
utterance and play a role in determining the truth-conditional content by providing 
some indicators to the referents to be assigned: 
 
(4)      He will give it to her.     
      
The highlighted linguistic expressions in the above sentence are non-truth-
conditional per se. However, their linguistic meaning affects the truth-conditional 
content by constraining the interpretation and leading the hearer to assign 
referents to the highlighted expressions. No truth conditions can be assigned to the 
sentence of (4) before referents to the marked expressions are supplied. Once that 
is done, propositions such as the following can be communicated by the sentence 
of (4): 
 
(5)      Peter will give the book to Mary. 
(6)      John will give the letter to Clare. 
 
It seems that theorists who have discussed ‘non-truth-conditional meaning’ 
have excluded pronouns as elements of sentence semantics—and have done so 
simply because the linguistic meaning encoded by pronouns affects the truth 
conditions of utterances containing them. I will return to pronouns later in this 
chapter in section 2.4.3.1 and discuss the procedural relevance-theoretic account 
of pronouns (Wilson and Sperber 1993, Carston 2002 and Hedley 2005). 
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2.2.2.2. Requests and questions 
It is generally accepted that the utterances of non-declarative sentences such as 
orders and questions cannot be given truth conditions. The reason for this is that 
such utterances do not refer to any state of affairs in the first place. Thus, the 
notion of truth or falsity cannot apply to them. Consider the following examples 
for demonstration: 
 
(7)      Open the gate. 
(8)      Are you vegetarian?        
 
The utterance in (7) is a request which is usually complied with or disregarded, 
and the utterance in (8) is a question which can be given an answer or not. Thus, 
these utterances cannot be judged as true or false. Iten (2005:18) points out that 
some linguists have noticed that there are propositions that can be closely related 
to requests and questions. Thus, the equivalent propositions to (7) and (8) are (9) 
and (10), respectively: 
 
(9)      XHEARER OPENS GATEY 
(10)    XHEARER IS VEGETARIAN       
 
Given that, what is communicated by (7) and (8) can be roughly paraphrased as 
(11) and (12): 
 
(11)      The speaker is requesting the hearer to open the gate. 
(12)      The speaker is asking whether the hearer is vegetarian or not.  
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Iten points out that the non-truth-conditional aspect of the meaning of (7) and (8) 
is due to the non-declarative syntax and not the meaning of their words such as 
open, gate and vegetarian. The meanings of these words are obviously truth 
conditional.  
2.2.2.3. Sentence adverbials 
Theorists such as Wilson and Sperber (1993) maintain that illocutionary and 
attitudinal (sentence) adverbials neither contribute to nor affect the truth-
conditional content of utterances in which they occur. However, unlike requests 
and questions, sentences containing such adverbials do have truth-conditional 
element. But what is encoded by these illocutionary or attitudinal adverbials does 
not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance. 
 
(13)      Seriously, John is a genius. 
(14)      Sadly, I missed my train.    
 
The truth conditions of (13) and (14) are equivalent to the propositions expressed 
by these two utterances minus the illocutionary adverbial seriously and the 
attitudinal adverbial sadly. An utterance of (13), for instance, can communicate 
two propositions: 
 
(15)      JOHNX IS A GENIUS   
(16)      YSPEAKER IS SAYING SERIOUSLY THAT JOHN IS A GENIUS 
 
  
 
94 
(15) is the truth-conditional content of the utterance, not (16). The same goes for 
the utterance of (14). One should not confuse these adverbials with their ‘manner’ 
counterparts which contribute to the truth-conditions of utterances containing 
them. Manner adverbials are not separated by a comma in writing. 
 
(17)      John is speaking seriously.  
(18)      Peter sighed sadly.  
 
Unlike the utterance of (13), which communicates two propositions as illustrated 
in (15) and (16), the utterance of (17) communicates only one proposition, i.e. 
JOHN IS SPEAKING IN A SERIOUS MANNER.  
2.2.2.4. Focus adverbs 
In addition to illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials, there are other adverbs such 
as even, too and also which do not contribute to the truth conditions of utterances 
containing them. These adverbs are referred to by Iten (2005:23) as ‘focus’ 
particles. Consider the following examples: 
 
(19)      Even Peter is on holiday. 
(20)      Peter is on holiday too.       
(21)      Peter is also on holiday. 
 
The linguistic meaning encoded by the highlighted adverbs in the above 
utterances does not contribute to the truth conditions of these utterances. In other 
words, (19), (20) and (21) are true if and only if Peter is on holiday. However, 
there is obviously something more communicated by each of the highlighted 
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adverbs, depending on where the focus lies in each utterance. For instance, if the 
focus of even in (19) lies on Peter, then the utterance suggests that Peter’s being 
on holiday is less likely than other people being on holiday. If the focus of even is 
on is on holiday, then the assumption is that Peter’s being on holiday is less likely 
than his doing something else. 
2.2.2.5. Discourse markers 
Other linguistic expressions whose encoded meaning does not contribute to the 
truth-conditional content of utterances in which they occur are discourse markers 
(henceforth DMs). Such expressions include but, therefore, so, after all. They 
have been referred to in the literature as ‘pragmatic markers’ or ‘pragmatic 
connectives’, in addition to some other labels. 
Theorists such as Blakemore (1987, 2002), Blass (1998), Rouchota (1998) 
and Iten (1998, 2000, 2005) argue that the linguistic meaning encoded by DMs 
does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of utterances containing them. 
Consider the following examples:  
 
(22)      John is a lawyer but he is in prison now. 
(23)      John is in prison now although he is a lawyer. 
(24)      Thaksin Shinawatra will buy Manchester City FC. So, he is a millionaire. 
(25)      Thaksin Shinawatra will buy Manchester City FC. After all, he is a 
             millionaire.  
 
The use of the highlighted expressions does not affect the truth-conditional 
content of the utterances they connect. What each marker encodes is a procedure 
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that controls the relation between the truth-conditional content of the utterances 
they connect. For example, (22), is an utterance of two sentences connected by but.  
There are two propositions expressed by this utterance: (i) ‘John is a lawyer’; (ii) 
‘John is in prison now’. And, there is a procedure encoded by the linguistic 
meaning of but which points to the hearer that ‘there is a contrast between John’s 
being a lawyer and his being in prison’. This procedure does not contribute to the 
truth conditions of the utterance of (22). The utterance is true if and only if ‘John 
is a lawyer’ and ‘John is in prison’. The sense of contrast encoded by but does not 
affect the truth or falsity of (22). If the speaker of (22) did not have the meaning 
of contrast in mind, this will not make her utterance false. Similar analyses can be 
provided for (23), (24) and (25).  
2.3. Linguistic meaning and Relevance Theory 
2.3.1. Utterance interpretation: a complementary process 
It has been noticed in chapter 1 that RT is a cognitive theory of utterance 
interpretation, which involves mental representations and computation. Mental 
representations in the relevance-theoretic framework refer to ‘the language of 
thought’, or what is known as ‘Mentalese’ (Fodor: 1985, 1990). ‘Words’ in this 
language of thought are ‘concepts’ or ‘conceptual information’. The (Fodorian) 
idea here is that mental representations undergo computations due to their 
syntactic nature in a similar way to inference processes in formal logic where 
syntactic (rather than semantic) properties of mental representations are taken into 
consideration (Iten 2005:70).  
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Computation in the cognitive process of the utterance interpretation plays 
two roles. The first is required because the conceptual output of the decoding 
process or the logical form of the utterance does not yield a fully propositional 
form. The computation in this case is represented by the application of some 
pragmatic processes such as ‘disambiguation’ and ‘reference assignment’ to the 
logical form. For instance, the result of linguistic decoding of (26) would be 
something like (27) which does not encode a fully propositional form (assumption 
or thought):  
 
(26)       She plays it      
(27)       •   PLAYS •     
  
In order to know what is communicated by the speaker of (26), referents should 
be assigned to the pronouns ‘she’ and ‘it’. This cannot by done by linguistic 
decoding alone, but rather by the pragmatic process of ‘reference assignment’. 
The linguistic decoding of (27) could not give values to the pronouns. This has to 
be pragmatically inferred.  
The second and equally important aspect of interpretation is when 
computation takes the output of decoding (logical form) as input to determine 
what is communicated by the speaker of a certain utterance. This happens when 
the hearer takes the logical form and processes it in the light of other information 
available to him from memory and other input systems, to infer what is 
communicated by the speaker. This is known as the inferential stage of the 
  
 
98 
utterance interpretation in which the logical form is fleshed out. Without this 
inferential process, communication between language users would not be possible.  
2.3.2. Linguistic encoding: concepts and procedures 
On the view outlined in the previous section, mental representations are 
‘concepts’. It seems natural to say that most natural language words encode 
conceptual  information—the building blocks of logical form, so to speak (Iten: 
2005:71). For example, words such as snow and white in (28) would encode the 
concepts of SNOW and WHITE respectively: 
 
(28)       Snow is white.   
 
Computation, unlike decoding, is a ‘procedure’ in the sense that it is a 
function carried out by pragmatics to flesh out the linguistically decoded logical 
form for deriving a full proposition. 
It seems that procedural information (constraints on computation) can be 
linguistically encoded. Blakemore (1987) argues that some linguistic expressions 
encode information which constrains the inferential phase of the utterance 
interpretation rather than the conceptual representation. 
As explained, RT accounts for utterance interpretation with the emphasis 
on minimising processing effort needed to achieve the intended cognitive effect. 
Since the processing effort is exerted in the computational process of testing the 
relevant interpretation, any information that constrains this computational process 
would be considered to be effort-saving. Consider the following example:  
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(29)       (a) John can open Bill’s safe.      (b)  He knows the combination.  
 
If we follow the line of reasoning provided by Blakemore (1987, 2002), the hearer 
of the utterance of (29) will not find it easy to determine how (b) achieves 
relevance in respect with (a) and thus, he will exert more effort in looking for the 
cognitive effect. The inferential relationship between (a) and (b) could be that (a) 
is a ‘premise’ and (b) is a ‘conclusion’, but could also be the other way round: (b) 
is a ‘premise’ and (a) is a ‘conclusion’. To save the hearer the effort of 
determining the inferential relationship in the sequence in (29), the speaker can 
use some linguistic means (linguistic expressions), such as but, therefore, so and 
after all, the encoded procedural information of which can provide him with some 
signals and clues to find out the interpretation intended by the speaker. For 
instance, Blakemore (2002) points out, if the linguistic expression so has been 
used to connect the two segments in (29), the interpretation would be that (b) is a 
‘conclusion’ derived as a contextual implication from (a), and if after all is used, 
then (b) would be the ‘premise’ to (a), the ‘conclusion’. 
Blakemore’s claim is that, in the absence of DMs such as so and after all, 
contextual assumptions and cognitive effect accessible to the hearer are not 
necessarily those intended by the speaker. Thus, the speaker finds it useful to use 
some linguistic constructions such so and after all to make it easy for the hearer to 
point to the intended interpretation.  
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2.3.3. The conceptual/procedural distinction 
The notion of procedural meaning in RT needs further investigation. It is not 
known yet how the procedural meaning is represented in the mind, neither is it 
known how the process of ‘constraining the inferential phase’ of utterance 
interpretation actually works. When the notion was first introduced by Blakemore 
(1987), the purpose was to make a distinction between truth-conditional and non-
truth conditional aspects of linguistic meaning. The correlation between 
conceptual/procedural and truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional meanings was 
assumed. It was also assumed that ‘conceptual’ and ‘procedural’ were mutually 
exclusive. Blakemore (1987) defines the notion of procedural meaning in a 
negative way. For her, if what is encoded by a linguistic expression is not 
conceptual, it should then be procedural by necessity, since linguistically encoded 
meanings in RT are either concepts or procedures (not both). Blakemore (1987) 
does not provide a criterion by which we can distinguish linguistic expressions 
that encode procedural meaning from those which do not. She just gives a list of 
certain expressions, particularly DMs, and argues that such expressions do not 
encode conceptual information, which means that they must be procedural.  
It will become clear that the assumed parallelism between truth-
conditional/non-truth-conditional and conceptual/procedural meaning does not 
hold: 
 
It is tempting to assume that these two approaches are equivalent, 
and classify the data in identical ways. This would be so, for 
example, if any construction which contributed to the truth 
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conditions of an utterance did so by encoding concepts, while all 
non-truth-conditional constructions encoded procedural 
information. We want to argue that this assumption is false. The 
two distinctions cross-cut each other: some truth-conditional 
constructions encode concepts, others encode procedures; some 
non-truth-conditional constructions encode procedures, others 
encode concepts. 
 
                                                          (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 2) 
 
 
 The equation that conceptual = truth-conditional and procedural = non-
truth-conditional is invalid. Linguistic expressions such as personal pronouns do 
not linguistically encode conceptual information, but they play a role in 
determining the truth-conditional content of the utterances in which they occur. 
Conversely, sentence adverbials, for instance, encode conceptual information but 
their contribution does affect the truth condition of the utterances in which they 
occur. 
We will also see that the conceptual/procedural distinction is not mutually 
exclusive. There are, I maintain, linguistic expressions which encode both 
conceptual and procedural meaning, as is the case with the definite article the and 
the conditional marker if.  
Wilson and Sperber (1993) introduce some tests 10  for the distinction 
between conceptual from procedural meaning. Although such tests do not give an 
explanation as to how the procedures constrain utterance interpretation, they 
provide some criteria for distinguishing conceptual from procedural meaning. 
                                                 
10
 These tests have been also adopted by Rouchota (1998) and Iten (1998). 
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These tests are: 1) ‘accessibility to consciousness’, 2) ‘truth-evaluability’ and 3) 
‘compositionality’. 
 As regards the first test, Wilson and Sperber (1993) point out that since 
concepts in RT are mental representations, conceptual meaning encoded by 
linguistic expressions should be consciously accessible to speakers and hearers. 
For instance, if we ask native speakers of English what the words garden, library 
and car mean, they would be able to answer the question by either paraphrasing 
the words or giving some of their synonyms. Procedural expressions11, on the 
other hand, are not easily accessible to consciousness. By the same analogy, if we 
ask native speakers of English what the words but, so and therefore mean, they 
find it difficult to give a straightforward answer. Their answer, if any, would 
much more likely to be about how these expressions are used rather than what 
they mean. Given the first test, it seems Wilson and Sperber are assuming that 
there is a parallelism between conceptual/representative on the one hand and 
procedural/non-representative on the other hand. Iten (2005:76) points out that 
there is evidence from second language learning that learners find it much harder 
to learn (or acquire) a procedural expression than to learn a conceptual expression. 
That is why most learners of English have some problems in learning and using 
words such well, even and just.  
Regarding the second test, Wilson and Sperber (1993) maintain that 
concepts are truth-valuable because they are representations of states of affairs in 
the real world: 
                                                 
11
 For the sake of simplicity, linguistic expressions which encode procedural meaning will be 
called ‘procedural expressions’ and expressions encoding conceptual meaning will be called 
‘conceptual expressions’.  
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(30)       The shirt is blue.  
 
The sentence in the above example can be uttered to refer to a state of affairs in 
the real world as in (31). 
 
(31)       The shirt John has bought from Debenhams on his 27th birthday is blue. 
 
The word ‘blue’ contributes a constituent to the representation of this state of 
affairs. In other words, the contribution made by it can determine whether the 
representation is true or false. To put it differently, the concept encoded by the 
word ‘blue’ affects the truth or falsity of (30). By contrast, what is encoded by 
procedural expressions is not a representation that can be true or false. The 
contribution made by procedural expressions cannot be judged as true or false. 
For instance, the hearer could not object to the use of after all in (32) by claiming 
that it is not true. Thus, he cannot utter something like (33): 
 
(32)       (a) John can open Bill’s safe. (b)  After all, he knows the combination. 
(33)       This is not true: ‘he knows the combination’ is not used as a premise. 
 
The third test for distinguishing conceptually encoded from procedurally 
encoded information is ‘compositionality’. According to this test, concepts can 
combine (and modify each other) to form larger complex conceptual 
representations. For instance, the concepts BROWN and COW combine to form 
the larger concept BROWN COW. The notion of compositionality does not seem 
to work with procedural expressions. It is very hard to find a procedural 
expression that can combine with (or modify) another procedural expression. For 
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instance, so cannot combine with after all to form a larger procedural unit so after 
all. Only representational entities can combine to form larger representations. 
Procedural expressions are non-representational. 
2.3.4. Procedures: constraints on implicature or explicature? 
As we have seen in chapter 1, Sperber and Wilson (1995:182) distinguish two 
categories of communicated assumptions: explicatures and implicatures. 
According to them, a communicated assumption is an explicature if and only if it 
is a development of the logical form (sub-propositional incomplete conceptual 
representation) encoded by a sentence. If a communicated assumption is not a 
development of a logical form, it is an implicature. I do not want to rehearse the 
explicit/implicit distinction again since it has been discussed in chapter 1 (sections 
1.2.3 and 1.4.1). What concerns me here is how this distinction relates to the 
conceptual/procedural distinction. 
The initial assumption made by Blakemore (1987) is that conceptually 
encoded information is part of what is explicitly communicated since it appears in 
the logical form encoded by the utterance and in any development of this logical 
form. Procedurally encoded information, on the other hand, is considered by 
Blakemore (1987) as part of the implicit side of what is communicated by an 
utterance, since procedural information is not representational and does not appear 
in the logical form of the sentence. However, subsequent research has shown that 
procedural information can contribute to both explicit and implicit communication. 
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Below is a comparison between Blakemore’s (1987) and Iten’s (2005) views of 
linguistic encoding and its relationship to the explicit/implicit distinction: 
 
Blakemore’s linguistic encoding                    Iten’s linguistic encoding  
 
   
 
   conceptual             procedural               conceptual           procedural  
 
 
 
      explicit                  implicit                 explicit           explicit or implicit 
communication     communication     communication       communication  
 
Figure 4: Blakemore’s vs. Iten’s conceptual/procedural distinction. 
  
We will see that Iten’s picture is more reasonable, since there are some 
linguistic expressions such as pronouns which have been analysed as encoding 
procedural meaning, but contribute to the explicit rather than implicit side of the 
utterance interpretation. We will see also (in Chapter 4) that some linguistic 
expressions in Arabic such as fa encode procedural meaning that contributes to 
both the explicature and implicature of the utterance in which it occurs.  
2.4. Discourse markers and truth conditions  
Blakemore (1987) is the first theorist who developed a fully detailed account of 
DMs. She studied DMs such as but, so and therefore from a relevance-theoretic 
point of view, arguing that such markers encode procedural meaning which 
controls the inferential phase of utterance interpretation. 
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In relation to this, I would like to make clear that, in addressing 
Blakemore’s account, I concentrate not just on DMs but rather on linguistic 
expressions whose linguistic meaning plays an inferential role in the utterance 
interpretation 
I will classify linguistic expressions into three categories: a) purely 
conceptual linguistic expressions, b) conceptuo-procedural linguistic expressions 
and c) purely procedural linguistic expressions. It will become clear that DMs 
such as but, so, because and after all belong to both (b) and (c) categories. The 
first two categories will be discussed in this chapter, while the third category will 
be discussed in the coming chapters. Before moving to that, I will briefly 
introduce the notion of metarepresentation, given the strong link between the 
procedural and metarepresentational use of some linguistic expressions such as 
illocutionary adverbials and parenthetical constructions. 
2.4.1. Metarepresentation and linguistic communication 
Wilson (2000) defines metarepresentation as a representation of another 
representation. More specifically, a higher-order representation with a lower-order 
representation embedded within it. According to Wilson, the higher-order 
representation is usually an utterance or thought, while the lower-order 
representation can be public representations (utterances), mental representations 
(thoughts) and abstract representations (sentences, propositions). Suppose that 
Clare utters (34) to John: 
 
(34)      You are a careless guy.  
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And John reports her utterance in two different ways, as in (35): 
 
(35)        a. Clare said to me, “You are a careless guy.”   
               b. Clare told me that I don’t take things seriously. 
 
In this case, both the lower-order and the higher-order representations are 
utterances. John’s reported direct quotation in (35a) and indirect quotation in (35b) 
are two metarepresentations of Clare’s original utterance. 
There are some cases where the lower-order representations are of abstract 
nature: linguistic logical or conceptual: 
 
(36)       a. ‘J'ai mal a la tête’ is a sentence of French.  
              b. It is true that the Earth is the third planet from the Sun in the Solar 
                System. 
              c. ‘Earth’ implies ‘planet’. 
 
Here, the higher-order representation is an utterance and the lower-order 
representation is an abstract representation: a sentence type in (36a), a proposition 
in (36b) and a concept in (36c).  
Wilson (2000:141) argues that all types of metarepresentation (public, 
mental and abstract) can be analysed in terms of the notion of ‘representation by 
resemblance’. This entails that the relation between the higher-order 
representation and the lower-order representation is a matter of resemblance rather 
than identity. For instance (35a, b) are not identical to (34), but there is a 
resemblance between them. 
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Noh (1996) points out that metarepresentations can be either ‘interpretive’ 
or ‘descriptive’. They are interpretive if there is a resemblance in content between 
the higher representation and the original one as is the case with (34) and (35). 
They are descriptive if the representation is used to describe a state of affairs. Noh 
has also tackled other metarepresentational cases (pronunciation and word stress) 
where the metarepresentation involves resemblance in linguistic form rather than 
content. Consider Noh’s examples: 
 
(37)       a. I eat TOMEIDOUZ (American pronunciation of ‘tomatoes’).  
              b. If you eat TOMEIDOUZ, you must be from America.  
 
(38)       a. I called the POlice.  
              b. If you called the POlice, the poLICE will not come. (jokingly). 
                 (Capital letters indicate the syllable on which word stress falls.) 
 
The metarepresentational antecedents given in (37b) and (38b) do not exploit 
resemblance with the originals in semantic content but rather in pronunciation and 
word stress. 
Illocutionary adverbials and parenthetical expressions and constructions 
can be analysed as metarepresentational devices in the sense that they add a 
further layer of metarepresentation to the communicated content (lower order 
representation): 
 
(39)       a. Allegedly, the fire is out of control.   
              b. Confidentially, the fire is out of control. 
              c. Unfortunately, the fire is out of control.  
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(40)       a. There is heavy rain tomorrow, the weather forecast says.  
             b. There is heavy rain tomorrow, I warn you. 
             c. There is heavy rain tomorrow, I am afraid. 
 
The illocutionary adverb and parenthetical comment in (39a) and (40a) is 
used metarepresentationally to attribute a thought to someone other than the 
speaker. In (39b-c) and (40b-c), the illocutionary adverb and parenthetical 
comment are used to carry speech act or propositional-attitude information about 
the speaker’s own utterance (Wilson 2000; Blakemore 1992; Recanati 1987; 
Urmson 1963). 
Illocutionary adverbs and parenthetical constructions will be analysed as 
encoding procedural meaning in some uses, as we will see later in this chapter. 
This does not mean that the procedural analysis of such constructions contradicts 
with the metarepresentational one. It will become clear that there is a strong link 
between procedural and metarepresentational uses of linguistic expressions, in the 
sense that both contribute to the inferential part of the utterance interpretation. 
2.4.2. Purely conceptual expressions 
2.4.2.1. Nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs 
As far as the conceptual/procedural distinction in RT is concerned, I will argue 
that most nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs in English (and almost in all 
languages) encode conceptual information. By applying Wilson and Sperber’s 
(1993) three tests, it appears that language users are able to recognise that nouns 
such as school, shirt, and hat encode conceptual representations. If we take the 
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first test ‘accessibility to consciousness’, we, as speakers and hearers, notice that 
it is very easy to bring their conceptual content to consciousness. In other words, 
it is very easy for us (as language users) to know that the linguistic expressions 
school, shirt and hat encode the concepts: SCHOOL, SHIRT and HAT 
respectively. It could be claimed that this analysis of nouns is the same in all 
languages. The meaning of nouns can be brought to consciousness due to fact that 
what is encoded by a noun is a concept not a procedure.  
This analysis is also true with verbs, adjectives and adverbs. The meaning 
of these expressions can be brought to consciousness in the same way the 
meanings of nouns can. It is quite easy for native speakers of English to bring to 
consciousness the meanings of linguisitic expressions such as write, huge and 
tomorrow. 
As for the second test ‘compositionality’, it is noticed that nouns, verbs, 
adjectives and adverbs which encode concepts can combine together to encode 
larger complex concepts. For instance, the expression bed which encodes the 
concept BED can combine with the expression room which encodes the concept 
ROOM to form the expression bedroom which encodes the larger complex 
concept BEDROOM.  
Concerning the third test ‘truth-evaluability’, most nouns, verbs, adjectives 
and adverbs contribute to the truth or falsity of utterances in which they occur. In 
other words they contribute constituents of the representation of the state of affairs 
for utterances: 
 
(41)       The sick boy will go to school tomorrow.  
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The above utterance corresponds to a state of affairs in the actual world; it can be 
judged as true or false. The mental representations contributed by the highlighted 
expressions affect the truth or falsity of the utterance. It is true, if the highlighted 
expression correspond to the state of affairs and false otherwise. 
2.4.3. Conceptuo-procedural expressions 
2.4.3.1. Pronouns as procedures 
Wilson and Sperber (1993) and Hedley (2005) argue that the linguistic meaning 
encoded by pronouns is procedural. They consider pronouns as communicative 
linguistic devices used by the speaker to point the hearer towards the intended 
referent. Hedley (2005:41) points out that, in RT, mind is seen as involving 
representations which are manipulated by mental computational apparatus (an 
approach broadly parallel to that of Fodor (e.g. 1980, 1983) and others). The 
general view is that linguistic expressions are linked to things in the real world via 
concepts (mental representations) manipulated by the computational apparatus. 
This in fact involves two different processes. The first one is based on decoding 
linguistic expressions into conceptual representations. The second one concerns 
the use of pragmatic faculties of inference in order to reach the intended meaning.  
As far as this distinction is concerned, Hedley argues that pronouns 
operate within the second process. For him, pronouns do not encode conceptual 
representations—what they provide is the computational apparatus that 
manipulates concepts. Consider the following example:  
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(42)       He is not John’s friend.  
 
According to Hedley, the pronoun he in the above utterance does not encode 
conceptual information. It rather gives instructions to the hearer to find the 
intended referent. In sum, pronouns in Hedley’s account encode procedures not 
concepts. 
The question that arises now: do pronouns indeed encode procedures? And 
if they do, are these procedures similar to those encoded by some DMs such as but, 
therefore, after all and so. An answer to this question could be that pronouns 
encode a different type of procedure. Unlike DMs, which control the inferential 
phase of utterance interpretation by constraining the contextual effect under which 
an utterance is relevant, pronouns offer instructions to the hearer to identify the 
referent of the pronoun. DMs such as but, therefore, so and after all do not encode 
concepts. None of Wilson and Sperber’s three tests for distinguishing conceptual 
from procedural information apply to them: They can neither be brought to 
consciousness, nor combine with other linguistic expressions, nor contribute to the 
truth conditions of utterances in which they occur. I will call this type of linguistic 
expressions ‘purely procedural linguistic expressions’. 
The case of pronouns is different. Pronouns are not empty lexical items as 
the DMs mentioned above. Pronouns do carry some sort of conceptual meaning 
which can be considered as pro-concept or concept schema, following Carston 
2002. For instance, a pronoun such as he can be brought into consciousness. It 
encodes the pro-concept of singularity and masculinity. By contrast, the pronoun 
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she encodes singularity and femininity. Other pronouns such as they and we 
encode plurality.  
Of course, the conceptual nature of pronouns is different from that of 
nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs. The conceptual dimension is not as clear in 
pronouns as it is in the other linguistic expressions referred to. As for truth-
evaluability, it can be noticed that what is linguistically encoded by pronouns 
plays a role in determining the truth conditions of the utterances in which 
pronouns occur. That is, the pro-conceptual schematic sub-propositional aspect 
encoded by the pronouns he in (42) affects the truth or falsity of the utterance. 
Furthermore, as regards ‘compositionality’, it is clear that pronouns combine with 
other linguistic expressions to form larger concepts. 
What I seek to argue here is that pronouns are neither purely conceptual 
nor purely procedural. They encode both procedural and conceptual meaning as 
shown in the figure below: 
 
                                         pronoun                          
     
                                       pro-concept  
    
                        pro                               concept  
 
             procedural meaning           conceptual meaning 
 
Figure 5: Pronouns as conceptuo-procedural linguistic expressions 
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Such expressions are pro-concepts. They encode a sub-propositional form 
which affects the truth-conditional content of utterances in which they occur and 
at the same time they provide hearers with instructions on how to reach the fully 
propositional form, i.e. the intended referent of the pronoun. For instance, a 
pronoun such as he used in an utterance, instructs the hearer to search for a 
referent which is ‘male’ and ‘singular’.  
2.4.3.2. The definite article and procedural encoding  
I am introducing the definite article here because it is relevant to the discussion of 
procedural expressions. To my knowledge, articles have not been analysed by 
Wilson and Sperber, Blakemore, Blass or any other researcher interested in the 
relevance-theoretic account of procedural meaning. My argument (Hussein 2008) 
is that the definite article the encodes procedural meaning in a similar way to 
pronouns, in the sense that it directs the hearer to the reference of a noun phrase.  
Lyons (1999:1) points out that in many languages, a noun phrase may 
contain an element which indicates the definiteness or indefiniteness of the noun 
phrase. This element could be a linguistic item such as the definite or indefinite 
article the and a as in English. It could also be a sort of affix as is the case in 
Arabic where the prefix al- is used to indicate definiteness and the suffix –n is 
used to indicate indefiniteness. 
As far as the definite and indefinite articles in English are concerned, 
Lyons (1999:2) argues that definiteness and indefiniteness are expressed by the 
use of such articles in the noun phrase. In other words, definiteness and 
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indefiniteness are linguistically encoded by the use of the articles referred to. He 
maintains that articles encode definiteness or indefiniteness plus other things. 
The notion of definiteness has been explained by some traditional 
grammarians in terms of ‘specificity’ and ‘particularity’. If the speaker or writer 
uses a noun phrase with a definite article, this means that she might be referring to 
a specific or particular thing. For instance, the in (43) indicates that the speaker 
refers to a specific or particular letter, not just any: 
 
(43)       I wrote the letter this afternoon.  
 
Lyons argues that the ‘specifity’ or ‘particularity’ account of definiteness 
is vague and inaccurate. The speaker or writer of (43) could possibly use a letter 
as a noun phrase to indicate that she is referring to a specific or particular letter 
not just to any although the article used in the noun phrase is indefinite: 
 
(44)       I wrote a letter this afternoon.   
 
Lyons suggests that definiteness might be explained in terms of 
‘familiarity’. The speaker in both (43) and (44) refers to a particular or specific 
letter. However the reference of the letter in (43) is assumed to be clear to both the 
speaker and hearer of the utterance. 
There are some cases in which the ‘familiarity’ account of definite article 
does not work either. Consider the following scenario given by Lyons (1999:6): 
Ann, who is putting up a picture on the wall, utters (45) to Joe who has just 
entered the room: 
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(45)       Pass me the hammer, will you?  
Joe looks around and sees a hammer on the chair. The familiarity account 
cannot work here because Joe, at the time of Ann’s utterance, does know that 
there is a hammer in the room. He has to look around and find a referent to the 
word ‘hammer’. The definite article used by Ann guides Joe to identify the 
hammer. This account is called the ‘identifiability’ account where the use of the 
definite article directs the hearer to the referent of the noun phrase by indicating 
that the hearer/addressee is in a position to identify it. In this sense, the definite 
article is similar to personal pronouns which are linguistic devices used by the 
speaker to point the hearer towards the intended referent. 
Furthermore, there are cases where both the ‘familiarity’ and 
‘identifiability’ accounts of the definite article fail to work. Consider Lyons, 
example (15) used here as (46) for convenience: 
 
(46)       I have just been to a wedding. The bride wore blue.  
 
The noun phrase the bride in the above utterance is definite. The hearer 
knows that in a wedding there should be a bride. But does the hearer identify a 
referent in the real sense? Even though the bride is a definite reference, the hearer 
does not know who the bride is or anything about her. If he sees the bride in the 
street next morning, he will not be able to recognise her as a person. 
In short, different accounts have been used to explain definiteness. The 
question that I want to raise now: is definiteness an outcome of conceptual or 
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procedural encoding? In other words, does the definite article the encode a 
concept or procedure? 
It is not clear from Wilson and Sperber’s three tests whether the article the 
encodes a concept or procedure. It is noticeable that the is not accessible to 
consciousness. Native speakers of English find it very hard to tell the meaning or 
give synonyms of the. What they can tell is just how the article is used. Given 
Sperber and Wilson’s tests, this is evidence that it is procedural. As regards, 
‘semantic compositionality’, the definite article the combines only with one type 
of linguistic expression, namely ‘nouns’. However this combination does not form 
larger complex concept. As for the third test ‘truth-evaluability’, I assume that the 
definite article contributes to the truth-conditional content of utterance in which 
they occur. There is difference in truth conditions between (47) and (48) as can be 
noticed in (49): 
 
(47)    I wrote the letter.    
(48)    I wrote a letter.   
(49)    It is true that I did not write the letter this afternoon, but I did write a letter.  
 
I will argue that the definite article is a conceptuo-procedural linguistic expression. 
It is neither purely procedural nor purely conceptual. It encodes a procedural 
meaning which leads to a concept. 
The procedural nature of definite article is referred to indirectly by Lyons 
(1999:6) in his footnote 3:  
 
Note that the article itself does not identify the referent; the is a 
“grammatical word” with no descriptive lexical content, and 
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therefore contains nothing which can itself identify a referent. The 
most it can do is invite the hearer to exploit clues in the linguistic 
or extralinguisitc context to establish the identity of the referent. 
 
This is actually what the account of procedural meaning is about (or at 
least how I understand it); linguistic expressions do not contribute constituents to 
the conceptual representations of the utterance but provide constraints on how 
those conceptual representations should be processed during the inferential stage 
of the utterance interpretation. To see how the procedural account of the definite 
article works, consider (45) repeated here as (50) for convenience: 
 
(50)       Pass me the hammer, will you?   
 
The noun phrase the hammer in the above utterance is used to make a 
definite reference, on the identifiability account given by Lyons. However, the 
identifiability of the referent hammer is not conceptually encoded by the article. 
The article offers a guarantee by the speaker that there is an identifiable hammer 
though it does not identify it. We have seen that the is a linguistic expression with 
no descriptive lexical content. It encodes a procedure which leads to the concept 
of ‘definiteness’. I assume that the identifiability of the referent hammer is 
procedurally encoded by the in the sense that the article directs the hearer to find 
the referent by indicating that he is in a position to identify it (Hussein 2008: 75). 
My analysis of the definite article as encoding procedural meaning is 
compatible with Hawkins’ (1991) analysis. The latter argues that the definite 
article introduces the referent to the hearer, instructs the hearer to locate the 
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referent in some contextually salient set of objects and refers to the totality of the 
objects or mass within this set which satisfy the description. He claims that the 
entails uniqueness and carries a conventional implicature that there is some P-set 
accessible to the speaker and hearer with which uniqueness holds.  
The reason why I am including the definite article among conceptuo-
procedural expressions rather than purely procedural expressions is that the 
procedural meaning encoded by the definite article is different from the 
procedural meaning encoded by purely procedural expressions such as but, 
therefore and so. The difference is that the procedural meaning encoded by DMs 
contributes to the inferential part of the utterance interpretation by constraining 
the contextual information under which the utterance is relevant. Whereas, similar 
to pronouns, the definite article contribute to the process of utterance 
interpretation by directing the hearer towards the referent of noun phrase and thus 
the explicature. 
2.4.3.3. Parentheticals: concepts or procedures? 
The relevance-theoretic notion of procedural meaning was limited to linguistic 
expressions that contribute to the interpretation by constraining the contextual 
information under which the utterances containing them are relevant (Blakemore: 
1987). Blakemore’s early work on procedural expressions assumes a parallelism 
between the terms ‘procedural’ and ‘constraint’. She argues that any linguistic 
expression encoding procedural meaning puts constraints on the interpretation of 
the utterance in which it occurs. In other words, the procedure encoded by a 
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linguistic expression guides the hearer during the process of the utterance 
interpretation. On this account, conceptual meaning never provides inference that 
constrains the utterance interpretation. 
However, Blakemore (2007a) reviews her earlier view of the assumed 
parallelism between ‘procedural’ and ‘constraint’. Her revision is motivated by 
the fact that some parenthetical constructions and sentence adverbials which have 
been analysed in conceptual terms by relevance theorists, do constrain the 
interpretation of their host utterances. Such constructions encode conceptual 
information which provides indication on how the host utterance is interpreted. 
This was referred to by Ifantidou (1993, 2001), even though she did not use the 
term ‘constraint’ herself. Ifantidou suggests that an utterance containing a 
parenthetical sentential adverbial should be treated as a collection of sub-
utterances that communicate a variety of explicatures. For instance the utterance 
in (51) can be treated as two sub-utterances—the host utterance which 
communicates the explicatures in (52a) and the parenthetical utterance which 
communicates the explicature in (52b): 
 
(51)       Unfortunately, Jo has no intention of leaving.   
(52a)     The speaker believes that Jo has no intention of leaving.  
              The speaker is saying that Jo has no intention of leaving.   
              Jo has no intention of leaving. 
(52b)     The speaker believes that it is unfortunate that Jo has no intention of 
              leaving.   
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As can be seen, Ifantidou’s analysis entails that the parenthetical sentential 
adverbial is a constituent of the propositional representation which enters the 
inferential computations needed to satisfy the hearer’s expectation of relevance.   
Blakemore (2007a:2) suggests that the issue of assumed parallelism 
between ‘procedural’ and ‘constraint’ could perhaps be solved terminologically, 
i.e. by adopting two different terminologies such as ‘procedural constraints’ and 
‘conceptual constraints’. On this suggestion, constraints can be communicated by 
either procedural or conceptual information.  For instance, conceptual constraints 
can be communicated by expressions (or constructions) which are constituents of 
propositional representations, as is the case with the parenthetical sentential 
adverbial discussed in (51). By the same analogy, we can also have ‘procedural 
constraints’ imposed by expressions which encode procedures as is the case with 
most of the DMs.  
However, Blakemore (2007a:22) seems to disfavour the terminological 
solution. She points out that the terminological solution will not help us 
understand how parentheticals contribute to the interpretation of their host 
utterances. According to her, it will be misleading to describe expressions such as 
‘frankly’ and ‘apparently’ as constraining the interpretation of the host utterance. 
Blakemore (2007a) does not make her final statement about the acceptance of the 
terminological solution. But she points out that, if we wish to admit the existence 
of constraints on the interpretation which are communicated by expressions that 
encode conceptual content, we have to recognise that what is communicated is 
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communicated at the level of conceptual (propositional) representation rather than 
at the level of what is linguistically encoded. 
Blakemore’s notion of procedural meaning has been developed and 
broadened through different stages. Her initial argument (1987) was that 
procedural meaning puts constraints on the implicit side of the utterance 
interpretation, as is the case with the procedural meanings encoded by DMs such 
as so, after all and therefore. Further work (2002) allows for expressions whose 
linguistic encoding puts constraints on the explicit side of the utterance 
interpretation, as we have seen in Wilson and Sperber (1993) and Hedley’s (2005) 
analysis of personal pronouns. Her current work claims that parentheticals place 
constraints on both the explicit and implicit side of the interpretation of their host 
utterances. Consider her example (56) in which the parenthetical clause is 
interpreted as constraining the interpretation of the host by implicitly 
communicating information about the degree of commitment that the hearer is 
expected to have towards the host proposition:  
 
(53)       What is obvious – and we have the reports – is that they were killed (from 
              a discussion of the causes of the destruction of the population of Easter 
              Island, BBC Radio 4, 26 August 2005).   
  
2.4.3.4. Parentheticals and reformulation 
One of the most important and defining feature of parentheticals is that they 
interrupt the syntactic structure of the host sentence. In this respect, Blakemore 
(2007b) argues that the reformulations introduced by an appositional marker such 
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as or may be parenthetical, i.e. the or-reformulation in (54) is not part of the 
syntactic structure of the host sentence: 
 
(54)       Debka, or folk dance, is very famous in the Middle East.   
 
Blakemore (2005, 2007b) investigates parenthetical and-reformulations, 
parenthetical or-reformulations and parenthetical that is-reformulations. The 
concentration, in this section, will be on her analysis of the reformulations 
introduced by or and that is. 
Blakemore (2007b:311) argues that reformulations introduced by or are 
not interpreted in the same way as reformulations introduced by that is. This 
suggests that pragmatic reformulation is not a unitary phenomenon. Building on 
Burton-Robert’s (1993) account of or, she suggests that the meaning of or in its 
appositional use is that of the standard disjunctive connective, but used meta-
linguistically. She maintains that the reformulations introduced by that is, by 
contrast, are analysed on the level of conceptual representation, not meta-
linguistically. Blakemore (2007b) agrees with Potts (2005) that, unlike or-
reformulations, that is-reformulations communicate information about the 
propositional content of the host. In other words, such reformulations explicitly 
communicate a proposition which plays a role in the identification of the truth-
conditional content of the host utterance. 
The main difference between or-reformulation and that is-reformulations 
is that the former is metalinguistic, while the latter is meta-representational. Or-
reformulations, in Blakemore’s account, are analysed as the information 
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communicated about the linguistic representation used in the communication of 
the concept. To put that differently, an or-reformulation communicates that there 
is an alternative linguistic expression (or construction) which can be used for the 
communication of the concept communicated by an expression in the host 
utterance. This is the case in (54) where the construction folk dance is another 
way of communicating the concept communicated by Debka. That is- 
reformulations, by contrast, are metarepresentational. They are analysed as the 
information communicated about the propositional or conceptual representation 
communicated by the host utterance. Consider the following example: 
 
(55)       We are looking for a hall for our Christmas party, that is, a hall which 
              is large enough for 100 persons. We might find such a hall in the Union 
             Society.  
 
The parenthetical reformulation introduced by that is in (55) could not be 
analysed in terms of linguistic representation, but rather in terms of interpretive 
resemblance between conceptual or propositional representations. Parenthetical 
that is-reformulation does not offer a linguistic expression that communicates a 
concept communicated by another linguistic expression in the host utterance; it 
rather communicates a thought or proposition communicated by the host utterance. 
The parenthetical clause that is, a hall which is large enough for 100 persons 
plays a role in identifying the concept in the host utterance, i.e. the concept 
communicated by the reformation resembles that communicated by the original 
host. 
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It can be noticed that both or-reformulations and that is-reformulations put 
constraints on the interpretation of the host utterance no matter whether these 
reformulations are analysed as meta-linguistic or meta-representational. Other 
parenthetical expressions such as ‘sentence adverbials’ can also play a role in the 
interpretation of the utterance in which they occur as we have seen in example 
(51). 
In relation to parenthetical constructions particularly parenthetical or-
reformulations and parenthetical that is-reformulations, I would like to make the 
following three claims. Firstly, parenthetical or-reformulations and that is- 
reformulation are conceptuo-procedural. The elements in these reformulations can 
be analysed in conceptual terms. For instance, the linguistic construction folk 
dance is a conceptual combination which has two further concepts FOLK and 
DANCE. However, at the same time, this conceptual combination is used 
procedurally in constraining the interpretation of the utterance in which it occurs. 
The combination folk dance contributes to the interpretation of the host utterance. 
It is used by the speaker to point out to the hearer that Debka is a special type of 
dance performed by a group of people. This combination is used by the speaker 
because she may assume that the hearer will find it difficult to know which type 
of dance is meant by her.  
Secondly, I assume that there is a unitary account of reformulation, in the 
sense that both or-reformulations and that is-reformulations, no matter whether 
they are analysed as meta-linguistic or meta-representational, put constraints on 
the interpretation of the host utterances. For instance, that is-reformulation in (55) 
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is used parenthetically. It is analysed by Blakemore in conceptual terms, but I 
assume that the parenthetical plays a procedural role in the sense that it constrains 
the interpretation of the host utterance. The speaker uses the parenthetical to 
indicate to the hearer that she is looking for a special type of hall, not just any hall, 
but a hall which is large enough to have 100 persons. Without this information 
given in this parenthetical, the hearer will not know what is intended by the 
speaker. It is true that the parenthetical in (55) has its own truth conditions, but it 
does not contribute to the truth conditions of the host utterance, it rather provides 
the hearer with a clarification of the speaker’s intention. 
Thirdly, I assume that a sort of parallelism does exist between the term 
‘procedural’ and the term ‘constraint’. In Blakemore’s account of procedural 
meaning, all procedures encoded by linguistic expressions and/or constructions 
put constraints on the interpretation of the utterances in which they occur. All 
procedures provide the hearer with inference on how to interpret the utterance. By 
that, as single terminology (conceptuo-procedural) can be used to describe such 
expressions whose linguistic meaning is used both conceptually and procedurally.  
2.4.3.5. The case of ‘because’ 
Schiffrin (1987) considers because as a discourse marker which operates on the 
ideational structure of discourse: 
 
Another structure of discourse is ideational. In contrast to exchange 
and action structure, the units within this structure are semantic; 
they are propositions, or what I’ll just call ideas. 
                                                                                         (Schiffrin 1987: 25)                                                                         
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In this sense, because relates two ideas and/or propositions in discourse. 
She points out that because is used by the speaker to indicate causal relations in 
discourse as shown in the example below: 
 
(56)       [Peter failed the exam] because [he did not prepare well].          
 
As can be noticed in (56), the clause introduced by because ‘he did not prepare 
well’ is a real-world ‘cause’ for the ‘result’ in the main clause ‘Peter failed the 
exam’. If we take this example from a relevance-theoretic of view, we can say that 
because encodes a conceptual relationship between two propositions and that 
there is nothing procedural in this use. 
However, Sweetser (1990:77) points out that because can have three 
readings: ‘content’ reading, ‘epistemic entity’ reading and ‘speech act’ reading. 
The first reading is equivalent to Schiffrin notion of ideational because: 
 
(57)       Peter got sick because he ate the poisoned food.  
(58)       Peter may come back because he forgot his wallet.  
(59)       What is time now, because I have got an appointment with my dentist? 
(60)       Leave the room, because I want to clean it.  
 
In the first sentence, (57), because has a content use. It indicates that there is real-
world ‘causality’ between two clauses, namely ‘Peter’s eating the poisoned food’ 
is a real-world ‘cause’ for ‘his getting sick’. By contrast, because in sentence (58) 
does not indicate ‘causality’ but rather shows that the speaker is asking the hearer 
to consider Peter’s coming back as a ‘conclusion’ and ‘leaving his wallet’ as a 
‘premise’. Sweetser calls this reading of because as ‘epistemic’. In sentence (59), 
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there is no sense of ‘causality’. Because is interpreted by Sweetser as indicating a 
speech act within the main clause in the sense that (59) can be paraphrased as ‘I 
ask you: what is time now because I have an appointment with my dentist’. 
Similar analysis can be constructed for (60). 
As far as the conceptual/procedural distinction is concerned, I would claim 
that because is conceptuo-procedural linguistic expression. It encodes conceptual 
meaning in some cases but it can be used procedurally in others. If we reconsider 
its use in (57), we can notice that because in this sentence operates on the 
conceptual level. It encodes that there is a concept of ‘causality’ between two 
events. In this sense, it contributes a constituent to the conceptual representation 
of the utterance containing it. Furthermore, this use of because contributes to the 
truth-conditional content of the utterance, i.e. (57) is true if and only if P 
(proposition communicated by the main clause) is true, Q (proposition 
communicated by because-clause) is true and ‘Q causes P’ is true as shown below: 
 
(P because Q) is true iff: 
P = T 
Q= T 
Q causes P 
 
On the other hand, the use of because in (58) does not operate on the conceptual 
representational level. We can see that because does not communicate a sense of 
causality between two events as is the case with (57). It could be argued that this 
use of because can best be analysed in relevance-theoretic notion of procedural 
meaning according to which a certain linguistic expression encodes information 
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which operates on the inferential level of the utterance interpretation. Because in 
(58) encodes procedural information that constrains the inferential phase of the 
utterance interpretation by guiding the hearer to interpret the clause introduced by 
because as a ‘premise’ and the main clause as a ‘conclusion’. Moreover, what is 
encoded by because in (58) does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of 
the utterance. (58) is true if and only if P is true and Q is true no matter whether 
there is a causal relation between P and Q or not: 
The third use of because in (59) is similar to that in (58) in the sense that 
because in both uses does not communicate any causal relation between the two 
propositions it links. The use of because in (59) constrains the interpretation of the 
utterance, in which because occurs, by pointing to the hearer that the information 
in the second clause (introduced by because) is relevant to him. 
As can be noticed, because can be used in three different types of sentence:   
‘declarative’ (57) and (58), ‘interrogative’ (59) and ‘imperative’ (60). It can 
encode conceptual information in some uses as in (57) and used procedurally in 
others as (58) and (59) and (60).  
It can be noticed that, no matter whether it occurs in declarative, 
interrogative or imperative sentence, because is used metarepresentationally. In 
(58), (59) and (60) because does not contribute a constituent to the semantic 
representations of the utterances or encode conceptual—‘causal’ relationship 
between the content of the two clauses. It rather contributes to the 
metarepresentational level of the utterance interpretation by relating between the 
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proposition it introduces and the reasons behind saying, asking or requesting what 
is said, asked or requested in main clause. 
It could be argued that, in the metarepresentational uses, because can be 
analysed procedurally as constraining the relevance of the clause it introduces. 
Consider its uses in the following examples: 
 
(61)       He broke his arm because he fell off his bike. 
                    ‘result’                              ‘cause’               ⇒ [representational] 
 
(62)       a. He is going out because he put his hat on.  
                 ‘conclusion’                          ‘premise’          ⇒ [metarepresentational] 
 
Unlike because in (61), because in (62) does not operate on the representational 
level—it does not relate the two representations in each sentence. In other words, 
it does not relate between ‘going out’ and ‘putting the hat on’. There is no 
indication made by because that one representation is a ‘cause’ or ‘result’ to the 
other. The relation encoded by because in this sentence is metarepresentational. 
Because relates between the representation it introduces ‘putting the hat on’ and 
that reasons behind saying that ‘he is going out’.  
This metarepresentational use of because can be analysed in procedural 
terms. It can be argued that because in (62) contributes to the inferential phase of 
the utterance interpretation by putting constraints on the relevance of the 
proposition it introduces. It guides the hearer to interpret the proposition 
communicated in the first clause ‘he is going out’ as ‘conclusion’ to the ‘premise’ 
communicated in the because-clause (he put his hat on).    
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To sum up, because is a conceptuo-procedural linguisitic expression. It has 
a conceptual content in general but it can be used procedurally, in 
metarepresentational cases, by constraining the relevance of the clause it 
introduces. It can be used representationally and metarepresentationally in 
declarative, interrogative and imperative sentences.  Representational uses of 
because are similar to Sweetser’s (1990) content use where because is used to 
indicate conceptual relations between two propositions. By contrast, because in 
the metarepresentational uses does not contribute a constituent to the semantic 
representation of the utterance, but rather works on the higher level of the 
utterance interpretation in the sense that it relates between the clause it introduces 
and reason behind uttering the first clause.  
2.4.3.6. Real and unreal conditionals 
Some researchers, such as Grice (1967), analyse the natural language expression if 
as semantically identical to the material implication in logic ‘⊃’ which is a truth-
functional connective. According to the truth table of material implication, (P ⊃ Q) 
is true on all possible combinations except when P is true and Q is false: 
 
(63)       P Q    P ⊃ Q    
             T  T    T 
             T  F    F 
             F  T    T  
             F  F    T   
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On this analysis if, in natural language, encodes a truth functional operator on the 
two clauses it links, i.e. the ‘antecedent’ (protasis) and the ‘consequent’ (apodosis). 
Consider the following conditional utterance: 
 
(64)       If the king dies, his son will take over the throne.   
 
As can be noticed, if in the above example relates two states of affairs: ‘the king’s 
death’ and ‘his son’s taking over the throne’. The conditional in (64) is true in all 
situations except that in which the king dies and his son does not take over the 
throne. Furthermore, two logical inferences can be allowed in such conditionals: 
 
(65)                      Modus Ponens  Modus Tollens   
                              1. P ⊃ Q               1. P ⊃ Q 
                              2. P               2. ~ Q  
Therefore:       3. Q    3. ~ P 
 
According to Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens, if it is the case that P then it is 
the case that Q and if it is not the case that Q then it is not the case that P. In other 
words, if it is the case that ‘the king dies’ then it is the case that ‘his son will take 
over the throne’ and if it is not the case that ‘his son will take over the throne’ 
then it is not the case that ‘the king dies’. In this type of conditional, P ⊃ Q does 
not entail P and Q, i.e. ‘if the king dies, his son will take over the throne’ does not 
entail that ‘the king dies’ and does not entail that ‘his son will take over the 
throne’.  
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Some researchers, such as Akatsuka (1986), Van der Auwera (1986) and 
Sweetser (1990), claim that if semantically encodes non-truth-functional relations 
such as ‘causal’ and ‘consequential’ relations between the antecedent and the 
consequent. For instance, if in (66) semantically encodes that ‘the king’s death’ is 
a ‘cause’ and ‘his son’s taking over the throne’ is a ‘consequence’. On this 
analysis, the conditional could have the ‘if p then q’ (‘P→Q’) interpretation: 
 
(66)       If the king dies, then his son will take over the throne.   
 
In his analysis of conditionals, Van der Auwera proposes the principle of 
Sufficiency Hypothesis (SH) on which ‘if P then Q’ means that P is a sufficient 
condition for Q. In other words, the truth of the antecedent is a sufficient 
condition for the truth of the consequent. For instance ‘the king’s death’ in (66) is 
a sufficient condition for ‘his son’s taking over the throne’. 
However, there is another type of conditionals where Van der Auwera’s 
principle of SH does not work and the ‘if p then q’ interpretation is not possible. 
Consider the following example: 
 
(67)       If you are thirsty, there is a lemon juice in the fridge.   
 
The SH proposed by Van der Auwera could not account for the above conditional. 
The truth of the antecedent is not a sufficient condition for the truth of the 
consequent; the hearer’s thirst is not a sufficient condition for the presence of the 
lemon juice in the fridge. If in the conditional referred to, does not encode 
semantic relations—‘causal’ or ‘consequential’. It is not possible to say that ‘the 
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presence of lemon juice in the fridge’ is a consequence of the ‘hearer’s thirst’. To 
put that differently, this sort of conditional does not lend itself to ‘if P then Q’ 
interpretation: 
 
(68)       *If you are thirsty, then there is a lemon juice in the fridge.  
 
The truth conditions in such sort of conditionals are not identical with the truth 
table for material implication. The truth table shows that if P is false, (68) will be 
true no matter whether Q is true or false. But (68) does not suggest that if the 
hearer is not thirsty, there will be no lemon juice in the fridge. On the contrary, it 
suggests that, even if the hearer is not thirsty, the lemon juice is still in the fridge.  
Such type of conditional does not lend itself to Modus Ponens and Modus 
Tollens logical inferences. For instance, the case that P (you are thirsty) does not 
lead to the case that Q (there is a lemon juice in the fridge). And, the case that not 
Q (there is no lemon juice in the fridge) does not lead to the case that not P (you 
are not thirsty). In this type of conditionals, P ⊃ Q entails Q but not P—‘if you are 
thirsty, there is a lemon juice in the fridge’ entails that ‘there is a lemon juice in 
the fridge’, but it does not entail that ‘you are thirsty’. 
In her analysis of conditionals, Sweetser retains Van der Auwera’s SH. 
She argues that ‘conditionality’ functions in three domains: content, epistemic and 
speech act domains. Content conditionals relate events or states of affairs. They 
indicate that the truth of the antecedent is a sufficient condition for the truth of the 
consequent; the ‘king’s death’ is a sufficient condition for ‘his son’s taking over 
the throne’. In the epistemic domain, by contrast, conditionals relate between 
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epistemic states where the conditional could be paraphrased as ‘If I know the 
[antecedent], I conclude the [consequent]: 
 
(69)       If Peter submitted his dissertation last Monday, then he was trying to 
             finish by the deadline.   
 
On this analysis, if the hearer knows that Peter submitted his dissertation last 
Monday, then he will conclude that Peter was trying to finish by the deadline. The 
knowledge of the antecedent, in epistemic conditionals, is sufficient for the 
knowledge of the consequent. 
As for speech act conditionals, Sweetser maintains that the truth of the 
antecedent is a sufficient condition for a speech act involving the consequent. 
According to Sweetser, this type of conditionals performs a speech act assigned to 
the consequent on condition that the antecedent is true. For instance, (67) 
indicates that ‘if you are thirsty I inform you (speech act) that there is lemon juice 
in the fridge’. In other words, ‘your being thirsty is a sufficient condition for my 
informing you of the presence of lemon juice in the fridge. 
My claim is that conditionals which fit the truth table of material 
implication are ‘real’ conditionals. Such conditionals operate on the 
representational level. They relate two representations (e.g. ‘the king’s death’ and 
‘his son’s taking over the throne). Conditionals which do not fit the truth table of 
material implication are ‘unreal’ conditionals. Such conditionals operate on the 
metarepresentational level where if does not relate two representations as is the 
case in real conditionals. For instance, if in (67) does not relate between the two 
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clauses but rather between the ‘if clause’ and the reasons behind saying what is 
said in the second clause. This claim seems to be compatible with Horns’ (1989) 
claim that the conditional operator can be either used ‘descriptively’ or 
‘metalinguistically’. In the descriptive use, if is equivalent to the material 
implication ‘⊃’ in logic, while in the metalinguistic use it is not. For instance, if in 
(64) is used descriptively, while in (67) it is used metalinguistically. 
Based on that, my argument will be that that if can function as a 
conceptuo-procedural linguistic expression. It is used conceptually in real 
representational conditionals   and procedurally in unreal metarepresentational 
conditionals. In the conceptual use, if contributes to the semantic representation of 
the proposition communicated in the conditional as is the case with (64). By 
contrast, in the procedural use, if does not contribute to the semantic 
representation of the conditionals but play a role in the inferential part of the 
conditional interpretation by constraining the relevance of the second clause. 
Reconsider (64) and (67) repeated here as (70) and (71): 
 
(70)       If the king dies, his son will take over the throne.  
(71)       If you are thirsty, there is a lemon juice in the fridge.  
 
As can be noticed, if in (70) operates on the representational level, it contributes to 
the conceptual representations of the conditional by encoding the concept of 
‘causality’ or ‘consequence’: ‘the king’s death’ causes ‘his son’s taking over the 
throne’ or ‘his son’s taking over the throne’ is a consequence of ‘the king’s death’. 
It is generally accepted that causal and consequential relations are conceptual 
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relations. As for (71), it seems that if does not encode conceptual information 
which contributes to the representations of the conditional as is the case with (70) 
where if encodes ‘causality’ or ‘consequence’. The linguistic expression if in (71) 
rather encodes procedural information which operates on the inferential level of 
the conditional interpretation. What is encoded by if in (71) constrains the 
interpretation by guiding the hearer to see how the proposition, given in the 
second clause, achieves relevance in accordance with the proposition given in the 
first clause. If explains to the hearer the relevance of the speaker’s saying that 
‘there is a lemon juice in the fridge’. In other words, the speaker is telling the 
hearer that ‘there is a lemon juice in the fridge’ in case ‘if’ he is thirsty and this 
implicates that the hearer can drink the lemon juice.  
Unlike the interpretation of (70) which involves two propositions; one of 
them causes (or is a consequence of) the other, the interpretation of (71) involves 
three propositions: a) ‘you are thirsty’, b) ‘there is lemon juice in the fridge’, c) 
‘the presence of lemon juice in the fridge is relevant to the person referred to in 
the conditional’. That is why, ‘if P then Q’ interpretation is not possible in this 
conditional.  
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter was a scrutiny of two types of linguistic meaning: the truth-
conditional/non-truth-conditional and conceptual/procedural meaning. As for the 
first type, some non-truth-conditional elements have been discussed. Concerning 
the second type, the argument was, as far as the conceptual/procedural distinction 
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is concerned, linguistic expressions can fall into three categories: a) purely 
conceptual linguistic expressions such as ‘nouns’, ‘verbs’, ‘adjectives’ and 
‘adverbs’; b) conceptuo-procedural linguistic expressions such as ‘pronouns’, the 
‘definite article the’, ‘unreal conditional’, ‘because’ and the expression if, c) 
purely procedural linguistic expressions which include most discourse makers 
such as but, so, after all and therefore. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3. Discourse Markers in English: Two Approaches  
3.1. Introduction 
Discourse markers have been much studied in the last twenty years; different 
proposals and approaches have been developed on this subject. Fraser (1999) 
refers to their problematic and controversial nature. He points out that DMs have 
been studied by different researchers under different labels. Fraser maintains that 
researchers have agreed that DMs are lexical expressions that relate discourse 
segments, but they have disagreed on how they are defined and what functions 
they carry. 
Schourup (1999) expresses similar views. He argues that there is 
disagreement on fundamental issues in the study of DMs. Researchers are unable 
to agree on the grammatical category of DMs or how to delimit their class or even 
what types of meaning these markers express.  
In this chapter, my purpose is to give a detailed analysis of the main 
approaches and proposals adopted in studying DMs in the last 20 years and 
highlight the similarities and differences between theses proposals. I classify the 
researchers of DMs into two groups. The first group includes researchers who 
adopt a coherence-based account. The main figures of this group are Schiffrin 
(1987), Fraser (1988, 1990), Schourup (1999), Redeker (1990, 1991), Zwicky 
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(1985) and Giora (1997, 1998). The second includes the researchers who base 
their study and analysis of DMs on Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) RT. This group 
includes Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2002), Blass (1990) Iten (1998), Wilson and 
Sperber (1993) and Rouchota (1998). 
This chapter highlights the dispute between the two groups regarding 
different issues in the study and analysis of DMs. The major issue, in my opinion, 
is how the use of DMs contributes to discourse interpretation. Researchers in the 
coherence group argue that DMs play a major role in the interpretation of the text 
by signalling ‘coherence’ relations between discourse units. In other words, the 
interpretation of a text, according to the coherence group, depends on the 
identification of coherence relations between the units of that text (Schourup, 
1999: 240). The notion of ‘text’, as a level of linguistic representation, is 
important here.  
 As for researchers in the relevance group, they consider DMs as 
indicators or procedures that constrain the inferential phase of utterance 
interpretation by guiding the process of utterance interpretation and offering clues 
that enable the hearer/reader to recognize the intended cognitive effect with the 
least processing effort (Blakemore, 2000: 464). In short, the coherence group 
looks at DMs as linguistic devices that maintain coherence in the text through 
linking its units, whereas the relevance group considers such markers as pragmatic 
devices that constrain the relevance of discourse units. In the latter, the notion of 
‘text’ is less important and in fact plays no role in the theory in the sense that 
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relevance relations hold, not between linguistic representations but between 
relevance conceptual representations (thoughts).  
It will become clear, towards the end of this chapter, that I favour the 
relevance-theoretic approach over the coherence-based one. It will be concluded 
that ‘coherence’ is replaced by ‘relevance’—which is a cognitive, not a linguistic, 
concept. The essential difference between ‘coherence’ and ‘relevance’ is that the 
latter considers discourse well-formedness as a cognitive (not linguistic) entity. In 
other words, ‘relevance’ will be offered as an alternative to ‘coherence’.  
In addition to the above primary difference between the two groups, this 
chapter investigates some other sub-differences concerning the semantic, 
pragmatic and structural status and functions of DMs. The investigation also 
tackles the disagreement between researchers in the same group. For instance, 
some researchers in the coherence group argue for a unified grammatical category 
for DMs (Zwicky 1985), some others do not (Schiffrin 1987). Some researchers 
claim that DMs have semantic (core) meaning (Murray, 1979) and (Bolinger 
1989), while others deny this (Schiffrin 1987). And, among researchers of the 
relevance group, there is disagreement (a) whether their meaning is conceptual or 
procedural and (b) whether they contribute to the implicit or explicit interpretation 
of utterances. Blakemore (1987) argued that DMs are lexical expressions whose 
meaning does not contribute to the truth conditional content of utterances in which 
they occur. The main function of these markers is to constrain the implicit side of 
utterance interpretation. 
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This chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 discusses the coherence-
based account of DMs (Schiffrin 1987; Giora1997, 1998 and Fraser 1988, 1990). 
This account argues that DMs play a crucial role in the interpretation of discourse 
by signalling coherence relations between discourse units. Section 3.3 investigates 
the relevance-based account of DMs (Blakemore1987, 1992, 2002; Blass1990; 
Iten 1998 and Wilson & Sperber1993). Section 3.4 gives an evaluation of the two 
accounts and favours the relevance account which considers coherence as a 
cognitive rather than linguistic entity. Section 3.5 is a conclusion 
3.2. Coherence-based account of discourse markers  
3.2.1. What is coherence?  
Halliday and Hasan (1976) point out that coherence is what makes a passage of 
sentences semantically well-formed (makes it constitute a ‘text’). When two 
sentences cohere, a semantic relationship holds between them—and a text is 
created. Werth (1984:60) points out that the well-formedness of discourse is 
achieved through ‘connectivity’ which is realised in four forms; ‘cohesion’, 
‘collocation’, ‘connectors’ and ‘coherence’. Werth argues that these four forms 
are ultimately the same in the sense that the first three are subsumed under the 
fourth. I ignore ‘collocation’ and ‘connectors’ here and concentrate on 
‘coherence’ and ‘cohesion’. It seems that there is interrelation between these two 
concepts. Coherence is an umbrella under which cohesion operates. Cohesion is 
one of the linguistic devices that contributes to the coherence of a certain text 
through the syntactic process of interconnecting the sentences of this text. 
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Halliday and Hasan (1976) point out that the concept of ‘cohesion’ accounts for 
the semantic relationships through which a certain passage of speech or writing 
become a text. According to them, cohesion can have the following forms: co-
reference, ellipsis, and conjunction as illustrated in (a), (b) and (c) respectively: 
 
(a)       John visited me yesterday. He is my closest friend. 
(b)       Would you like to have some more tickets to the party? I have ten left. 
(c)       He is in the garden, but I cannot see him. 
 
Halliday and Hasan (1976:1) provide a comprehensive discussion of the 
notion of cohesion. They point out that cohesion is a set of different linguistic 
devices through which one can judge whether a certain sequence of sentences is a 
text or not. If sentences maintain semantic relationships between each other 
through the use of some cohesive devices, then these sentences would form a text.  
This makes the notion of cohesion very crucial to the term ‘texture’. The 
texture of a certain passage of sentences is achieved through the presence of some 
cohesive relations between the sentences of this passage. Consider an example: 
 
(1)       I have bought some pens. I gave three of them to my brother. 
 
As can be noticed, the sentences in (1) cohere; there is a cohesive relationship 
between them represented by the anaphoric reference where ‘pens’, three’ and 
‘them’ refer to the same object.  
Halliday and Hasan (1976:5) argue that cohesion can be achieved partly 
through grammar and partly through vocabulary. This can result in having two 
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different types of cohesion: ‘grammatical cohesion’ and ‘lexical cohesion’. The 
famous examples of grammatical cohesion are those achieved through linking 
(connecting) linguistic expressions or DMs such as and, or, but, yet, now, then, 
however and after all. Consider the example below:  
 
(2)       a. He has got a very good mark in the math test. 
            b. And he has been the first in his class for the last two years (additive). 
            c. Yet he failed his syntax test this term (adversative). 
            d. Now, he feels very frustrated and thinks of leaving school (temporal).  
 
The linking words in (2) are cohesive devices that express semantic relationships 
between the sentences as illustrated. As for lexical cohesion, it can be achieved 
through devices such as ‘repetition and ‘reiteration’. Consider the following 
example in which lexical cohesion is achieved through the repetition of the word 
woman and the synonymy of the word mother.  
 
(3)      There was a great woman, who used to look after me when I was a kid. She 
           used to feed me, play with me and tell me nice stories. The woman was 
            my mother. 
 
Halliday and Hasan (1976:8) argue that cohesive relations go beyond the 
sentence structure. They could be identified within a sentence or between 
sentences in a certain text. Cohesive relations are semantic relations between an 
element of the text and another element that is crucial to its interpretation 
regardless of grammatical or structural boundaries. Suppose that we pick up a 
novel (written text), turn randomly to a page and read the following: 
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(4)       They think so. 
 
As an element of a text, the sentence in (4) could not be interpreted alone. As 
readers, we have to go back and search for some referents to they and so. In other 
words, we have to identify the elements that semantically match (and cohere with) 
the present elements. This leads Halliday and Hasan to the following account of 
cohesion:  
 
The concept of cohesion is a semantic one; it refers to relations of 
meaning that exist within the text and that define it as a text. 
Cohesion occurs where the interpretation of some element in the 
discourse is dependent on that of another. The one presupposes the 
other, in the sense that it cannot be effectively decoded except by 
resource to it. When this happens, a relation of cohesion is set up, 
and the two elements, the presupposing and the presupposed, are 
thereby at least potentially integrated into a text.       
 
                                                                           (Halliday and Hasan: 1976:4) 
 
It is clear from the above quotation that Halliday and Hassan (1976:27) 
consider ‘cohesion’ as linguistic notion. For them, ‘cohesion’ is responsible for 
text-forming (texture or well-formedness). They view cohesive devices such as 
‘co-reference’, ‘substitution’, ‘ellipsis’ and ‘conjunction’ as linguistic tools that 
semantically link elements which are structurally unrelated. 
In this chapter, I argue that the well-formedness of text is not achieved by 
coherence which is signalled by linguistic means. It is rather achieved 
pragmatically through the establishment of relevance relations between 
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conceptual representations. I also argue that the linking ‘connecting’ words are 
not linguistic tools that contribute to the interpretation of text through expressing 
cohesive relations between elements of discourse, but rather pragmatic markers 
that contribute to the interpretation of text through controlling relevance relations 
between conceptual representations. Before introducing this argument, let us 
discuss two coherence-based accounts of DMs, namely Schiffrin’s (1987) and 
Fraser’s (1988) accounts: 
3.2.2. Schiffrin’s account of discourse markers.   
The industry of research in DMs has flourished at least since 1987. Three 
accounts were developed at roughly the same time; Schiffrin (1987), Blakemore 
(1987) and Fraser (1988). This section explores Schiffrin’s accounts of DMs. 
Schiffrin (1987), one of the leading figures in the coherence group, 
presents a very detailed analysis of some DMs, explaining their semantic and 
grammatical status and their functions and characteristics. Schiffrin maintains that 
DMs contribute to the coherence of the text by establishing coherence 
relationships between units of talk (Schiffrin, 1987: 9). Schiffrin’s analysis of 
DMs shares some views with Halliday and Hasan’s (1976) analysis of the 
cohesive devices in English.  
Both Schiffrin (1987) and Halliday and Hasan (1976) agree that DMs 
should be considered as linguistic devices that link adjacent units of talk to make 
the whole discourse coherent. Schiffrin proposes that DMs play a cohesive role in 
the sense that they relate informational units in the present discourse with 
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informational units in the prior discourse; this kind of coherence achieved by DMs 
is known as local coherence in Schiffrin’s framework. It is local in the sense that 
DMs link two adjacent units in the text (or indicate coherence relationships 
between two adjacent utterances in discourse). Local coherence will be contrasted 
with Giora’s (1979) global coherence later in this chapter. For the time being, I 
will concentrate on some of the DMs markers studied by Schiffrin and show what 
coherence relationships they indicate and how they contribute to the interpretation 
of the text they are used in. 
Schiffrin gives a detailed analysis of eleven DMs in English: and, but, or, 
so, well, then, now, because, oh, y’know and I mean. My purpose here, is not to 
discuss all these DMs in detail, but rather investigate the functions (or coherence 
relations) achieved by such markers. The data that Schiffrin used to analyse these 
DMs are based on her sociolinguistic corpus which is composed of tape-recorded
interviews with ordinary speakers. The data consist of long transcribed speech 
units taken from these interviews. I will use some of her examples for illustration.    
Schiffrin maintains that DMs can function on different levels of discourse 
structure (linguistic or non-linguistic). They can operate on the ‘ideational’ 
(informational) structure in the sense that they indicate relations between ideas in 
discourse or in other words, they mark the organisation of ideas in discourse. For 
instance, a DM such as but indicates that what follows it contrasts with what 
precedes it. They can also operate on the participation framework (discourse 
exchange and interaction) in the sense that they play a role in controlling the 
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conversational labour between speakers and hearers as is the case with oh and 
well.  
 
My discourse model has both non-linguistic structures (exchange 
and action) and linguistic structures (ideational). Speaker and 
hearer are related to each other, and to their utterances, in a 
participation framework. Their knowledge and meta-knowledge 
about ideas is organised and managed in an information state. 
Local coherence in discourse is thus defined as the outcome of 
joint efforts from interactants to integrate knowledge, meaning, 
saying and doing. 
 
                                                                                         (Schiffrin 1987:29) 
 
For example, Schiffrin argues that DMs such as and, but, or, so and because are 
operative on the ideational structure. DMs such as well, oh, now, y’know and I 
mean, operate on the other levels: exchange, action, participation framework and 
information state. Schiffrin (1987) argues that DMs contribute to the coherence of 
discourse through relating different components of talk in the sense that the 
interpretation of any component is dependent on the interpretation of the other: 
 
Since coherence is the result of integration among different 
components of talk, any device which simultaneously locates an 
utterance within several emerging contexts of discourse 
automatically has an integrative function. That is, if a marker acts 
like an instruction to consider an upcoming utterance as speaker-
focused on prior text within an information state, with a 
simultaneous instruction to view that utterance within a particular 
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action structure, then the result is a type of integration between 
those components of talk.  
 
                                                                                      (Schiffrin 1987: 330) 
 
 It can be noticed that Schiffrin views ‘discourse unit’ as a linguistic entity. 
She uses the term to refer to syntactic (structural) units such as ‘clauses’ and 
‘phrases’ as well as ideational (informational) units such as ‘ideas’ and ‘opinions’. 
She has used the term interchangeably with other terms such as ‘discourse 
segment’, ‘unit of talk’ and ‘component of talk’. No matter what as discourse unit 
is called, it will be argued later in this chapter that it is a cognitive rather than 
linguistic entity. In what follows, I give a brief summary of the functions and 
coherence relations expressed by DMs in Schiffrin (1987). 
3.2.2.1. ‘And’ and ‘but’  
Schiffrin argues that these DMs operate on the ideational structure. Contrary to 
Halliday and Hasan’s (1976) who claim that conjunctions such as and and or 
express semantic relations between elements of discourse without having any 
structural role, Schiffrin assumes that they have both cohesive and structural roles; 
structural because they link two (or more) syntactic units such as clauses, phrases 
or verbs, and cohesive because the interpretation of the whole conjunctive 
utterance depends on the combination of both conjuncts. As for and, it can 
precede support units of talk (explanation, evidence and clarification to previous 
units). It can also have a pragmatic effect in the sense that it indicates a speaker’s 
continuation. However, and does not provide information about what is being 
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continued. Such information is derived from the discourse content and structure 
(1987: 150). Consider Schiffrin’s example in which and is used to indicate the 
speaker’s continuation.  
 
(5)       Debby:  What made you decide t’come out here? Do y’remember? 
           Ira:          a. What made us decide t’come out here. 
                          b. Well uh we were looking in different neighbourhoods 
                          c. and then uh this was a Jewish community 
                         d. and we decided t’come out here  
                         e. Uh the-several of the communities we looked uh they weren’t- 
                            they weren’t Jewish.   
                         f. and we didn’t wanna live there.  
                         g. Then we decide on Glenmore.  
 
But, according to Schiffrin, indicates ‘adversative’ relations in discourse. It 
conveys contrast between two ideas or topics or it can be used to mark the denial 
of the speaker’s expectation of something:   
 
(6)       She drives a Porsche, but her husband drives a Kia. 
(7)       She is a lecturer of psychology at Oxford, but she does not 
            know how to spell SCHIZOPHRENIA. 
 
As can be noticed, but in (6) indicates that there is a contrast between two clauses 
‘driving a Porsche’ and ‘driving a Kia’. It is true that both are cars. However, 
Porsche is a German manufacturer while Kia is a Korean one. In addition, Porsche 
is more expensive than Kia which means that it will cost more to drive a Porsche. 
As for but in (7), it indicates that there is a denial-of-expectation relation between 
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the two clauses. Knowing how to spell the word SCHIZOPHRENIA would be an 
expectation of a lecturer of psychology at Oxford. However, this expectation is 
denied by the second clause. The DM but will be discussed in more detail from 
relevance-theoretic point of view in chapter 4. 
3.2.2.2. ‘Because’ and ‘so’  
These two DMs are operative on the ideational structure as well. They contribute 
to the coherence of discourse by signalling relations between discourse units.  
According to Schiffrin, because is used by the speaker to indicate a relation of 
‘cause and result’, while so is used to indicate a relation of ‘premise and 
conclusion’. Consider the following examples:  
 
(8)       [John did not go to school]Res because [he was is sick]Cau. 
(9)       [John was sick] Pre. So [he did not school to school] Con.  
 
In (8), because indicates that the event ‘John did not go to school’ is a result of the 
event ‘John was sick’. So in (9) indicates that the event ‘he was sick’ is a 
‘premise’ and the event ‘John did not go to school’ is a ‘conclusion’. More details 
will be given on so in the relevance-theoretic analysis in chapter 4. 
3.2.2.3. ‘Now’ and ‘then’ 
These two DMs function on the ideational level of discourse structure. They 
indicate temporal relationships between units of talk. Schiffrin claims that now is 
used to indicate a speaker’s progression through a discourse which contains an 
ordered sequence of subordinating parts. It is also used to indicate the upcoming 
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shift in talk, or when the speaker wants to negotiate the right to control what will 
happen next in talk (1987:241). Consider Schiffrin’s example in which Ira is 
discussing why he is against intermarriage. In this speech, Ira uses now to shift 
from recounting hypothetical events (a-d) in a narrative mode to interpreting them 
(e): 
 
(10)       a. For example, eh…eh…let’s assume that husband’s a-w-a-a-a the 
                  husband’s   
                  Jewish , 
              b. and the girl’s, say, Catholic 
              c. and they have an argument 
              d. and she says ‘You goddamm Jew!’ 
              e. Now she wouldn’t say something like that, if she was rational.  
 
Then is used in discourse to indicate succession between prior and 
upcoming talk—a succession from one topic to another. Consider (11) in which 
the first two uses of then indicate a temporal succession between two events and 
the third one indicates a succession to a different topic. 
 
(11)       I arrived at home very late this evening. I was exhausted. I took a hot bath,  
             and then I had a light dinner. When I finished my dinner, I switched the 
             TV on and watched my favourite programme, and then went to bed. I 
             woke up very early in the morning because I heard some noise coming 
             from the living room, then I remembered that I forgot to switch the TV 
             off before I went to sleep.  
 
There are differences between these two markers: unlike now, which is 
used as a time deictic providing temporal index in discourse time, then can be 
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either deictic or anaphoric. As deictic, then indicates reference time, i.e. temporal 
relations between a linguistic event and speaking time, but as an anaphor, it marks 
temporal relations between two linguistic events (1987:246). Consider (12) and 
(13) in which then is used deictically and anaphorically respectively: 
 
(12)       a. When did you submit your thesis? 
              b. I submitted it then.  
 
(13)       a. Are you going to see your supervisor during the Easter vacation? 
              b. I will see him then. 
  
3.2.2.4. ‘Oh’ and ‘well’ 
These two markers are different from the markers discussed above in the sense 
that they operate on the interactional and informational level of discourse 
structure. Schiffrin presents oh as a marker of information management. It is used 
to indicate old information recognition and new information receipt, the 
replacement and redistribution of information and when locally provided 
information does not correspond to the speaker’s prior expectations. It is usually 
used in repairs, questions, answers and acknowledgements (1987: 90-95). Oh can 
have a pragmatic function; it is responsible for the division of turn-taking in the 
exchange structure. Thus, it plays a role in the participation framework as well. 
Schiffrin agrees with Heritage (1984) that oh is used to indicate that the speaker 
has undergone some kind of change in her locally current state of knowledge, 
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information, orientation or awareness (1987: 99). Consider (14) and (15) in which 
oh indicates old information recognition and new information receipt respectively:  
 
(14)      a. Did you invite your flatmate to your birthday party? 
             b. Oh yeah, the Nigerian guy. Of course I did.  
 
(15)       a. Do you know who the new prime minister is? He is Mr. Smith. 
              b. Oh! 
              c. He is my father’s best friend.  
              d. Oh! But I did not hear that on TV.     
 
Well is used as a response marker which anchors its user in an interaction 
when an upcoming contribution is not fully constant with prior coherence options. 
Schiffrin argues that well can have pragmatic function; it is used to indicate a 
request for elaboration and clarification (1987: 120). Consider the following 
example: 
 
(16)       a. How did you get your new mobile? Was it a contract or pay as you go? 
              b. Well, you mean the Nokia N95? 
 
3.2.2.5. ‘Y’know’ and ‘I mean’ 
These two markers are used on the informational level of discourse structure; they 
relate informational units in the present discourse with informational units in the 
previous discourse. Furthermore, they have functions in the participation 
framework. Schiffrin (1987:268) maintains that y’know has two discourse 
functions: a marker of meta-knowledge about what speakers and hearers share, 
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and a marker of meta-knowledge about what is generally known. It is also used to 
indicate a situation in which the speaker knows that the hearer shares some 
knowledge about a particular piece of information. Consider the following 
example: 
 
(17)       a. Finally, John and Sarah got married. 
              b. Y’know they have been in love for five years. 
 
(18)       a. You study very hard these days. 
              b. Oh ye, y’know “no bees no honey; no work no money”. 
 
I mean functions on the participation framework; it marks the speaker’s 
orientation to two aspects of the meaning of talk: ideas and intentions. It is used 
by the speaker to mark her upcoming modification of the ideas and intentions of 
the prior utterance (1987:296). Consider the following examples given by 
Schiffrin: 
 
(19)       a. But I think um ten years from now,  
              b. it is going to be much more liberal. 
              c. I could see it in my job.  
              d. I mean, when I started working for the government, there were no 
                  colored people.  
              e. And today eh…uh… twenty five, thirty percent, forty percent of the 
                  people I work with are—colored.  
 
This discussion shows that DMs in Schiffrin’s proposal do not form a 
unified grammatical class, but rather functionally related group of items drawn 
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from other classes. They can be particles (oh, well), conjunctions (and, but, or), 
time deictics (now, then), lexicalised clauses (y’know, I mean) and others (1987: 
327). Schiffrin treats DMs as members of a functional class of verbal (and non-
verbal) devices which provide contextual coordinates for ongoing talk. She builds 
her definition of DMs on a theoretic level: “DMs are sequentially dependent 
elements which bracket units of talk”. On that basis, Schiffrin (1987: 31-2) argues 
that, although DMs introduce sentences, they are independent of sentential 
structure. In other words, the removal of DMs such as I mean, y’know or oh from 
its initial position will not affect the syntactic structure of the sentences. 
It can be concluded that Schiffrin’s account of DMs concentrates more on 
the linguistic and structural role DMs play in maintaining discourse coherence 
through linking discourse units. However, she acknowledges that some DMs such 
as oh and well can have pragmatic functions.  
3.2.3. Fraser’s account of discourse markers.  
3.2.3.1. The problem of definition 
As Fraser (1999) points out, the study of DMs has turned into a growth industry in 
the last ten years. Dozens of articles appear yearly focusing on the nature, 
meaning and function of DMs. Fraser (1999) reviews the past research and 
concludes that no clear definition has been given of DMs. He mentions an early 
reference by Levinson (1983) who considers DMs as a class of linguistic 
expressions worthy of study in its own right. Levinson briefly comments on DMs, 
but neither gives a name to this class nor a definition of it: 
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There are many words and phrases in English, and no doubt most 
languages, that indicate the relationship between an utterance and 
the prior discourse. Examples are utterance-initial usages of but, 
therefore, in conclusion, to the contrary, still, however, anyway, 
well, besides, actually, all in all, so, after all, and so on. It is 
generally conceded that such words have at least a component of 
meaning that resists truth-conditional treatment… what they seem 
to do is indicate, often in very complex ways, just how the 
utterance that contains them is a response to, or a continuation of, 
some portion of the prior discourse. 
 
                                                                                    (Levinson 1983: 87-8) 
 
Like Fraser, Zwicky (1985) has explained DMs, but he, too, has not 
provided a clear definition. He points out that they must be distinguished from 
other function words; and that they should be prosodically independent; that they 
have to be separated by punctuation in writing and intonation pause in speech; 
that they are insulated from the rest of the sentence in which they occur and that 
they have pragmatic functions of relating the current utterance to the larger 
discourse:  
 
Within the great collection of things that have been labelled 
‘particles’, we find at least one grammatical class of items, in 
English and in languages generally. These have been variously 
termed ‘discourse particles’ and ‘interjections’; here I will call 
them ‘discourse markers’… on the grounds of distribution prosody, 
and meaning, discourse markers can be seen to form a class. But 
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like the ‘particles’ discussed, they are independent words rather 
then clitics12 
 
                                                                                        (Zwicky 1985: 303) 
 
Fraser (1999) is concerned with the following questions. What are DMs? 
What are not DMs? What is the grammatical status of DMs? And what do DMs 
link? The remaining of this section will answer the first two questions. The next 
section will be devoted to answer the other two questions. Fraser (1999) provides 
a comprehensive definition of DMs: 
 
  A class of lexical expressions drawn primarily from the syntactic 
classes of conjunctions, adverbs and prepositional phrases. With 
certain exceptions, they signal a relationship between the 
interpretation of the segment they introduce S2, and the prior 
segment, S1. They have core meaning13 which is procedural, not 
conceptual, and their more specific interpretation is ‘negotiated’ by 
the context, both linguistic and conceptual.   
 
                                                                                          (Fraser (1999:831) 
 
 Given this definition, Fraser (1999:942), excludes some of the segment-initial 
expressions used to be as DMs. Consider the following example: 
 
                                                 
12
 An unstressed word typically is a function word that is incapable of standing on its own and 
attaches in pronunciation to a stressed word, with which it forms a single accentual unit. Examples 
of clitics are the pronoun 'em in I see 'em and the definite article in French l'arme, "the arm." 
13
 This core meaning is similar to Blakemore’s notion of ‘procedural meaning’ where a linguistic 
expression encodes a procedure that guides the hearer/reader during the process of the utterance 
interpretation. This will be discussed in more detail in Blakemore’s account of procedural meaning.  
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 (20)       a. You should help John in his maths homework. 
              b. Frankly, I am not very good at maths.  
 
According to Fraser, frankly does not relate two discourse segments14, but rather 
signals a comment of separate message that relates to the following segment. 
Fraser (1996) calls frankly, and similar segment-initial expressions such as 
obviously and stupidly, “commentary pragmatic markers” rather than DMs. Fraser 
also excludes particles such as even, only, just and pause markers such as well and 
ah form the class of DMs for the same reason. Consider his examples below:  
 
(21)       a. The exam was easy. Even John passed.  
              b. They are fairly restrictive there. Only poor Republicans are allowed in. 
              c. What am I going to do now? Well… I really don’t know.  
              d. A: Do you know the answer? B: Ah …, I will have to think about it.  
 
3.2.3.2. The grammatical status and function of discourse markers. 
Fraser (1999:943) argues that DMs do not form a unified grammatical class. They 
are rather linguistic expressions gathered from different classes. They have the 
grammatical status of the main class they belong to. For example, they can be 
conjunctions (and and but), adverbs (anyway and however) and prepositional 
phrases (after all and in spite of this). Such DMs differ in grammatical class, but 
have the same function. 
                                                 
14
 The term ‘discourse segment’ is used by Fraser to refer to a ‘sentence’, ‘proposition’, ‘utterance’ 
or ‘message’.  
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Fraser (1999) also argues that DMs are syntactically subordinate 
conjunctions. They cannot introduce separate sentences. They require previous 
independent sentences as can be seen in the following example: 
 
(22)       a.* Unless he finishes his maths homework. 
             b. John will not go to cinema unless he finishes his maths homework. 
             c. A: John will not go to the cinema. B: Unless he finishes his maths 
                 homework.  
   
Contrary to his earlier writings (1990, 1993), in which he argues that DMs 
are only those expressions that can introduce separate sentences such as since, 
because and although, Fraser (1999:943) argues that DMs can include expressions 
such as and and but simply because such expressions can relate two separate 
messages no matter whether they introduce a separate sentence or not: 
 
(23)      a. He plays football and I read my favourite novel. 
             b. He plays football but I read my favourite novel. 
 
As far as the function of DMs is concerned, Fraser (1999) argues that DMs 
signal a relationship between the interpretation of the segment they introduce (S2) 
and the interpretation of the prior segment (S1). For instance, the use of but in 
(24a) indicates that there is a contrastive relationship between ‘studying very 
hard’ and ‘failing the exam’, and the use of so in (24b) indicates that there is a 
‘premise-conclusion’ relationship between ‘taking the metro’ and ‘arriving on 
time’: 
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(24)       a. Laura studied very hard. But she failed her exam. 
              b. He took the metro. So, he arrived on time.  
 
Fraser maintains that such markers contribute to the coherence of the text 
by indicating coherence relationships between ‘units of talk’. Thus, but in (24a) 
indicates that S2 and S1 cohere in relation to contrast, and so in (24b) indicates 
that S2 and S1 cohere in relation to logical consequence. However, Fraser (1999: 
938) indicates that DMs do not have to signal any relationship between S2 and S1 
(adjacent segments of talk). A DM can relate the segment it introduces with any 
other previous segment in discourse. This is known as ‘global coherence’ as 
contrasted to Schiffrin’s ‘local coherence’. Fraser goes further to argue that a DM 
does not even have to introduce any discourse segment whatsoever. It can occur in 
a medial or final position in discourse. Consider Fraser’s example (3) repeated 
here as (25): 
 
(25)     a. Harry is old enough to drink. However, he can’t because he has 
               hepatitis. 
            b. It is freezing outside. I will, in spite of this, not wear a coat. 
            c. We don’t have to go. I will go, nevertheless.  
 
Finally, Fraser (1999:948) argues that DMs have a ‘core’ meaning which 
is procedural not conceptual. Fraser’s notion of procedural is similar to RT’s one 
in the sense that such expressions do not contribute to the truth-conditional 
content of utterances in which they occur. However, Fraser argues that such 
expressions work as syntactic connecting devices between units of discourse, not 
as cognitive devices that put constraints on the relevance of discourse.  It is right 
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that they encode meanings that define the relationships between discourse 
segments, but they do not contribute to the truth-conditional content of these 
segments. Consider the following example: 
    
(26)       a. Clare is a philosopher. But her husband is a soldier in the national  
                  army.  
              b. John can help in installing this software. After all, he is a computer 
                  engineer.  
 
The highlighted DMs in the above examples can be deleted without affecting the 
propositional content of the segments. However, if deleted, the hearer will be left 
with no guidance to the relationship between the two segments. Thus, the ‘core’ 
meaning encoded by DMs, provides the hearer/reader with the information on 
how to interpret the message conveyed by S2 vis-à-vis the interpretation of S1 
(Fraser 1997:302, 1999:944).  
3.2.3. The difference between Schiffrin’s and Fraser’s accounts. 
Prima facie, Schiffrin’s (1987) and Fraser’s (1999) accounts seem similar. Both 
argue for a coherence-based account of DMs. That is, DMs convey coherence 
relationships between units of talk. Furthermore, both of them claim that DMs do 
not form a syntactic class but are rather linguistic expressions drawn from 
different classes. However, there are two main differences between the two 
accounts. The first is Schiffrin’s (1987) claim that DMs link adjacent units of talk. 
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This is known as a ‘local15 coherence’, whereas Fraser (1999) argues that a DM 
need not link two adjacent units of talk. DMs can relate the segment they 
introduce (S2) to any other previous segment in discourse. This is known as 
‘global coherence’. Consider the following example adapted from Fraser (1999: 
938): 
 
(27)      He drove the truck through the parking lot and into the street. Then he 
            almost cut me off, he ran a red light. However, these weren’t his worst  
            offences. He was driving without a licence.  
 
In this example, however does not relate the segment it introduces ‘these weren’t 
his worst offences’ with just the immediately previous segment ‘after that, he ran 
a red light’ but rather with all the previous segments including the immediately 
prior segment. Fraser also argues that a DM can occur in a medial as well as final 
position in discourse as we have seen in example (25). 
The second difference concerns the structural, semantic and pragmatic 
status of DMs. DMs in Schiffrin’s proposal can be divided into three types: the 
first includes DMs that have referential meaning such as and, but and or which 
serve as cohesive devices that contribute to the coherence of discourse. The 
second type includes DMs which lack (referential) meaning, such as oh and well. 
Such markers are independent of the sentential syntactic structure of discourse. 
They do not have a cohesive role similar to those of the first type, but affect 
discourse interpretation in the sense that they indicate relationships at the level of 
                                                 
15
 The term ‘local coherence’ was introduced by Schiffrin (1987) who argues that DMs indicate 
coherence relations between adjacent units of talk. This term has been later used by Fraser (1997, 
1999) as opposed to ‘global coherence’. 
  
 
164 
‘information state’, i.e. markers of information management. The third type 
includes DMs that have referential meaning but are independent of the sentential 
structure such as I mean and y’know. Although they have semantic meaning, such 
markers can be removed from the text structure without affecting the meaning or 
grammaticality of the text. 
Fraser’s (1997, 1999) account concentrates on the pragmatic functions 
carried by DMs.  In the light of that, he calls them ‘pragmatic markers’ (PMs). 
DMs in his account are all linguistic elements that encode clues which signal the 
speaker potential communicative intention. Unlike Schiffrin, who concentrates on 
the structural and linguistic role of DMs in achieving coherence, Fraser 
concentrates on the cognitive role such markers play in building text coherence. 
DMs in Fraser’s account do not contribute to the truth-conditional (propositional) 
content of utterances in which they occur. They do not affect the truth or falsity of 
the utterance if they are removed. Fraser (1999: 945) argues that DMs have 
semantic ‘core’ meaning, which is not conceptual but rather procedural. The term 
procedural here is very similar to that discussed in Wilson and Sperber’s (1993), 
and Blakemore (1987, 2002). The difference is that Fraser studies DMs within a 
coherence framework, while Wilson and Sperber and Blakemore study them 
within a relevance-theoretic framework. Fraser (1997:302) argues that DMs work 
as procedures that provide the hearer/reader with information on how to relate 
between the interpretation of S2 and that of S1. This procedural meaning 
conveyed by DMs contributes to the coherence of the text. For instance, the use of 
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after all in (28) guides the hearer/reader to recognize that the message expressed 
by S2 is coherent as ‘premise’ with respect to the ‘conclusion’ expressed by S1: 
 
(28)       John felt sick. After all, he drank three bottles of beer.  
 
Such an example is analysed differently by Blakemore. She argues that after all, 
in (28) has a procedural meaning that guides the hearer/reader in the inferential 
phase of the process of utterance interpretation. Thus it instructs the hearer to infer 
that ‘drinking three bottles of beer’ is relevant as a ‘premise’ to the ‘conclusion’ 
‘feeling sick’ communicated in the first clause. This will be discussed in further 
detail in Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) account of DMs.  
3.3. Relevance-based account of discourse markers 
Much research has been conducted in studying DMs within a relevance- theoretic 
framework. Blakemore (1987), to my knowledge, is the first to have developed a 
relevance-theoretic approach which is considered to be a turning point in the study 
of DMs. This section discusses Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) relevance-theoretic 
account of DMs and how this account differs from those in the coherence 
framework. 
3.3.1. Discourse markers as semantic constraints on relevance 
Blakemore’s (1987) main argument is that DMs play an important role in the 
process of utterance interpretation by providing the hearers/readers with some 
guidance in the inferential phase of utterance interpretation and the search for 
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optimal relevance. Blakemore refers to the ‘procedural’16 nature of DMs. She 
argues that some DMs do not contribute to the semantic truth-conditional content 
of utterances in which they occur; such expressions are procedural in the sense 
that they constrain the process of utterance interpretation. The use of such 
expressions helps the hearer/reader to work out the implicit side of the utterance 
interpretation where linguistic decoding alone does not, as we will see later in this 
section (Blakemore 1987:18, 2000: 464). 
Blakemore’s account of procedural meaning is a reaction to Grice’s (1967) 
notion of conventional implicature. As we have seen in section (1.4.3), Grice 
argues that some linguistic expressions have conventional (encoded) meaning 
which gives rise to implicature (hence conventional implicature). Such 
linguistically encoded meaning does not contribute to the truth-conditional 
content of utterances in which they. Consider Grice’s famous example again: 
 
(29)       He is English; he is, therefore, brave.  
 
In this example, Grice argues that the conventional meaning of therefore gives 
rise to the implicature that: ‘being brave’ is a consequence of ‘being English’. 
Blakemore (1987) builds on that and argues that the linguistic expression 
therefore and similar expressions such as but, so and after all do not give rise to 
conventional implicature, as Grice assumes, but rather encode procedural meaning.  
Blakemore (1987:75, 2000:472) analyses the meaning encoded by DMs 
such as therefore, so, after all and but as procedures that constrain the relevance 
                                                 
16
 As note, Fraser 1999 has also used the term procedural. See footnote 13.  
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of utterances in which they occur. In other words, the meaning encoded by such 
DMs control the choice of context under which the utterances containing them are 
relevant. The use of these DMs plays a role in establishing the optimal relevance 
of their utterances by guiding the hearer/reader to derive the intended contextual 
(cognitive) effect. Consider the following example, for illustration:  
 
(30)       a. He did not prepare well for the chemistry exam. So, he failed 
                                   premise                                                      conclusion 
            b. He did not prepare well for the chemistry exam. After all, he failed. 
                                  conclusion                                                        premise  
            c. He did not prepare well for the chemistry exam. He failed.     
                        (premise, conclusion)                                    (conclusion, premise) 
 
Blakemore argues that the use of so and after all in (30a) and (30b) respectively 
constrains the context under which, these utterances are relevant. Accordingly, so 
in (30a) instructs the hearer/reader to see that what follows so is relevant as a 
‘conclusion’ and what precedes it as a ‘premise’, whereas the instructions given 
by after all in (30b) indicates that what follows is relevant as a ‘premise’ and what 
precedes is relevant as a ‘conclusion’.  However, if neither so nor after all is used 
in (30a) and (30b), i.e. no context is provided or even constrained, then the 
utterance will be open to both interpretations, as can be seen in (c). In other words, 
the procedural meaning encoded by so and after all helps the hearer/reader to 
work out the implicitly communicated message, which is not reached by linguistic 
decoding alone.  
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3.3.2. Blakemore’s revised account of discourse markers  
In the light of the subsequent research by Wilson and Sperber (1993) on the 
relation between linguistic form and relevance, Blakemore (2002) revises some of 
her views of DMs and the conceptual-procedural distinction. 
In Blakemore (1987), it is argued that linguistically encoded (meaning) 
can either be conceptual or procedural. She claims that the linguistically encoded 
conceptual information is the truth-conditional information that plays a role in 
establishing the explicit level of utterance meaning; linguistically encoded 
procedural information is the non-truth conditional information that works at the 
implicit level of utterance interpretation. To put it differently, Blakemore (1987) 
argues that what is conceptual should always contribute to truth conditions and 
what is procedural should never contribute to truth conditions. Thus conceptual 
and procedural are mutually exclusive. 
It follows from the argument that what is conceptual should only 
contribute to the explicit level of utterance interpretation, and what is procedural 
should only contribute to the implicit level. Accordingly, all DMs in Blakemore’s 
(1987) account are considered as procedural elements that work at the implicit 
side of the interpretation of utterances in which they occur. The general picture of 
the linguistically encoded information in Blakemore’s (1987) account is given 
below: 
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                                    linguistically encoded information  
 
 
                                conceptual                               procedural  
 
 
                             truth-conditional                    non-truth-conditional 
 
 
                      contribution to explicature        constraints on implicature 
 
Figure 6: Linguistically encoded information in Blakemore (1987) 
 
However, Wilson and Sperber (1993: 2) argue that the distinction drawn above is 
invalid. They propose that the conceptual/procedural distinction is not parallel 
with the truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional distinction. Their claim is that, on 
the one hand, there are linguistic expressions which encode conceptual 
information but do not contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterance 
in which they occur, as is the case in sentence adverbials such as frankly and 
unfortunately. On the other hand, there are linguistic expressions that play role in 
determining the truth-conditional content of their utterance without encoding 
conceptual information. This is the case with some personal pronouns. 
Wilson and Sperber want to argue that these two distinctions cross-cut 
each other and are not isomorphic. To put it differently, some truth conditional 
constructions encode concepts, some others encode procedures; some non-truth 
conditional constructions encode concepts, some others encode procedures 
(1993:2). For example, illocutionary adverbials such as seriously and frankly 
encode conceptual information which does not contribute to the truth conditions 
of the utterance in which they occur. The removal of such adverbials will not 
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affect the truth or falsity of utterances containing them. In this concern, Wilson 
and Sperber (1993:19) reach a conclusion that there are four types of linguistic 
expressions:  
 
A. Linguistic expressions which encode conceptual information that does 
not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance in which they occur. 
These expressions include illocutionary adverbials such as seriously and 
frankly and attitudinal adverbials such as unfortunately: 
 
 (i) Seriously, I am not coming to your birthday party. 
(ii) Frankly, I am not coming to your birthday party. 
(iii) Unfortunately, I am not coming  to your birthday party 
 
B. Linguistic expressions which encode conceptual information that 
contributes to the truth-conditional content of their utterances such as 
manner adverbials. Consider the synonymous manner adverbials of 
seriously and frankly: 
 
 (i) She told me seriously that she is not coming to my birthday party. 
(ii) Clare told John frankly that she is not coming to his birthday party. 
 
C. Linguistic expressions which encode procedural information that does 
not contribute to the truth conditions of utterance containing them. 
According to Blakemore (1987), such expressions (so, but, after all and 
therefore, etc.) put constraints on the implicit side of the utterance 
interpretation.  
 
 (i) He did not prepare well for the chemistry exam. So, he failed.  
(ii) He did not prepare well for the chemistry exam. After all, he failed.  
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D. Linguistic expressions which contribute to the truth-conditional content 
of utterances in which they occur and yet they encode procedural 
information. Examples of these expressions are personal pronouns such as 
I and he.   
 
In fact, the fourth type of these linguistic expressions is a big challenge to 
Blakemore’s (1987) account. Wilson and Sperber (1993) argue that pronouns are 
linguistic expressions that encode procedural information which plays role in 
determining the truth-conditional content of the utterance. Furthermore, the 
procedural information encoded by pronouns puts constraints on explicature 
rather than implicature, in the sense that the use of a pronoun guides the hearer to 
the intended referent of that pronoun, which is part of the propositional content. 
Consider the following example: 
  
(31)       He is very optimistic.  
 
The information encoded by the pronoun he in (31) contributes to the 
truth-conditional content of the utterance since it affects the truth or falsity of the 
utterance. Furthermore, the information encoded by the pronoun he is procedural 
in the sense that it guides the hearer in the process of the utterance interpretation 
(guiding the determination of the intended referent of he).  
The general picture drawn by Wilson and Sperber (1993) on the 
conceptual/procedural distinction is given below: 
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                                     linguistically encoded information 
 
 
 
                   conceptual                                                     procedural  
 
 
 
truth-conditional   non-truth-condtional   truth-conditional   non-truth-condtional 
  
 
 
contribution to     contribution to              constraints on       constraints on 
the proposition     the high-level               the proposition      the implicature   
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Figure 7: Linguistically encoded information in Wilson and Sperber (1993) 
 
 
Blakemore revises her account of procedural meaning in the light of the 
critical analysis of the relation between linguistic form and relevance offered by 
Wilson and Sperber (1993). In the revised version, Relevance and Linguistic 
Meaning, Blakemore (2002) gives up the claimed parallelism between truth-
conditional/conceptual and non-truth-conditional/procedural. She acknowledges 
that sentence adverbials are linguistic expressions whose conceptual encoding 
does not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance in which they are used 
(2002:43). 
Blakemore (2002) acknowledges that the notion of procedural meaning is 
not as simple as it is presented in her old version (1987). The notion of procedural 
meaning should be widened to account for some phenomena such as pronouns 
whose procedural encoding contributes to the truth conditions of the utterances 
containing them: 
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However, following Kaplan (1989), Wilson and Sperber (1993) 
have argued that pronouns do not encode constituents of a 
conceptual representation, but only procedures for constructing 
such a representation. In other words, they contribute to truth 
conditional content only in the sense that they constrain the 
hearer’s search for the representations of their referents. If this is 
right, it would seem that there are expressions which encode 
procedures but which contribute to what is traditionally regarded as 
truth conditional content. In other words, it would seem that it is 
not the case that all procedural meaning is non-truth conditional 
 
                                                                       (Blakemore, 2002: 80) 
 
In her new version, Blakemore (2002) reconsiders her old account of the 
DM but where it has been used to encode two meanings ‘contrast’ and ‘denial of 
expectation’. The new analysis of but proposed by Blakemore goes for a unified 
account in which but has only one procedural meaning, namely, ‘contradiction 
and elimination of an assumption’ (2002:103). 
No doubt, Blakemore has reconsidered several points in her old account of 
procedural expressions. However, one point is still not made clear: does the 
procedural information encoded by some DMs put constraints on the derivation of 
the cognitive effect or does it encode the cognitive effect itself? In other words, 
does the procedure encoded by a certain DM guide the line of interpretation or 
does it encode the elements of this interpretation? It seems that Blakemore (2002) 
makes no distinction between these two cases. In some places of her book, she 
argues that the procedural meaning encoded by some DMs puts constraints on the 
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derivation of the cognitive effect; in some other places, the claim is that the 
procedural meaning encodes the cognitive effect itself: 
 
The analyses just sketched suggest not only that meanings of 
discourse markers or connectives are linked to cognitive effects, 
but more particularly, that they directly encode the type of 
cognitive effect intended. Thus but is analysed as encoding the 
information that the hearer is intended to follow an inferential route 
which ends in the ‘elimination’ of a contextual assumption, while 
after all is analysed as encoding the information that the intended 
inferential route is one which results in the ‘strengthening’ of an 
existing assumption. 
                                                                         (Blakemore, 2002:95)   
 
Contrary to what Blakemore (2002) assumes, I think that the procedural 
information encoded by some DMs do not encode the cognitive effect. The 
information plays a role only in constraining the derivation of such cognitive 
effect. This is done through leading the hearer to certain inferential routes through 
which he can reach the intended cognitive effect. In other words, the presence of a 
DM in a certain utterance does not necessitate the presence of the cognitive effect 
and vice versa. For instance, the cognitive effect established in (30a) is not 
derived through the procedural meaning encoded by so. The assumption that what 
precedes so is a ‘premise’ and what follows it is a ‘conclusion’ is not encoded but 
derived by following the procedural information encoded by so. The same goes 
for after all in (30b). 
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The evidence for my claim is that the cognitive effect will not necessarily 
be lost by the removal of so or after all from the utterances of (30a) and (30b). 
The hearer will still be able to derive the cognitive effect in (30c) even though 
neither so nor after all has been used. In (30c), each clause in the sentence could 
be either a ‘premise’ or ‘conclusion’ as we have seen. This means that the use of 
so or after all only directs the hearer to the intended effect and not encodes the 
cognitive effect itself.  
3.4. Coherence or relevance? 
As has been discussed earlier, there are two approaches for studying DMs, namely 
‘coherence’ and ‘relevance’. Coherence proponents argue that DMs are linguistic 
elements that contribute to the coherence of discourse by encoding cohesive 
relationships between conceptual representations. Relevance theorists argue that 
DMs encode cognitive (procedural) information which controls the relevance 
relations between discourse units by constraining the choice of contextual 
information under which an utterance is relevant. This section highlights the 
essential difference between these two approaches, discusses the heated dispute 
between Giora (1997, 1998) and (Wilson 1998) on the discourse analysis and 
finally suggests that RT is the ideal and more appropriate approach for analysing 
discourse and DMs.  
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3.4.1. Giora’s views on discourse 
3.4.1.1. Discourse coherence and well-formedness  
Giora (1997:17) maintains that relevance should not be regarded as the only 
principle that controls human communication and that Sperber and Wilson’s 
relevance account cannot replace the past and current accounts of discourse 
coherence. She argues that discourse coherence is not a derivative notion of 
relevance and that relevance cannot account for coherence and degrees of 
coherence, as Sperber and Wilson assume.  
Giora maintains that discourse coherence is an independent notion. It has 
to be seen as a linguistic and semantic relation that contributes to the well-
formedness of discourse. Giora (1985; 1997:22-3) formulates categorical 
conditions for well-formedness of discourse: 
 
(32)       An informative discourse is well-formed if and only if:   
 
a. Conforms to the Relevance Requirement in that all its propositions are 
conceived of as related to a discourse–topic proposition. The discourse 
topic is a generalisation, preferably made explicit, and placed in the 
beginning of the discourse. It functions as a reference point to which all 
incoming propositions are assessed and stored. 
 
b. Conforms to Graded Informativeness Condition which requires that 
each proposition should be more (or at least not less) informative than the 
one that precedes it in relation to discourse-topic. A message is 
informative to the extent that it has properties unshared by the previous 
proposition, which, in turn, allow it to reduce possibilities by half. 
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c. Marks any deviation from Relevance and Graded Informativeness by an 
explicit marker, e.g. by the way, after all. 
 
To illustrate how these conditions work, consider the following example given by 
Giora:  
 
(33)       It has often occurred in the history of science that an important discovery  
             was come upon by chance. A scientist looking into one matter 
             unexpectedly came upon another which was far more important than the 
             one he was looking into. Penicillin is a result of such a discovery. 
 
The discourse in (33) above is well-formed in Giora’s terms. It conforms to the 
Relevance Requirement. It starts with the general topic and each of the 
propositions that follow develops the information mentioned in this discourse 
topic. This discourse also conforms to the Informativeness Requirements. It starts 
from the least to the most informative. 
Giora argues that Sperber and Wilson’s relevance account cannot be a 
replacement of the discourse coherence account. To support her argument, she 
gives the following couple of examples: 
 
(34)       This first time she was married, her husband came from Montana. He was 
              the kind that when he was not alone he would look thoughtful. He was 
              the kind that knew that in Montana there are mountains and mountains 
              have snow on them. He had not lived in Montana. He would leave 
              Montana. He had to marry Ida and he was thoughtful (taken form Ida by 
              Gertrude Stein). 
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(35)        This first time she was married her husband came from Montana. He was 
               the kind who loved to be alone and thoughtful. He was the kind who 
               loved mountains, and wanted to live on them. He loved Montana. But he 
               had to Marry Ida and leave Montana. 
 
Giora argues that (34) and (35) are equally relevant in Sperber and Wilson’s terms, 
but there is a huge difference between (34) and (35) in terms of coherence. The 
reader of these two examples finds that (35) is more coherent (well-formed) than 
(34). Giora claims that the difference in coherence between (34) and (35) is not 
accounted for by Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory, but rather by discourse 
coherence. (35) is more coherent (well-formed) because it conforms to the 
Relevance Requirement; all the propositions in (35) are related to the main 
discourse-topic ‘What Ida’s husband had to give up upon marrying her’. It also 
conforms to the Graded Informativeness Conditions; each proposition in (35) is 
more informative than the one which precedes it in relation to the main discourse-
topic. However, this is not the case with (34). 
3.4.2. Wilson’s views on discourse 
3.4.2.1. Discourse markers and relevance  
Relevance theorists such as Sperber and Wilson (1995), Wilson and Sperber 
(1993), Wilson (1998) and Blakemore (1987, 2002) have reanalysed past 
coherence accounts of discourse interpretation and concluded that relevance is the 
only principle that can account for all aspects of utterance interpretation. 
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Wilson (1998) and Blakemore (2002:161) argue that the coherence-based 
analysis of DMs is incomplete and unreliable. Coherence proponents classify 
DMs into categories that are very broad. For instance, they associate so, therefore 
and hence with ‘causal’ relations, and however, but, yet and still with 
‘adversative’ relations. Such a classification ignores the difference in meaning 
between one DM and another in the same category. Accordingly this classification, 
so, therefore and hence are treated as having the same meaning.  
This classification also implies that there is no one-to-one relationship 
between the DM and discourse function. To put it differently, each member of the 
same category can encode the coherence relationship encoded by the other 
members since all of them are considered to have the same meaning. For example, 
the coherence relationship encoded by however will be the same as that encoded 
by still, yet, and but.  
Wilson (1998) and Blakemore (2002) argue against the above-mentioned 
classification. They point out that however and but do not have the same meaning 
and thus cannot be used interchangeably. However, Blakemore (2002:161) points 
out that the difference in meaning is very difficult to capture in an analysis in 
which these two expressions are associated with a relationship of ‘contrast’ or 
‘adversity’. The same goes for so and therefore which are associated with the 
‘consequence’. Consider the following examples:  
 
(36)       He is a prime minister but/? however not a president. 
(37)       a. I am on holiday next week. 
              b. So/? Therefore, you will not attend the meeting.  
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Wilson (1998) and Blakemore (2002), argue against any coherence-based 
account of DMs. They claim that such account cannot give an explanation for 
situations such as (36) and (37) where however cannot replace but and therefore 
cannot replace so even though each pair of these DMs encode the same coherence 
relation. Such accounts are also unable to give an explanation of the utterance-
initial use of some DMs. Consider Blakemore’s examples: 
 
(38)       [speaker looks in his wallet and finds a £5 note] 
              So I did not spend all the money.  
(39)       [speaker, who is suffering from shock, has been given a glass of whisky] 
              But, I don’t like whisky 
(40)       Well, what would you like to do today?  
  
The problem with the coherence account is that it considers DMs as devices that 
encode relations between linguistic units of discourse. On that assumption 
utterance-initial DMs should not be possible. Relevance theorists maintain that 
such relations are not necessarily between linguistics units, it could be merely 
cognitive —relevance of certain thoughts or propositions to an individual. That is 
why the coherence account is not able to account for the initial use of the above-
mentioned DMs. 
These difficulties, Blakemore suggests, can be overcome if DMs are 
analysed within a relevance-theoretic framework as encoding constraints on the 
relevance of the utterances in which they occur. DMs should not be looked at as 
marking connections in discourse, i.e. connecting propositions expressed by 
discourse segments. A better understating of DMs, Blakemore suggests, can be 
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achieved if these markers are considered to be contributing to the relevance of the 
utterance in which they occur by controlling the choice of context under which 
such utterances are relevant. 
3.4.3. Is coherence a linguistic or cognitive relation? 
As we have seen in the previous section, Giora argues that the well-formedness of 
discourse depends on discourse coherence which she considers as a linguistic 
relation. Giora claims that discourse coherence is not of cognitive nature—it is not 
a derivative notion of relevance. There is no need for any inference or calculation 
to achieve coherence in discourse. A certain discourse can be coherent no matter 
whether the propositions and thoughts it contains are relevant to an individual or 
not.  
 By contrast, Wilson (1998:57, 65) argues that relevance theory can 
account for the intuition of discourse coherence. To support this argument, Wilson 
uses the following  examples: 
(41)       Bill, who has thalassemia, is getting married to Susan, and 1967 was a 
             great year for French wines. 
 
(42)       Bill, who has thalassemia, is getting married to Susan. Both he and Susan 
             told me that 1967 was a great year for French wines.  
 
According to Giora (1997), (41) and (42) are not coherent (or unacceptable) even 
though they are relevant in Sperber and Wilson’s terms. The sense of incoherence 
and unacceptability in these two utterances stems from the fact that the two 
segments in each utterance are unrelated. It seems that a part of the dispute 
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between the coherence and relevance approaches of discourse is the notion of 
‘acceptability’. Giora argues that a certain discourse is acceptable if it is coherent 
and well-formed, i.e. the units in this discourser are intuitively related and 
connected. Thus for Giora, notions such as ‘coherence’, ‘acceptability’, 
‘relatedness’, ‘connectedness’ and  ‘well-formedness’ are equivalent. However 
the notion of ‘acceptability’ is different in Wilson’s terms. Acceptability in RT 
does not mean well-formedness or linguistic relatedness or connectedness but 
rather the consistency with the principle of relevance. To put that differently, a 
certain discourse is acceptable by an individual, if it is relevant to that individual 
no matter whether the utterances in this discourse are well connected or not.   
Wilson (1998:66) argues that RT can account for the sense of acceptability 
or unacceptability in (41) and (42). In other words, RT can explain why these two 
utterances are relevant or not. To do so, Wilson provides the following scenarios. 
The first is when Peter and Mary, who are keen at catching up on the news, are 
clearing out the kitchen cupboard. Mary is carrying a newspaper and is about to 
tell Peter about the marriage of Bill and Susan. Simultaneously, Peter carries a 
bottle of French wine with a questioning look and Mary utters (41). In such a case 
each segment of this utterance is relevant to Peter. However, they are intuitively 
unrelated. The second scenario is when Peter and Mary are catching up on the 
events of the day and Mary has heard that Bill and Susan will get married on that 
day and then Mary utters (42). By hearing the utterance Peter has access to the 
following contextual assumptions: 
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(43)       a. People with thalassemia drink only red wine. 
              b. When people get married, it is usual to give a present. 
              c. A crate of wine is a suitable wedding present. 
              d. The best present is one that pleases the recipient. 
 
So, through following these deductive rules, Peter will recover the implicature 
that the 1967 French red wine would be a good wedding present to Bill and Susan. 
The utterance of (41) is consistent with the principle of relevance, it is also 
acceptable (coherent) since its segments are intuitively related. This relatedness of 
the two segments in (41) can be explained in terms of relevance; the interpretation 
of the first segment makes difference to the relevance of the second segment. That 
is, we might have got different cognitive effects if the second segment is 
processed in a different context. 
Wilson (1998:68) argues that RT can account for the acceptability of 
discourse more than the Giora’s Relevance Requirements. Giora’s discourse 
coherence is achieved through the hierarchical structure of discourse-topics. A 
well-formed coherent discourse, according to Giora, should have a main 
discourse-topic to which all the other sub-topics are related. Both the main 
discourse-topic and sub-discourse-topics should be explicitly stated, and any 
deviation in the relevance requirements between the main discourse-topic and the 
sub-discourse-topics should be indicated by explicit marker. 
Wilson points out that it is not the hierarchical relations of discourse topics 
what makes discourse hang together, but rather the contextual information carried 
by these discourse-topics as we have seen in (41) and (42). Thus, discourse is 
comprehensible if the propositions it contains carry contextual information to the 
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hearer or reader no matter whether its discourse-topics are explicit or not. 
Furthermore, Wilson (1998:71) argues that a deviation in the Relevance 
Requirement and the Graded Informativeness Conditions need not be indicated by 
an explicit DM as Giora assumes. Consider the following example: 
 
(44)       a. What did you say?  
              b. Mind you head. 
 
According to Giora (1997), (44b) can have two interpretations. The first is locally 
coherent; (b) is a direct answer to (a)’s questions; (a) and (b), as discourse 
segments are intuitively related. The second interpretation is non-coherent; (b) is 
considered as a discourse segment which is not related to (a), and thus (44) is an 
ill-formed discourse because it deviates from the Relevance Requirements. 
Wilson (1998:72-73) maintains that the acceptability or unacceptability of any 
deviation in discourse cannot be accounted for by Giora’s discourse coherence. 
Giora considers an utterance such as (45) as well-formed because the deviation in 
this utterance is explicitly indicated: 
 
(45)       a. What did you say? 
              b. Oh, mind you head. 
 
Wilson (1998:73) maintains that not only (44) is ambiguous between two 
interpretations, but also (45), even though it has got an explicit marker for 
deviation. So, Wilson asks why (45) is ‘well-formed’ and (44) is not. An answer 
to this question could not be offered by the linguistic (semantic) notion of 
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coherence given by Giora. For coherence to be an effective tool in analysing 
discourse, it has to be reanalysed as cognitive rather than linguistic relation 
through maintaining that discourse coherence is derived through relevance of 
discourse to an individual. Thus, the acceptability or unacceptability of (44) and 
(45) will not be determined by the presence or absence of an explicit linguistic 
DM but rather by the notion of optimal relevance and the criterion of consistency 
with the principle of relevance.  
3.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, two approaches for studying DMs have been investigated. The 
first approach maintains that DMs are linguistic expressions that relate discourse 
units. Proponents of this approach analyse DMs as cohesive devices that 
contribute to the coherence of well-formed linguistically constituted discourse by 
encoding cohesive (semantic) relationships between discourse units. The second 
approach treats DMs as pragmatic devices that contribute to the interpretation and 
comprehension of utterance by encoding procedural information that controls the 
choice of contextual information. In other words, such devices encode relevance 
relations between propositions (thoughts) and the cognitive environment of an 
individual.  
It seems that there is something in common between the two approaches. 
The coherence approach has two goals. Firstly, it aims to provide a theory of 
comprehension of discourse, i.e. how discourse is understood and interpreted. 
Secondly, it is concerned with providing a theory of evaluation and explanation of 
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the intuition of discourse well-formedness. It is obvious that the relevance 
approach shares the first goal with the coherence approach since RT’s main 
objective is to explain how utterances are understood. 
The coherence approach suggests that the best way to account for 
discourse interpretation is to look at coherence relations between topics in 
discourse. By contrast, the relevance approach argues that the recognition of 
coherence relations between discourse topics is neither necessary nor sufficient 
condition for a successful discourse. What is needed for a comprehensible 
interpretation of discourse is the recognition of contextual (cognitive) effect held 
in that discourse. As for the second goal, RT rejects the notion of well-formedness 
of discourse. RT sees that well-formedness of discourse exists only in relation to a 
set of well-formedness rules which are independent of individuals, situations and 
contexts.  
It seems that that the whole dispute centres on the notion of ‘well-
formedness’ with respect to ‘discourse’. Coherence theorists such as Schiffrin and 
Giora argue that the well-formedness should be maintained in discourse and it is 
achieved by linguistic means. A certain discourse is well-formed if and only if its 
segments are intuitively related. Thus discourse such as (41) and (42) are ill-
formed because the segments in each utterance are unrelated. 
As for relevance theorists, well-formedness does not exist. The relations in 
RT are not between articulated linguistic units, but rather between thoughts and 
propositions. To put that differently, the notion of discourse in RT is cognitive 
rather than textual. The acceptability of discourse is not determined by linguistic 
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or semantic relationships between units in discourse but rather by the consistency 
with the principle of relevance discourse has. Given that, discourses such as (41) 
and (42) would be acceptable in some circumstances as we have seen in section 
3.4.3. It seems that Wilson’s account is more convincing and reliable than Giora’s 
one. After all, everything will be cognitively integrated in the interpretation and 
comprehension of discourse. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
188 
CHAPTER 4 
 
4. Standard Arabic and Procedural Meaning  
4.1. Introduction  
The notion of discourse and DMs has not been given a great importance in Arabic 
linguistics. Very few studies have been conducted in the analysis of DMs and the 
role they play in the interpretation of discourse. Most of these concentrate on the 
colloquial (local) dialects, e.g. Al-Batal (1994) and Al-Khalil (2005). To my 
knowledge, the use of DMs in Standard Arabic has not been researched. Contrary 
to Al-Khalil’s claim that DMs are only used in Colloquial Arabic (COL), this 
chapter argues that DMs can be used in both Standard and Non-Standard Arabic. 
As for the use of DMs in COL, I will limit the discussion to those used in Syrian 
Arabic (SYA). The little research of DMs in Arabic has been conducted in the 
framework of Conversation Analysis (CA). By contrast, in this study, I adopt a 
relevance-theoretic framework and argue that DMs encode procedural meanings. 
This chapter is devoted to investigate the procedural meaning encoded by some 
linguistic expressions in Standard Arabic (SA). The next chapter discusses the 
procedural meaning encoded by some linguistic expression in SYA. 
This chapter is structured as follows: section 4.2 gives a brief introduction 
to the diglossic situation in Arabic and discusses why certain DMs are used in SA 
but not in COL and vice versa. Section 4.3 investigates the procedural meanings 
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encoded by some linguistic expressions in SA, such as lakinna, bainama, lakin, 
bal and fa. Section 4.4 is a conclusion 
4.2. The linguistic situation in Arabic 
4.2.1. Diglossia  
Before discussing the procedural expressions in Arabic, it is necessary to discuss 
the notion of diglossia and the impact it has on the use of DMs in standard and 
non standard forms of Arabic. Diglossia affects the use of DMs in Arabic in the 
sense that some DMs are used in one form but not in the other. For instance, fa, 
lakinna, bainama, lakin and bal are only used in SA, while DMs such as bass, la- 
heik, la-ha-sabab, ma‘nāt-o and bi-ittālī are only used in SYA.  
 The earliest notion of diglossia goes back in literature to the work of the 
German linguist Karl Krumbacher (1902) in his book Das Problem der Modernen 
Griechischen Schriftsprache. In this book, Krumbacher discusses the nature, 
origin and development of diglossia with special reference to Arabic and Greek. 
Another reference to diglossia is offered by the French linguist William Marcais 
(1930) in his article “La diglossie arabe”, in which he provides a formal definition 
of the phenomenon. 
Ferguson’s (1959) article on diglossia is a classic reference in the literature. 
Ferguson discusses the notion of diglossia in the context of four language 
situations namely, Arabic, Modern Greek, Swiss German and Haitian Creole and 
provides the following definition of the phenomenon:  
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A relatively stable language situation in which, in addition to the 
primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or 
regional standards), there is very divergent, highly codified (often 
grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a 
large and respected body of written literature either of earlier 
period or in other speech community which is learned largely by 
formal education and used for most written and formal spoken 
purposes but not used by any sector of the community for ordinary 
conversation.                                      
                                                                                                  
                                                                                 (Ferguson 1959:325-37) 
 
According to this definition, there are two varieties of the language used 
side by side in the speech community—the superposed variety which is called the 
High (H) variety and the primary dialects which stand for the Low (L) variety. 
Each variety is used for different purposes and in different contexts. As far as 
Arabic is concerned, the H variety is called Al-fušh
 
a (Standard) and the L variety 
is called Al-a'miyyah or Al-dārijah (Non-Standard).  
The H variety (Al-fušh

a) in Arabic is used for formal spoken purposes 
such as religious ceremonies, political speeches, university lectures and TV and 
radio news bulletins and interviews. It is also used for written purposes; the 
history and literature of the Arabic nation is written in Al-fušh
 
a. The L variety on 
the other hand, is used for informal purposes such as personal letters, soap operas 
and spontaneous conversations with family, friends and colleagues. 
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4.2.2. Arabic as a special case of diglossia  
It seems that Arabic diglossia is very ancient. In the Pre-Islamic period, there 
were two main spoken varieties: Classical Arabic (CLA), which was spoken by 
the tribes in the Arabic peninsula particularly by Quraish tribe in Mecca, and the 
urban vernacular dialects spoken in Bagdad and Damascus. 
The written form of CLA was systematically codified in the 8th century 
AD. This form was the codification of the language variety spoken by Quraish 
tribe in Mecca. The main sources of this form were the Holy Quran and the Pre-
Islamic poetry. The classical (standard) form of Arabic has not changed in terms 
of syntax and phonology since that time. However, it went through some lexical 
changes. For example, a large number of lexical items in the Holy Quran and the 
Pre-Islamic literature are no longer used in today’s Standard Arabic. 
The Arabic diglossic situation seems rather exceptional. Freeman (1996) 
points out that Arabic has two major varieties, CLA and COL. According to him, 
COL falls in four major groups:  
 
i. Magrebi (Morocco, Algeria, Tunis and Western Libya) 
ii. Egyptian (Eastern Libya, Egypt and Sudan) 
iii. Levantine (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine) 
iv. The Arabic of the  Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
     Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE and Kuwait). 
 
People from these different groups find it difficult to communicate due to 
the lexical and phonological variation. For example, on the lexical level, [mara] in 
Palestine means ‘wife’, while in Egypt it means ‘loose woman’. [Maša] in 
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Palestine means ‘walked’, while in Morocco it is ‘went’. In Egypt, [mašī] means 
‘alright’ but in Yemen and Morocco, it is ‘nothing’. On the phonological level, 
‘where’ is [fein] in Egypt and [wein] in Syria, ‘man’ is [ri
ğğ
āl] in Syria and 
[riyyāl] in Kuwait and ‘gold’ is [dahab] in Syria and [dahab] in Saudi Arabic.  
Al-Khalil (2005) claims that Arabic does not have two forms, as Ferguson 
assumes, but rather three forms as given below: 
 
a. Classical Arabic (CLA): This was used in the Arabic Peninsula in the 
Pre-Islamic period. It is a highly prestigious form of Arabic; the Holy 
Quran and Arabic  Pre-Islamic classical poetry were written in this form. 
 
b. Colloquial Arabic (COL): this form is used as an informal spoken 
dialect in theArab countries, and it differs from one country to another. 
This results in having different dialects of Arabic, such as Syrian Arabic, 
Lebanese Arabic, Sudani Arabic, Moroccan Arabic, etc. 
  
c. Modern Standard Arabic (MSA): It is used nowadays in the Arab 
countries for formal purposes (education, politics and media). It is a 
mixture of COL and CLA. 
 
Al-Khalil’s claim, that Arabic is a triglossic language, is controversial. He 
tries to give two different terminologies to the same and single thing, namely SA. 
Arabic has only two major forms: the standard CLA and non-standard COL. The 
MSA, as a newly-invented term, is not distinguishable from CLA. Both CLA and 
MSA refer to the same variety, namely SA. There are no morphological, 
phonological or syntactic differences between CLA and MSA apart from some 
lexical changes which are common, I think, to all languages. Al-Khalil’s 
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classification might be motivated by the academic community in the US which 
names CLA as MSA. It is right that CLA has undergone some lexical changes. On 
the one hand, several words are no longer used in today’s SA. For example, words 
such as ‘t

arm
ūq’ (mud), ‘mustšzir’ (very high), ‘ha‘ha‘’ (plant) are no longer used 
in SA. On the other hand, several words have been introduced to SA such as 
‘kumputer’ (computer), ‘tilfaz’ (television) and ‘lamba’ (lamb). However, this 
lexical change does not make CLA and MSA two different varieties of Arabic. In 
this thesis, I treat them as one variety, namely SA (as opposed to COL).  
The notion of diglossia has been introduced in this thesis because it plays a 
major role in the use and distribution of DMs and procedural elements in Arabic 
as we will see in the next section.  
4.2.3. Diglossia and discourse markers               
Al-Batal (1994) presents a detailed analysis of DMs used in Lebanese Arabic 
(LA). Al-Batal’s data, collected from TV and radio programmes and recorded 
interviews, show that there are 21 DMs regularly used in LA. Al-Batal treats these 
DMs as cohesive devices that link phrases, clauses and paragraphs. Al-Batal’s 
account of DMs is similar to the coherence-based account of DMs discussed in 
chapter 3 where DMs are analysed as elements that contribute the coherence of 
the text by indicating cohesive relationships between units of discourse. DMs in 
Al-Batal’s analysis can occur on three levels: phrase level, clause level and 
discourse level. And they encode the following cohesive relations: ‘additive’, 
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‘adversative’, ‘alternative’, ‘causal’, and ‘conclusive’, ‘consequential’ and 
‘explicative’. 
Al-Batal shows that the Arabic diglossic situation affects the use of DMs 
in LA. He points out the DMs in LA fall into the following three categories: 
a. DMs that are unique to LA: this includes ya’nī, bass, halla’ and t

ayyeb. Ya’nī  
is used to indicate reiterative and explanative relationship between two elements it 
connects, similar to in other words in English. 
 
(1)       All children under eight must be accompanied by an adult. Ya‘nī  your 
           child cannot be admitted.  
 
As can be noticed in the above example, ya‘nī introduces a sentence in which the 
speaker further explains a point he had made in the previous sentence. Bass 
indicates an adversative relationship between two elements in the text as but does 
in English: 
 
(2)       He is very clever bass he is unable to answer this question. 
 
 Halla’17  indicates a shift in the movement of discourse. It is often used to change 
discourse topic. Consider Al-Batal (1994:96) example: 
 
(3)        In regard to the land, we can say that there was a goal: either to keep this 
            land as it was during the Mutasarrifiyya Period or to expand it, either as 
            little or a lot. Halla’, whatever the issue of the land was, they (in the 
            resistance) agreed on the necessity of establishing a new system of 
            government. 
 
                                                 
17
 It can be also used as a temporal adverbial: 
   (i) The president will arrive now. 
   (ii) Let’s sort out the problem now. 
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Halla’ in (3) signals a shift in discourse topic; the speakers moves from discussing 
the issue of land to the issue of the system of government. T
 
ayyeb indicates shift 
between speakers in discourse (Al-Batal: 1994: 94-97).  
 
(4)       S1: We came to this land 50 years ago. It was very poor, just like a desert. 
                  We worked very hard to make it good as you can see it now. 
           S2: Tayyeb, what are the difficulties you faced as new immigrants.  
 
b. DMs used in both LA and MSA: this includes wa, aw, la-‘innu, ‘izzan, leekin, 
and ma‘’innu. Al-Batal claims that wa and aw are connectives; the first indicates 
an additive relationship between two or more discourse units, while the second 
indicates an alternative relationship: 
 
(5)       He travelled to Moscow wa stayed five years in it. 
(6)       He works five days a week. He is off on Thursdays aw Tuesdays. 
 
 La-‘innu indicates causal relationship in discourse. ‘Izzan indicates conclusive 
relationship. Leekin and ma‘’innu indicate adversative relationships. Consider the 
following examples: 
 
(7)       He sold his watch la-’innu (he) got bankrupt.  
(8)       He is Syrian. Izzan, he is generous.  
(9)       He is Syrian leekin he is stingy. 
(10)     He is stingy ma‘’innu (he is) Syrian.  
 
c. DMs used in LA but borrowed from MSA: this includes: fa, ‘ada ‘an, inn, 
bilidafi li, fad
 
lan ‘an, innama, kazalek, ‘amma and ‘ay. Al-Batal claims that fa18 is 
the most complex and interesting DM in this type. It has different functions. Most 
importantly, it can denote causal and inferential relationships. 
 
                                                 
18
 Fa is used sometimes to indicate shift in discourse from LA to MSA.  
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(11)       a. John hit Mary fa she swore at him. 
             b. John can answer this questions fa he is a mathematician.  
  
 ‘Ada‘an inn, bilidafi li, fad
 
lan ‘an (all mean in addition to) encode additive 
relations in discourse: 
 
(12)       Dan Sperber is a French anthropologist, linguist and cognitive scientist. 
            ‘Ada‘an inn (bilidafi li, fad
 
lan ‘an), he is Research Director at the Jean 
             Nicod Institute.  
 
 ‘Innama indicates adversative relationship and ay is used to signal an explicative 
relationship: 
 
(13)       They don’t live in Newcastle ’Innama they live in London. 
(14)       He is from Newcastle ay he is Geordie. 
 
Recently, in his study of DMs, Al-Khalil (2005) gives a detailed 
conversational analysis of some DMs frequently used in Syrian Arabic (SYA): 
 
a. halla’: marking a topic shift, topic change and topic support. 
b. ya‘nī: explaining and summing up ideas. 
c. t

ayyeb: requesting explanation and marking focus and request. 
d. lakan: making conclusions.  
 
In fact, Al-Khalil (2005) makes two controversial claims. The first one is 
that DMs are only used in spontaneous informal conversation: 
 
It can easily be noticed that these markers never appear in books, 
newspapers, articles or official documents. While they appear 
frequently in extracts [(1) New], [(2) No one to help], and [(3) 
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Rotten teeth] above, which were taken from spontaneous 
conversation, the case does not seem to be so in either the written 
or spoken forms of Standard Arabic. Extracts [(4) Asia Cup] 
provides an example of the written form of Standard Arabic. It is 
taken from a newspaper reporting the comments of a football 
official, and it is clear that there are no discourse markers at all. 
 
                                                                                        (Al-Khalil 2005:30) 
 
 He gives a long extract19 taken from one of the Arabic newspapers to 
demonstrate that SA can never have DMs: 
  
“’inna man yadfa‘u sab‘a mi’aten wa hamsīna ‘alfa dolār lil-farīq 
at-Tailandī  fima law faza ‘ala fariqinā musta‘idūna h

atman lidaf‘i 
rub‘iha li-h

akamen d

a‘ifen wa hifnā min ’iltiqā’i ra’isi ba‘tati 
t
āyland bi-ra’isi la
ğ
nati al-h

ukkām akkadtu lil-
ğ
am
ī
‘ fi ‘idarati al-
bi‘ta ’anna h

akamana 
ā
adan sayakunu min šarqi ā’sya hatman li-
’anna t
āyland lā taqbal bih

akamen ‘arabī  li-hadihi al-mubarāh al-
mas

iriyah lma‘niyyūn bil-murahanāt ra
ā
ibūna bi-daliaka  ayd

an

” 
 
“Who pays seven hundred and fifty thousands dollars to the Thai 
team if they beat our team is surely prepared to pay a quarter of it 
to a referee who has a weak personality. We were worried about 
the meeting of the chairman of the Thai team with the chairman of 
the referee committee. I assured everyone in the team that our 
referee for the next day would certainly be from East Asia. The 
Thai team do not approve of any Arab referee for this decisive 
match. Those involved in betting want that too.”   
 
                                                                                       (Al-Khalil 2005-31) 
                                                 
19
 ISO 233 (1984 version) transliteration system has been used in this thesis.  
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It is true that the above extract does not have DMs, but, of course, this does not 
validate the claim. It seems that Al-Khalil has selected this passage rather 
carefully to show that DMs cannot be used in the standard from of Arabic. 
Contrary to what Al-Khalil claims, I argue that DMs are regularly used in SA. 
Consider the following passage taken from Mina’s novel (1965). 
 
Lakinna ’ummī  kanat tu
ğ
azif, wa tatah

malu al- d

arba wa al-šatma 
wa ta’t
ī
 ’ilaya fa-tafuku al- h

abla, wa ta’hudunī  min yadi ba‘idan 
‘an al-bait, fa-na
ğ
lisu ma‘an ‘ala s

ahra, aw tah

ta ša
ğ
ara, wa 
ta’hudu

 fi mulat

afatī  wa nus

h

ī
. 
 
“But my mother took the risk: she exposed herself to beating and 
cursing by releasing me. She used to take me far away from the 
house to sit together on a stone or under a tree. She was very kind 
and helpful to me”.  
 
Although this passage is very short, it displays 10 occurrences of 4 different DMs 
frequently used in SA, namely lakinna (= but), wa (= and), aw (= or) and fa (= so, 
then). 
Al-Khalil’s (2005) agenda behind this claim would appear to be that he 
wants to study DMs in Arabic from a conversational-analytic approach using the 
Conversation Analysis framework (CA). The main concern of CA is ‘ordinary 
conversation’. It does not attempt to come to terms with language, meaning or 
communication but rather an approach to the study of social action and the 
investigation of normative structures of reasoning which are involved in 
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understating and approaching courses of intelligible interaction (Heritage 
1995:391). 
Since the standard form of Arabic is not used in ordinary conversation, 
then Al-Khalil claims that this form cannot be studied from a conversational-
analytic approach and thus it does not have DMs. 
The second controversial claim proposed by Al-Khalil (2005:55) is that   
the conversation analysis approach is the only framework for studying and 
analysing DMs in Arabic. This claim entails that the relevance-theoretic 
procedural approach (Blakemore 1987, 2002; Blass 1990; Rouchota 1998; Iten 
1998) cannot account for the analysis of DMs. Contrary to what Al-Khalil 
assumes, CA is not the only framework that can account for the use of DMs in 
Arabic. I argue that the notion of ‘procedural meaning’ developed, by Blakemore 
(1987,2002) within RT offers an ideal and more appropriate approach for studying 
DMs in both Standard and Non-Standard Arabic. 
To my knowledge, Al-Batal (1994) and Al-Khalil (2005) are the only 
authors who give detailed accounts of DMs in Arabic highlighting the impact of 
diglossia on the use of DMs. However, both accounts are controversial in this 
respect. Al-Batal’s diglossia-based classification of DMs is far from perfect. On 
the one hand, he argues that certain DMs are unique to LA, while in fact they are 
not. Some of the DMs used in the set, such as ya’nī, halla’ and t
 
ayyeb can be used 
in other Arabic dialects such as Syrian Arabic, Egyptian Arabic and Saudi Arabic. 
See the following spoken extracts taken from TV operas produced in Syria, Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia:     
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A.   Son: ’assalamu ‛alaikum. 
       Father: wa ‛alaikum ’assalam. leiš t’aharit? 
       Son: mara’at ‛albeit bit’illak ’mmī  badha kilo lah

mi lalmih

šī . 
       Father: w leiš ma rih

it la‛ind ’abu ‛alī  w ’ahadit ’illah

m
ā
t. 
       Son: w ma lāzim ’illaq bil’awwal yabī  
       Father: t

ayyeb waddeit ilhbizāt la’abu hater w ’abu ‛isam w ’abu mih

i ’iddīn? 
       Son: waddeiton yabī . 
 
       Son: Peace be upon you. 
       Father: Peace be upon you too. Why are you late? 
       Son: I went home first. My mother needs one kilo of lamb meat. 
       Father: Why didn’t you go to the butcher and buy the meat? 
       Son: Shouldn’t  I have told you first father? 
       Father: Alright! Did you take the bread to Abu Khater, Abu Isam and Abu 
                   Mihi Iddin?                 
       Son: Yes, Father”. 
 
                                                      (Syrian TV opera: Bab Al-hara: episode 31) 
 
B.   Lutfiya: ya‛nī  lazem ‛alfawteh w ’ittal‛a ’ahud ’il’izen ibn ‛ammī? 
       Isam: halla’ ya lutfiya la tahdī  w ti‛tī  ktīr ’ihtī  ‘ā‛deh ‛am tistannakī  w s

ihrī   
      ‘a‛id ‛am yistannanī . mu h

ilweh nit’ahar ‛leihon ’aktar min heik. ya ’alla ’umī  
       th

arrakī . halla’ heik baddek ’idallī  mbuzmeh. ’fridi halwiš  šwai. 
 
       Lutfiya: Should I ask for permission whenever I am going in or out, my dear  
                     husband.  
       Isam: Now, listen Lutfiya! Don’t turn this to a big story. My sister is waiting 
                 for you and my brother-in-law is waiting for me. It is not nice to keep 
                 them waiting more than that. Come on! Let’s move now. Come on! 
                 Cheer up.  
 
                                                         (Syrian  TV opera: Bab Al-h

ara: episode 31) 
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C.   Al-naz

er: ’ana ‛
āyez i’fel ilfasl 
       Al-’ab: ma tinsāš ’innahum wlād su
ā
ayyarīn 
       Al-naz

er: la yumkin 
       Al-’ab: t

ayyeb ‛ala šān hatrī  ma ti’filši ilfasl 
       Al-naz

er: tayyeb ’ifrid

 ’innī  smi‛ti kalamak w ma ’afaltiš ilfasl. h

a 
                              gibluhom mudarrisīn minen? 
 
       Head teacher: I want to close the school.  
       Parent: Don’t forget that they are still children. 
       Head teacher: No way. 
       Parent: Alright, for my sake, don’t close the school. 
       Head teacher: Alright, suppose that I listened to you and did not close the 
                              school. How could I manage to get teachers for all of them? 
 
                                              (Egyptian play: Madrast Al-mushaghibeen: part1) 
 
D.   Ra’fat: sa‛adtak t

alabti minni ilh

a’i’a ’ultaha. w bira
ā
mi min kida mntaš   
                   misada’nī . 
       Boss: mīn illi ’āl kida? 
       Ra’fat: manta sa‛adtak bit’ulī  ’insa ilh

a’i’a 
       Boss: la la 
       Ra;fat: Ya‛nī  sa‛adtak misada’nī? 
       Boss: bikulli ta’kīd 
 
       Ra’fat: Your Excellency asks me to tell you the truth and I did. But you don’t  
                    seem to believe me. 
       Boss: Who said that I don’t believe you? 
       Ra’fat: You yourself. You are asking me to forget about everything. 
       Boss: No no. 
       Ra’fat: This means that you believe me. 
       Boss: Yes, of course.  
                                                 (Egyptian TV opera: Ra’fat Al-Hajjan: episode 15) 
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E.   Actor 1: ’itla‛ min hal-šāri‛ la’innu ys

ī
r h

arf T tm rūh

 ysār l-tas

l rabe‛ ‛amārah 
                      w tšūf lawh

a maktūb ‛aleiha šaga lil-’
ğ
ā
r.     
      Actor 2: 
ğ
azak alla heir. 
      Actor 1: tfaddel ya huy abrak ’issā‛āt. 
      Actor 2: maškurīn ma tgasrūn ’in šā’ allah bas walla ’innī  mista‛
ğ
il.  
 
      Actor 1: Go straight ahead in this street until it shapes as a T letter and then 
                     you will see a building with a big ‘flat for rent’ sign. 
      Actor 2: May God bless you? 
      Actor 1: Come on! Let us have you as guest today. 
      Actor 2: Thanks a lot, you are good people. May God bless you? But I am 
                     really in a hurry. 
 
                                                      (Saudi TV opera: Tash Ma Tash: episode 15) 
 
On the other hand, Al-Batal discusses DMs used in LA and MSA and 
other DMs used in LA but borrowed from MSA. It is not clear what the difference 
between these two categories is. In the first category, he gives examples of DMs 
such as, wa, aw, ma’ innu and la ‘innu. In the second category, he uses examples 
of DMS such as fa, lizalik, innama and amma. In fact, there is no difference 
between these two categories; they should be incorporated in a single category. 
And by that, the new classification should look as follows: 
 
a. DMs used in LA 
b. DMs used in SA  
 
The problem with this new classification is how to account for the DMs that occur 
in both LA and SA. In fact, this can be accounted for as follows: the DM used in 
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LA is sometimes used in SA to indicate a shift from LA to SA. By the same token, 
the DM used in SA is sometimes used in LA to indicate a shift from SA to LA. 
Consider the two following extracts for demonstration: 
  
Presenter: bism il MBC20 w bism kil farī’ il‘amal w ilh

udūr w il-mušahdīn badna    
                 nh

ann
īk li-annak ablaita bala’an hasanan. 
 
 Presenter: In the name of the MBC and in the name of the cast, attendance and  
                  spectators, we would like to congratulate you because you have done 
                  very well. 
 
                                                                                (Who wants to be a millionaire?) 
 
The above extract is taken from Man sa-yarabh
 
 Al-million—the Arabic version of 
the famous programme: Who Wants to Be a Millionaire. In this extract the 
presenter, who is Lebanese, congratulates the winner. He starts his utterance in 
LA (bism il MBC w bism kil fari’ il’amal w ilh

udur w il-mushahiin badna 
nh

ann
īk) and then shifts to SA (li-annak ablaita bala’an hasanan). This shift is 
indicated by the use of the DM li-annak: 
 
Media star: dawam il-h

āl min il-muh

āl akād akūn al-awh

ad al-mudallal fi it- 
                   tilifizion al-
ğ
adid (New TV). Bas bil-ahīr tla’eit ‘ard min tilfizion 
                   afd

al w huweh il MBC.  
 
Media star: Things always change. I was almost the only good presenter in the 
                    New TV channel. But, at last, I had an offer from a better TV channel 
                    namely, MBC.   
                                                 
20
 The  Middle East Broadcasting Channel which is very famous in the Arab World. 
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In the above extract, which is taken from a TV interview with one of the most 
famous Lebanese media stars, the speaker starts his reply to one of the questions 
using SA (dawam il-h

āl min il-muh

āl akād akūn al-awh

ad al-mudallal fi it-
tilifizion al-
ğ
adid) and ends it with LA (Bas bil-ahīr tla’eit ‘ard min tilfizion afd

al 
w huweh il MBC). The shift between the two varieties of Arabic is indicated by 
the DM bass. This could also be the case for all the other colloquial dialects. The 
shift from SA to local dialects and vice versa is indicated by the use of a DM. 
Al-Khalil’s claim that DMs in Arabic are limited only to the colloquial 
(informal form) is inaccurate. DMs in Arabic can be found in both Colloquial and 
Standard Arabic. Evidence of that is Al-Batal’s own classification, even though it 
has its own shortcomings. 
4.3. Procedural expressions in Standard Arabic   
Ibn Jinni (961) claims that there are three categories of linguistic expression in 
Standard Arabic:  
 
a. Nouns: every linguistic expression governed by a preposition or counts as a 
proper name is considered as a noun by Ibn Jinni. For examples, ‘al-
ğ
abal’ (the 
mountain), ‘al-maktabah’ (the library), ‘al-t

ā
wilah’ (the table) are nouns because 
they can be governed by prepositions such as ‛ala (on), fi (in), and tah
 
ta (under): 

‛
ala al-
ğ
abal’ (on the mountain), ‘fi al-maktabah’ (in the library) and ‘tah
 
ta al-
t
-
ā
wilah’ (under the table). ‘souria’ (Syria) and ‘’umarun’ (Omar) are also nouns 
because they are proper names. 
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b. Verbs: This type includes linguistic expressions that can either be used for 
issuing orders and commands or preceded by the particle qad21. For example, 
‘i
ğ
lis’ 22  (sit down) and ‘qom’ 23  (stand up) are verbs because they issue the 
commands of ‘sitting down’ and ‘standing up’. ‘
Ğ
alasa’ (sat down)   and ‘ya
ğ
lisu’ 
(sits down), ‘qāma’ (stood up) and ‘yaqūmu’ (stands up) are also verbs because 
they can come after qad: ‘qad kāma’ (had stood up) ‘qad yaqūmu’ (might stand 
up), ‘qad ğalasa’ (had sat down) and ‘qad24 yağlisu’ (might sit down). 
 
c. Particles (al-h

ur
ūf)25: This type can neither be preceded by qad or a preposition 
nor used for issuing orders and commands. For instance, the particles fa, tumma 
and lakinna cannot follow qad: *qad fa26 , *qad tumma, *qad lakinna or be 
preceded by a preposition in *fi fa, *fi tumma, *fi lakinna. 
 
Ibn Jinni (961) maintains that the expressions in the third category do not 
have meaning in themselves. In other words, these particles have no semantics. 
The only way to interpret them is to look at the context in which they are used. 
It seems that Ibn Jinni’s claim regarding particles in SA is controversial. 
According to him, particles such as tumma, fa and lakinna encode no meaning, 
but, let us consider their uses in the following examples: 
 
(15)       a. John entered the office tumma Mary followed him. 
             b. John entered the office fa Mary followed him. 
             c. John entered the office lakinna Mary followed him.  
                                                 
21
 This particle is used only with verbs (past and present) and it is only used in SA.   
22
 This is the imperative form “yağlisu” (sit down). 
23
 This is the imperative form “yaqūmu” (stand up) 
24
 Qad in SA is a very elusive particle; there is no word-to-word translation of this particle. It does 
not have an equivalent particle in English. When qad precedes verbs in the past tense, it indicates 
that the action encoded by the verb has started and finished in the past. Thus the best translation of 
‘qad ğalasa’ is ‘had sat down’. However when it precedes verbs in the present tense, it indicates a 
state of uncertainty whether the action encoded by the verb takes place or not. The best translation 
of qad in this case is ‘might’: ‘qad yağlisu’ = ‘might sit down’. 
25
 This is the technical name of this set of linguistic expressions in SA. 
26
 The asterisk is used to indicate that the combination is ungrammatical. 
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If Ibn Jinni’s claim is right, then utterances (15a-c) should have the same 
interpretation since no meaning is encoded by the highlighted particles. But this is 
not true. The interpretation of these utterances differs. This entails that the 
highlighted particles encode some sort of semantics which affects the 
interpretation of these utterances. For instance, tumma in (15a) encodes that there 
is a long-time span between the two actions, while fa in (15b) encodes the time 
span between the two actions is very short. As for lakinna in (15c), it encodes a 
denial-of-expectation meaning in the context where Marry is supposed to stay 
outside and wait for John to come out of the office, but instead she follows him to 
the office.  
I will argue, contrary to Ibn Jinni’s claim and following Blakemore’s 
(1987,2002) analysis of DMs in English, that particles (= DMs) in SA encode 
procedural meaning that affects the interpretation of the utterance in which they 
occur by constraining either the implicit or the explicit side of utterance 
interpretation. In the light of this, Ibn Jinni’s claim could mean that such 
expressions do not encode conceptual meaning. 
4.3.1. ‘Lakinna’, ‘bainama’, ‘lakin’ and ‘bal’ 
These four DMs are widely used in SA though very little has been written about 
them. They all correspond to but in English. In this section, I review some Arabic 
literature on these four DMs and link that to the literature on but in English. I then 
investigate the linguistic meaning encoded by each of these markers. Finally, I 
claim that the procedural meanings encoded by these four DMs can be treated as 
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translations of the different applications of the general procedure encoded by 
English but. 
4.3.1.1. Syntactic analysis 
Most of the literature written on these DMs in Arabic is of a syntactic nature. It 
explains the syntactic functions of these linguistic expressions and how they differ 
from each other. I will not discuss the syntactic nature of these markers at a great 
length here, since it is not my main interest, I will rather give a very brief 
description of their syntax. 
 Ibn Hisham (1340), Al-Murādī  (1324) and Ibn Jinni (961) call these 
linguistic expressions al-h
 
urūf (particles) and claim that they have different 
syntactic functions. Ibn Hisham (1340:382) argues that lakinna is a particle which 
is only used in nominal (subject-predicate) sentences. It assigns the accusative 
case to the subject and the nominative case to the predicate as is shown in the 
examples below: 
 
(16)       a. al-
ğ
aw              dāfi’      hada      al-yawm               
               the weather       warm         this        today  
                      “The weather is warm today.” 
 
             b. al-samā’u    mumt

iratun      lakinna   al-
ğ
aw-wa                dāfi’-un 
                  the sky        raining             but          the weather (Acc)     warm (Nom) 
                             “It is raining but the weather is warm.” 
 
(17)       al-rih

latu     t

aw
ī latun     
ğ
iddan     lakinna     al-sayyara-ta      
ğ
adīdat-un 
             the journey  long            very          but           the car (Acc)       new (Nom) 
                                     “The journey is very long but the car is new.” 
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As can be noticed, the use of lakinna in (16b) which is a nominal sentence 
changes the case of the subject (al-
ğ
aw) into accusative (al-
ğ
aw-wa) and the case 
of the predicate (dāfi’) into nominative (dāfi’i-un). The same goes for (17) where 
lakinna assigns the accusative case to ‘al-sayyara’ (the car) and the nominative 
case to ‘
ğ
adīda’ (new).  
Unlike lakinna, lakin does not have this function of case assigning. The 
first noun after lakin does not occur in the accusative case. Lakin is usually used 
in a discourse initial position to introduce a new topic. Lakin is regularly used in 
news reports and can be followed by a question. Consider the following examples:  
 
(18)       a. ‘indamā   taqaddamta   bi-t

alabi  ’ijazah   li-taqdīm      al- musbāqa 
                  when   asked+you    to apply     leave      to participate  the competition  
 
                  lam    ’abkhal       ‘alaik           
                  not      stingy        on you         
 
              b. lakin     ma    ma‘na     ’an tu
ğ
ādir  t

iwāla   an-nahār   wa   lam     ta‘ūd             
                  but      what  meaning  to leave      all           the day   and   not     come         
 
                 ’illa    fi      sā‘a      muta’khira     min   al-lail 
                  just   in     hour       late                from the night 
              
a. When you applied for a leave to participate in the competition , I gave you. 
b. But why have you been away all the day and have not come back until very late 
    at the night.  
                                                                                     (The Bridge of Death27 p.38) 
 
                                                 
27
 Abdo, I. (1997). Ğisr Al-Mawt (The Bridge of Death). Damscus, Dar Al-Marifa 
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(19)       a. ‘ala ’ayyati h

āl, laisat hiyya al-marah al-oula al-latī  tašh

ad fihā al-qiwa 
                 al-qolonialiyah al-
ğ
ašimah anyabahā d

idda souriya, wa lan takouna 
                 al-khirah… 
 
                ‘Anyway, this is not the first time that the brutal colonial forces sharpen 
                their teeth against Syria and it will not be the last time.’ 
 
           b.   lakin ’aswa’-u ma yumkin ’an yurtakab min hata’ fi muwa
ğ
atha  
                 tarikhiyyah kahadihi huwa al-taqlī l – wa law lilah

z

a wah

ida- min  
                 ahammiyet kul min al-’iqtis

ād wa al-’idārah ’ada’an wa nata’i
ğ
an… 
 
                  “But the worst thing that can be committed as a historic confrontation 
                   is belittling- even for awhile- the importance of the economics and 
                   administration at the performance and consequence level.” 
 
                                                            (Al-Baath Newspaper No 12774—4/1/2006) 
 
(20)       a. tazīduni    sanah     faqat

   wa   hiya      fi    s

aff      Walad   ’ibn  s

abrah  
                 increase   one year  only and    she       in     class    son          Ibn Sabra 
 
               b. lakin   man    yarahā      ya‘jab    min    ’amriha   wa     ’amr h

usnihā 
                    but     who    see here     wonders  from      her      and       her beauty  
 
                   fa-hiyya        s

arat       s

abiyya            kabīrah      wa           jamī lah  
                   that she         became   young lady     mature        and          beautiful 
 
a. She is only one year older than me. She is in the same class of  Walad Ibn 
    Sabrah. 
b. But her beauty has fascinated everybody. She is now mature and handsome.                                                                         
                                                                                              
                                                                                    (Raspberry Tree28 p.16) 
                                                 
28
 Abdul-Kareem, H. (2002). Šağart Al-Tūt (The Raspberry Tree). Damascus: Dar Al Kitab Al-
Arabi.  
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As for bainama, it is only used on the sentential level. It relates two noun 
(or verb) clauses. It is similar to lakin in the sense that it does not have the 
function of case assigning. However, unlike lakin, bainama cannot occur in 
discourse-initial position. Consider the following examples: 
 
(21)       a. ‘umar-un          t

aw
ī l-un       bainama      zaid-un         qas

ī
r-un 
                  Omar                tall               but              Zaid               short  
                                       “Omar is short but Zaid is tall” 
             
              b. dahaba ’umar-un  ’ila  al-sinama  bainama  baqiya  zaid-un   fi  al-bait 
                  went       Omar    to   the cinema   but           stayed    Zaid       at home   
                             “Omar went to the cinema but Zaid stayed at home” 
 
Concerning bal, Ibn Hisham (1340:152) claims that it can be used in 
utterance-initial positions where the utterances are uttered by two different 
speakers. It can also be used in utterance-middle positions when the utterance is 
articulated by a single speaker. 
 
(22)       a. dahabta      ’ila     al-sinama? 
                 went-you      to     the cinema?  
 
              b. bal      dahabtu       ’ila    al-masrah

   
                  but      I went           to     the theatre.  
 
(23)          lam       adhab     ’ila        al-sinama      bal     ’ila     al-masrah

 
                 not        go            to         the cinema    but      to       the theatre  
                        ‘I did not go to cinema but to theatre.’ 
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In comparison, there is a great body of literature written on but in 
English—Lakoff (1971), Anscombre and Ducrot (1977), Abraham (1979) Horn 
(1989), Bell (1998), Blakemore (1987, 1989, 2002) and Iten (2005). 
Most theorists, who studied but, agree that it encodes several meanings. 
Lakoff (1971) and Blakemore (1987, 2002) claim that but encodes a denial-of-
expectation meaning between the two conjuncts it links. Consider Lakoff’s 
example (1971:67): 
 
(24)       John is a Republican but he is honest.  
 
According to Lakoff, but in this example involves an implication relation between 
two conjuncts based on the suggestion that Republicans are not normally honest. 
The idea is that the first conjunct (John is Republican) implies an assumption 
which is contradicted by the second conjunct (he is honest). In other words, on the 
basis of the first conjunct, the hearer might be lead to expect something which is 
then denied.  
Lakoff (1971:133) points out that there is another use of but where the 
relation between the two conjuncts is not of a denial of expectation or implication 
but rather one of a simple contrast: 
 
(25)       Peter is rich but John is poor. 
 
As can be noticed, but in the above utterance simply encodes a contrastive 
relationship between the states of affairs, represented in each clause. 
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Other theorists, for example, Anscombre and Ducrot (1977) claim that but 
can have a yet further meaning which is different from the first two discussed 
above. Consider the following scenario where both A and B attending a Christmas 
party; A comments on the person who sees for the first time with B.  
 
(26)       A. Oh! Your brother looks exactly like you. 
              B. He is not my brother but my friend.  
 
The use of but in (26B) does not involve contradiction. It is not the case that the 
first conjunct (he is not my brother) implies the negation of the second conjunct or 
vice versa. This use of but is called the ‘correction’ use, where the clause 
introduced by but provides a correct replacement for the assumption in the first 
clause. 
There is a fourth use of but, which is called by Bell (1998: 527) the 
‘discourse’ or ‘sequential’ but. Usually, but in this case has an utterance-initial use. 
Consider the following example: 
 
(27)       A. I am very happy; we’ve had a very nice dinner today. 
              B. But did anybody see my wallet? 
 
Bell claims that this use of but signals a return to the main topic of discourse. He 
describes the but-clause as a cancelling clause which cancels what comes before 
in discourse.         
Since but has been seen as encoding a variety of meanings, some theorists 
including Anscombre and Ducrot (1977), Abraham (1979) argue that it is 
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linguistically ambiguous, i.e. there is more than one lexical but in English. Horn 
(1989) supports this argument by referring to cross-linguistic data which show 
that but in English could be translated to different lexical items in other languages. 
For instance, the denial but is translated as aber in German and pero in Spanish, 
while the correction but is translated as sondern in German and sino in Spanish.  
Data from Standard Arabic show that there are four non-synonymous 
linguistic expressions that translate but in English namely, lakinna, bainama, 
lakin and bal.  The denial but is normally translated as lakinna in SA: 
 
(28)     kana       min    at

-t

ullabi      al-mumtazīn     lakinnahu    lam   yas

il       ’ila    
           was+he  from   students       excellent           but+he         not    reach       to        
 
            mustawana  ad-dirasī     h

aitu    kuntu   wa    farouq    min     al-’awa’il.  
            our level      study         where  was+I   and   Farouq   from    the first  
 
“He was an excellent student, but he has never reached our level. I and Farouq 
were  the first in the class.” 
 
                                                                                    (Swimming in the Mud29 p.21) 
 
Lakinna in this example is similar to but in Lakoff’s example (24) in the sense 
that it indicates a denial-of-expectation relation between the two clauses based on 
the fact that ‘excellent students should be the first in their classes’. However this 
expectation has been denied by the second conjunct.  
                                                 
29
 Al-Suleibi (2002). Sibaha fi Al-Wahal (Swimming in the Mud). Damascus: Dar Al-Ilm. 
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As for the contrastive but, it is translated as bainma30 in SA. Consider the 
following example: 
 
(29)       
ğ
alasa       walad   abi     yusuf    al-qurfus

ā
a    bainama    ibn   al-s

abrah 
              Sat down  son    Abi    Yusuf      squat             but             Ibn   Al-Sabrah 
                                                     
             baqiya        wāqifan  
             remained     standing 
 
                        “Walad Abi Yusuf squatted but Ibn Al-Sabrah remained standing”.          
                           
                                                                                      (Raspberry Tree p.135)          
 
Bainama in (29) indicates a contrastive relation between two states of affairs 
(squatting) and (standing) in a similar way to what is indicated by but in (25): 
Concerning the correction but, it is traditionally translated as bal in SA as 
demonstrated in the following example: 
 
 
                                                 
30
 There is another DM (’innama) used in SA to encode a contrastive relationship between the two 
elements it connects. It differs from bainama in the sense that it is always preceded by negation: 
 
a. la      ’uridu        al-milh  a      ’innama      al-bihāra 
  not      want         the salt         but             the pepper 
         ‘I don not want the salt but the pepper.’  
 
b. ma       dahabtu        ’innam      ’intaz  rtuka           h  atta      al-taniaya z  uhran 
   not      went way      but            wait for you        until       2.00 pm 
                ‘I have not gone but waited for you until 2.00 pm.’ 
 
c. lam     ya’tū      min      al-bah  r      ’innama    ğā’ū    min     qalbi   beirut 
not     come      from     the sea       but           come   from    heart  Beirut 
        “They did not come from the sea but from the heart of Beirut.  
 
                                                                                                         (The Bridge of Death p. 41) 
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(30)       a. ahbir-nī      ‘an       ziarati-ka     li-london     fi    nisān     1995 
                 tell-me       about   visit-your    to-London   in   April     1995    
 
              b. ’naa  lam ’zur   london    fi  nisān  1995  bal  zurtu-ha   fi ’yyār   2001 
                   I    not   visit   London    in   April  1995  but visited-it  in May   2001 
 
              a’. Tell me about your visit to London in April 1995. 
              b’. I did not visit London in April 1995 but (visited it) in May 2001. 
 
As can be noticed, the clause introduced by bal in (30) corrects the assumption 
communicated in the first clause.  
Bell’s (1998) utterance-initial but is translated as lakin in SA. As can be 
seen, lakin in (19) indicates a return to the main topic in discourse and it cancels 
what comes before in discourse. 
Iten (2005:125) argues against the ambiguity account of but. She 
maintains that the presence of a word in one language which can have more than 
one translation in another language does not mean that the word itself is 
ambiguous. She gives an example of the word cousin in English which can be 
translated (in German) as Vetter for the male cousin and as Base for the female 
cousin. However, nobody would say that the word cousin in English is ambiguous. 
She also claims that if but in English is ambiguous, then this should lead to 
sentences containing but being ambiguous. But this is not intuitively the case.  
However, theorists who argue that but in English is ambiguous might think 
of ambiguous sentences containing but. Consider the following example: 
 
 (31)       My friend is not the smiling quiet gentle man sitting at the table but the 
              frowning angry one quarrelling with the waiter. 
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But in the above sentence can have three different readings. Consider the 
following scenario: John and his friend Peter are at the restaurant having their 
lunch. Co-incidentally David, John’s brother, comes to the same restaurant. John 
comes to David and asks him to join their table. David asks John whether he is 
alone or accompanied by somebody. John tells David that his friend the 
gentleman is having lunch with him. David looks at the table and sees two men 
around to the table and then says to him ‘your friend must be the smiling quiet 
person sitting at the table’ and John replies uttering (31). In this scenario, but 
encodes a denial-of-expectation meaning. The brother’s expectation ‘the gentle 
man is the quiet smiling person sitting at the table (given in the first conjunct) is 
denied by the second conjunct ‘the frowning angry person quarrelling with the 
waiter’. But, in the same scenario, can have a contrastive meaning as well. It 
encodes a contrastive relationship between two clauses ‘the smiling quiet person 
sitting at the table’ and ‘the frowning angry person quarrelling with the waiter’. 
But in this very scenario can also have a third reading namely ‘correction’. In this 
sense, by uttering (31), John intends to correct his brother’s assumption about his 
friend. Thus, in (31) the second conjunct ‘the frowning angry person quarrelling 
with the waiter’ provides a correct replacement to the second conjunct ‘the 
smiling quiet person sitting at the table’. 
However, my purpose here is not to establish whether but in English is 
lexically ambiguous or not but rather to show that the corresponding linguistic 
expressions in SA encode procedural meanings. Nevertheless, I agree with Iten 
(2005) and Blakemore (1987, 2002) that but in English is not ambiguous. Iten is 
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right in her claim that but-sentences are not ambiguous because the three separate 
interpretations derived in (31) are related in the sense that what comes after but 
contrasts with what comes before it. 
 If one word in L1 has more than one translation in L2, it does not mean 
that this word is lexically ambiguous in L1. But is different from linguistic 
expressions which encode real ambiguity. Take, for instance, the word šahāda in 
SA. This word is lexically ambiguous; it has four different linguistically encoded 
meanings. It can be translated as evidence, martyrdom, degree (BA, MA, PhD etc.) 
or the seen31 (as compared to the unseen). Consider the following examples where 
the word šahāda is translated as four different words in English: 
 
(32)       wa       huwa    al-ladī       halqa        al-samawati       wa       al-ard

a          
              and       he        who      created        the heavens      and      the earth      
 
             bil- h

aqqi   wa    yawma    yaqūlu   kun  fa-yakūn     qawluhu      al-h

aqqu    
             with truth  and    the day     say       be   will become  his saying   the truth    
  
            wa    lahu         al-mulku    yawma    yunfakhu   fi     al-s

ū
ri      ‘alimu      
            and   to him   the dominion   day       blown       in    the trumpet   knower   
 
            al-
ā
aibi        wa     al-šahāda    wa       huwa     al-h

akīmu     al-habīr.   
            the unseen   and     the seen      and      he         wise             aware               
 
“It is He Who has created the Heavens and the earth in truth, and on the Day 
(i.e. the Day of Resurrection) He will say: "Be!", - and it shall become. His Word 
is the truth. His will be the dominion on the Day when the trumpet will be 
                                                 
31The word šahāda in this sense (as well as when it means evidence) is often used in religious text, 
especially in The Holy Quran.  
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blown. All Knower of the unseen and the seen. He is the All-Wise, Well-Aware 
(of all things).”  
 
                                                                 (The Holy Quran32, Al-An‘am Verse. 73)  
 
(33)       wa     la      taktumu       al-šahāda      wa     man    yaktumuha 
             and    not    conceal        the evidence   and    who    conceals it  
 
             fa-’innahu  ’atimun    qalbuhu   wa   Allāhu     bima    ta‘maluna     ‘alīm 
             that he     sinful          his heart    and  Allah     about   your deeds   knower  
 
“And conceal not the evidence for he, who hides it, surely his heart is sinful. And 
Allah is All-Knower of what you do.” 
 
                                                                 (The Holy Quran, Al-Baqarah Verse. 283) 
 
 
(34)       wa      ’ahamu              ma      yamlikuhu     ‘ans

ā
ru      Hizbu    Allah    
             and     most important  what    own               followers    party    Allah 
 
            huwa   al-’imān      bi-qad

iyyatihim     wa     ‘azimatihim      ‘ala     al-qitāl  
            it          the belief    in their cause         and     their resolution on     fighting  
 
           h

atta       al-šahāda              aw       al-nas

r.  
           until       the martyrdom     or         the victory 
 
“The most important thing followers of Hezbollah rely upon is their belief in their 
cause and their determination to fight until martyrdom or victory.” 
                                                                      
                                                                   (News report33 Sunday 6th August 2006) 
                                                 
32
 This translation of The Holy Quran is provided by Dr. Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali, and  
Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan; available online on http://muttaqun.com/quran/e/index.html. Link 
retrieved 16/01/2008    
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(35)      ’uridu      ’i
ğ
ā
za      qas

irah     limudat        tamani     wa     ’arba’īna      
            I want       leave        short        for time        either      and     forty  
 
            s
ā
‘ah        min      ’
ğ
li       ’
ğ
 r
ā
’i       al-muqābalah       al-šafawiyyah 
            hour         for        sake       doing      the interview        the oral  
 
           wa      tah

qīq              al-na
ğ
āh

        fi       al-musābaqa        li-h

amalti 
           and    achieving         the success    in       the competition   for people  
 
           al-šahāda       al-
ğ
ā
mi‘iyya  
           the degree      the university 
 
“I would like to have a short leave—just 48 hours. I would like to do the interview 
arranged for people with university degree to get the job”. 
 
                                                                                        (The Bridge of Death p. 33) 
 
It is generally agreed that the meaning encoded by but cannot be analysed 
in terms of the contribution it makes to the truth conditions of the utterance in 
which it occurs: 
 
(36)       It was snowing but John went out cycling.  
 
In other words, the meaning encoded by but does not affect the truth or falsity of 
the (36). The utterance is true if and only if the first and the second conjuncts are 
true regardless of the relationship encoded by but. 
                                                                                                                                     
33
 Retrieved at the following link 
http://www.inbaa.com/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=14451 on 17/01/2008 
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Similarly, the meanings encoded by lakinna, bainama, lakin and bal do 
not contribute to the truth conditional content of utterances in which they occur. 
Reconsider (16b) repeated here as (37) for convenience: 
 
(37)        al-samā-u       mumt

irat-un          lakinna        al-
ğ
aw-wa    dāfi’-un 
               the sky             raining                   but              the weather   warm 
                             It is raining but the weather is warm. 
 
As can be noticed, but in (37) indicates that there is a denial-of-expectation 
meaning. However this meaning does not affect the truth or falsity of the utterance. 
(37) is true if and only if the two conjuncts ‘it is raining’ and ‘the weather is 
warm’ are true no matter whether there is a denial-of-expectation relation between 
the two conjuncts or not. Similar analyses could be composed for the other three 
DMs. Consider (18), (21) and (22) in which lakin, bainama and bal, respectively, 
do not affect the truth or falsity of their utterances.  
4.3.1.2. ‘But’: a concept or procedure?  
It is quite hard to find a concept that covers all the meanings encoded by but. In 
this respect, it is more appropriate, following Blakemore (1987, 1989, 2002) and 
Iten (2005), to argue that but is best accounted for in procedural terms. My claim 
will be that but in English encodes a general procedure which can be implemented 
to generate four different interpretations: ‘denial of expectation’, ‘contrast’, 
‘correction’ and ‘cancellation’. It will be argued that the four linguistic 
expressions corresponding to but, i.e. lakinna, bainama, lakin and bal are 
translations to the different implementations of the general procedure encoded by 
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but. Before I do that, I would like to give more evidence about the procedural 
nature of but in English. 
If we examine but in the light of Wilson and Sperber’s (1993) tests, it 
would become clear that the meaning encoded by but is procedural rather than 
conceptual. The first test—‘accessibility to consciousness’ shows that but lacks 
conceptual content. Unlike linguistic expressions with conceptual encoding, such 
as cat, tree, and table, but cannot be brought into consciousness. It would be very 
hard for a native speaker of English to answer a question such as ‘what does but 
mean?’. It would be much easier for her to answer a question such as ‘how is but 
used?’.  
Regarding the second test ‘truth evaluability’, it is widely accepted that the 
meaning encoded by but is not truth evaluable. Consider Iten’s example (83) used 
here as (38): 
 
 (38)      a. John is gay but he’s a nice guy. 
           *b. That’s not true—there’s no incompatibility between him being nice 
                 and him being gay.  
           *c. Come on. You can’t seriously suggest that being gay is incompatible 
                 with being nice.  
 
As can be noticed, the hearer cannot object to the sense of ‘contrast’ or 
‘incompatibility’ encoded by but in (38a). Thus, the hearer’s reply in (38b) is not 
accepted.  
As for the ‘semantic compositionality’ where conceptual representations 
can combine with other conceptual representations to form larger complex 
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conceptual representations, it is obvious that but could not combine with other 
linguistic expressions in the same way as conceptual words do. Consider the 
following examples given by Iten (2005:132): 
 
(39)       Sheila is rich [I strongly suggest this contrasts] she is unhappy. 
(40)       Sheila is rich [I don’t suggest this contrasts] she is unhappy. 
(41)       * Sheila is rich strongly but she is unhappy. 
(42)       * Sheila is rich not but she is unhappy. 
 
Iten points out that there is a difference between but and the linguistic expressions 
(between square brackets) which would have to be taken as synonymous with but 
on conceptual accounts. She maintains that unlike (39) and (40) which are 
perfectly acceptable, (41) and (42) are neither grammatical nor interpretable.  
Wilson and Sperber’s (1993) three tests show that the linguistic meaning 
encoded by but is best analysed in procedural terms. As far as my classification of   
linguistic expressions in English (given in the last chapter) is concerned, but 
comes in the second category namely ‘purely procedural linguistic expressions’.  
This section has presented a brief analysis which supports the procedural 
account of but. Next section investigates the general procedure encoded by but 
and shows how this procedure is implemented to reach the four interpretations 
derived in but-utterances. 
4.3.1.3. ‘But’: a Relevance-Theoretic account 
Blakemore (1987, 2002) concentrates on the two main interpretations of but 
namely, ‘denial of expectation’ and ‘contrast’. Her account demonstrates that but 
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encodes a procedure which constrains the relevance of the utterance in which but 
is used. According to her, the procedure encoded by but reduces the processing 
effort by pointing the hearer towards the contextual effect of the clause it 
introduces. In other words, the use of but helps the hearer/reader see how the 
proposition communicated in the clause it introduces is relevant to what is 
expressed in the first clause.  
Blakemore (1987, 2002) argues for a unitary account of but. Her claim is 
that the procedure encoded by but puts a single constraint on the relevance of the 
utterance in which it occurs, no matter whether it encodes a ‘contrast’ or ‘denial of 
expectation’. This procedure encoded by but, as given by Iten, (2005:147) is the 
following: 
 
(43)      What follows (Q) contradicts and eliminates an assumption that is 
             manifest in the context.  
            
Blakemore uses the procedure given in (43) to account for both ‘denial’ and 
‘contrast’ meanings of but. In the case of ‘denial of expectation’, she uses 
examples such as the following: 
 
(44)       John is a lawyer but he is in prison now. 
 
The assumption manifest in the first clause of (44) is that ‘John should not be in 
prison’. It is usually known that lawyers work to save people from being in prison; 
thus it is unexpected (and rather strange) for John himself to be in prison. 
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However, this assumption is denied by the conceptual content in the but-clause 
‘he is in prison now’. Blakemore calls this type of denial as a ‘direct denial’.  
Blakemore gives another type of denial where the propositional content of 
the but-clause does not contradict and eliminate the assumption, but rather the 
implicature communicated in the preceding clause. Consider the following 
example: 
 
(45)       It is freezing outside but John needs some milk for the kids.  
 
As can be noticed, what is denied is not the truth-conditional content expressed in 
the first clause of (45) but rather the contextual implicature communicated in the 
first clause—that ‘John might be expected not to want to got out’. Blakemore calls 
this type of denial as an ‘indirect denial’. 
Blakemore accounts for the contrast but in two different ways. She (1987, 
2002) argues that the contrast but is a special case of the denial but. She treats it 
the same way as the denial of expectation but as in (44) where but encodes a 
procedure of contradiction and elimination. Consider her example used below as 
(46): 
 
(46)       John is tall but Bill is short. 
 
Blakemore (1987, 2002) accounts for this use of but as follows: we might take the 
first clause ‘John is tall’ to imply that ‘Bill is tall too’ if John and Bill are twin 
brothers. In this case the implicature manifest in the first clause ‘Bill is tall too’ is 
denied by the but-clause ‘Bill is short’. However, Blakemore (1989:17) accounts 
  
 
225 
for the contrast but in a different way. She claims that the contrast case of but 
involves a different procedure from that involved in the denial case. Thus, she 
claims that but should be treated as having more than one single meaning. 
Hall (2004:199) develops an interesting account of but. She claims that the 
procedure encoded by but suspends an inference that would result in a 
contradiction with what follows. Consider (45) repeated below as (47) for 
convenience: 
 
(47)       It is freezing outside but John needs some milk for the kids. 
 
As can be noticed, but in (47) introduces a clause the propositional content of 
which provides a suspension of an inference that might be derived from the first 
clause such as ‘people do not get out in freezing weather’. This inference is cut-
off or suspended by the but-clause.  
The discussion presented above shows that theorists have different views 
regarding the procedural meaning encoded by but. Blakemore and Hall analyse 
the procedure encoded by but in different ways. Building on that, I argue that but 
in English encodes a general procedure the different implementations of which 
put constraints on the interpretation of the utterances in which it occurs. Thus, the 
implementation of this general procedure results in generating four different 
constraints on the interpretation of the utterance in which but occurs, namely 
‘denial’, ‘contrast’, ‘correction’ and ‘cancellation’. I will claim that these four 
implementations of the procedural meaning of but are translated as different 
linguistic expressions in SA: lakinna, bainama, lakin and bal as will be discussed 
in the next section.  
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4.3.2. ‘But’ as encoding a general procedure 
The ambiguity account of but proposed by Anscombre and Ducrot (1977) and 
Horn (1989) has been argued against by Iten (2005). Iten’s argument is based on 
two claims. On the one hand, she maintains that a word which has more than one 
linguistic expression equivalent to it in other languages does not mean that the 
word is ambiguous and she gives an example of the word ‘cousin’ in English. On 
the other hand, she argues that if but in English is ambiguous then sentences 
containing but must be ambiguous which, we do not find in English.  
Iten’s argument seems to be correct. But in English is never ambiguous. 
The different readings of but, i.e. ‘denial’, ‘contrast’, ‘correction’ and 
‘cancellation’ stem from the fact that but is a sense-general  linguistic expression. 
But is not an ambiguous expression because the different interpretations 
communicated in but-utterances are related. ‘Denial’, ‘contrast’ ‘correction’ and 
‘cancellation’ come under one procedural umbrella. This, I claim, is the ‘contrast’ 
encoded by the linguistic expression but (this is discussed in more detail in the 
next section).  
My argument (Hussein forthcoming) will be that but is a DM that encodes 
the general procedure given below: 
 
(48)       Treat the proposition communicated by the but-clause as contrasting with 
             the assumption explicitly or implicitly communicated by the utterance of  
             the preceding clause.  
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 The above procedure is implemented in particular contexts to generate the 
different meanings communicated by but-utterances namely: ‘denial’, ‘contrast’, 
‘correction’ and ‘cancellation’. My claim is that the four SA linguistic expressions 
corresponding to but are not exact translations of the linguistic expression (but) 
but rather translations of the specific implementations of the procedure encoded 
by but: 
4.3.2.1. Lakinna: the ‘denial but’ 
Data from SA show that there are four different lexical items corresponding to but 
in English. The argument (Hussein forthcoming) will be that each of these lexical 
items stands for a translation of one of the different implementations of the 
general procedure encoded by but as shown in the figure below:  
 
                                                         But 
 
 
                        
                               denial           contrast      correction     cancellation  
                               (Imp1)          (Imp 2)         (Imp3)           (Imp4)   
   
 
  
 
                             lakinna          bainama          bal                lakin  
                             (Trans1)         (Trans2)       (Trans3)         (Trans4) 
 
Figure 8: But as encoding a general procedure 
 
The first implementation of this general procedure leads to the denial-of-
expectation meaning communicated in but-utterances. The translation of this 
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implementation would be lakinna in SA. This implementation can be put as 
follows: 
 
(49)       What follows lakinna denies and replaces an assumption communicated  
              by what precedes it. 
 
Consider the following example for demonstration: 
 
(50)       jon       lis

s

-un    lakinna-hu      tayyibu       al-qalb 
              John    thief       but-he             good            heart  
                     “John is a thief but he is good-hearted”     
    
As can be noticed, the assumption communicated in the first clause in (50) is that 
John is not a good-hearted person on the expectation that ‘thieves are not good-
hearted’. However, this assumption is denied by the proposition communicated in 
the clause introduced by lakinna. The use of lakinna in (50) does not contribute to 
the truth-conditional content of the utterance. The utterance is true if and only if 
the two propositions ‘John is a thief’ and ‘John is good-hearted’ are true. The 
contribution of lakinna lies on the implicit level. It constrains the inferential phase 
of the utterance interpretation by guiding the hearer to interpret the proposition 
communicated in the lakinna-clause as denial and replacement of the assumption 
in the first clause. In other words, this implementation of the procedure points to 
the hearer that the lakinna-clause achieves relevance as denial and replacement of 
the assumption communicated in the first clause.  
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The other three translations (in SA) cannot be used for this implementation 
of the procedure encoded by the English but; the use of bainama, bal and lakin is 
not accepted in (50): 
 
(51)       a. John is a thief lakinna he is good-hearted. 
            *b. John is a thief bal he is good-hearted. 
            *c. John is a thief bainama he is good-hearted. 
            *d. John is a thief lakin he is good-hearted.  
 
4.3.2.2. Bainama: the ‘contrast but’ 
Unlike lakinna, which is the translation of the ‘denial’ implementation of the 
general procedure encoded by but, bainama is translation of the ‘contrast’ 
implementation. Given that, bainama in SA is analysed as encoding a contrastive 
relationship between two propositions: 
 
(52)       What follows bainama contrasts a proposition explicitly communicated 
              by what precedes it.   
 
Consider the following example in which bainama indicates a simple contrast 
between two states of affairs:  
 
(53)       ‘umar-un    qas

ī
r-un         bainama        zaid-un        t

aw
ī l-un 
               Omar        short               but                Zaid             tall  
                             “Omar is short but Zaid is tall’   
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As can be noticed, bainama in (53) indicates a contrastive relationship between 
two states of affairs: ‘Omar is short and ‘Zaid is tall’. Similar to lakinna, the 
contribution made by bainama does not affect the truth-conditional content of the 
utterance. The utterance of (53) is true if and only if both propositions ‘Omar is 
short’ and ‘Zaid is tall’ are true regardless of any contrastive relationship between 
them. The contribution made by bainama is operative on the implicit level by 
guiding the hearer to see that the proposition communicated by bainama-clause 
achieves relevance as a contrast of the proposition communicated in the first 
clause. There is no denial-of-expectation meaning involved when bainama is used. 
In addition, the other two translations, i.e. bal and lakin cannot be used for the 
contrast implementation referred to here: 
 
(54)       a. Omar is short bainama Zaid is tall. 
           ?b. Omar is short lakinna Zaid is tall. 
           *c. Omar is short bal Zaid is tall. 
           *d. Omar is short lakin Zaid tall.  
 
It is interesting to say that lakinna can be used instead of bainama in (54). 
However the interpretation would be different. If lakinna is used, the proposition 
communicated in the lakinna-clause is interpreted as a denial of the assumption 
communicated in the first clause. This could happen in scenarios where Omar and 
Zaid are taken to be twin brothers, which indicates that both are tall. The 
implication then is that ‘Zaid is tall’ too. However this implication is denied by 
the proposition introduced by the lakinna-clause. 
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4.3.2.3. Bal: the ‘correction but’ 
The translation of the third implementation of the general procedure encoded by 
but is bal which is used as a correction marker in SA. It is usually used by 
speakers to correct previous assumptions in discourse. It is regularly used in 
religious texts specially the Holy Quran. Consider the following example:  
 
(55)       ’am     yaqulūna  bihi       
ğ
inatun      bal      
ğ
a’ahum            bilh

aq 
              Or     they say     in him   madness    but      brought them     with truth 
    ‘Or say they: “There is madness in him?” Nay, but he brought them the truth.’ 
 
 
                                                                      (The Holy Quran: Part 23, Verse 70) 
 
In this verse, the Almighty God (Allah) defends his prophet Muhammad (peace be 
upon him). The disbelievers referred to in the clause that precedes bal accuse the 
prophet of being mad because he is asking them to worship one god. In the bal-
clause, Allah corrects the disbeliever’s assumption and points out that the prophet 
is not mad but is the messenger of truth to mankind. 
Bal in (55) does not encode a denial-of-expectation meaning. It is not the 
case that the disbelievers in the first clause expect that the prophet to be mad, but 
rather accusing him of madness. So, the purpose of the bal-clause is not to deny 
any contextual expectation. The use of the bal-clause is rather to correct the 
disbeliever’s judgement that the ‘prophet is mad’ and replace it with ‘a messenger 
of truth’. Building on that, the claim is that ‘correction’ is an implementation of 
the general procedure encoded by but and that the translation of this 
implementation into SA is bal: 
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(56)       What follows bal corrects and replaces an assumption explicitly 
              communicated by what precedes it. 
 
 Consider another example: 
 
(57)       a. ’uhtu-ka         tušbihu-ku    tamaman 
                  sister-your     like-you        exactly 
     
             b. hiya     laisat     ’uht-ī              bal        ’umm-ī  
                 She      not        sister-my        but       mother-my  
 
           “a. Your sister looks exactly like you.” 
           “b. She is not my sister but my mother.”  
 
The use of bal in (57b) contributes the inferential part of the utterance 
interpretation in the sense that it guides the hearer to see that the proposition 
expressed in the bal-clause is relevant as a correction and replacement of an 
assumption communicated in the previous clause. Similarly, the other three 
translations are unacceptable in the correction case: 
 
(58)       a. She is not my sister bal my mother. 
            *b. She is not my sister lakinna my mother. 
            *c. She is not my sister bainama my mother. 
            *d. She is not my sister lakin my mother.   
 
4.3.2.4. Lakin: the ‘cancellation but’ 
The last implementation of the procedure encoded by but is translated as lakin in 
SA. Lakin is a DM which is used in an initial position in discourse. It is used to 
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introduce a clause which communicates a proposition that relates to a previous 
proposition in discourse in the sense that the proposition in the lakin-clause 
cancels the importance of the proposition in the previous discourse. Consider the 
following example: 
 
(59)          a. mas

tabatu     baitika        šabihatun   bi-mas

tabati    baiti   ’abi  yusuf 
                    the terrace   your house    similar       to the terrace   house  Abi Yusuf 
 
                  b. lakin    ’aba   yusuf    tarak      baitahu      wa    ’abna’ahu   ’iqtala‘u 
                      but       dad    Yusuf     left       his house   and    his kids       pull out 
 
                      al-ša
ğ
arah       wa      hadamū           al-bait. 
                      the tree            and     demolished      the house. 
 
“a. The terrace of your house is similar to the terrace of Abi Yusuf’s house.” 
“b. But Aba Yusuf left his house and his kids pulled out the tree and demolished 
      the house.” 
 
                                                                                      (The Raspberry Tree: p80) 
 
Unlike lakinna and bal, the use of lakin does not deny or correct an assumption 
communicated in the preceding clause. The clause introduced by lakin in (59), 
‘Aba Yusuf left his house and his kids pulled out the tree and demolished the 
house’ neither denies the preceding clause ‘the terrace of your house is similar to 
the terrace of Abi Yusuf’s house’ nor corrects it. 
The clause introduced by lakin in (59) is a cancellation and replacement of 
the proposition communicated in the preceding clause. In this sense, lakin points 
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to the hearer that the proposition communicated by the lakin-clause is more 
important and significant than the proposition communicated by the preceding 
clause and that it has to cancel and replace it: The implementation can be put as 
follows:  
 
(60)       What follows lakin cancels and replaces a proposition communicated by 
               what  precedes it.   
 
Consider another example to demonstrate that lakin is the best translation of this 
implementation: 
 
(61)       a. ’unz

ur    al-‘adīd-u   min   al-nās  yata
ğ
mma‘una   fi    sāh

ti     al-baldah 
                 look        many          of      people    gathering        in   square   the town 
  
              b. lakin  limāda    
ğ
am
ī
‘u-hum      yarfa‘una       ’a‘lām-an      hudr-an  
                  but     what       all of them         carry                 flags        green 
 
              “a’. Look! Many people are gathering in the town square.’ 
              “b. But, why are they all carrying green flags?” 
  
Lakin in (61) introduces a clause, the proposition of which relates to the 
proposition in the previous clause. It guides the hearer to see that the proposition 
it introduces cancels the importance and significance of the proposition in the 
previous clause. There is no, denial or correction involved in this case of lakin, 
which means that the other three translations cannot be used instead: 
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(62)       a. Lakin, why are they all carrying green flags? 
            *b. lakinna, why are they all carrying green flags? 
            *c. bal, why are they all carrying green flags? 
           *d. bainama, why are they all carrying green flags? 
 
In this section, I argued for a unitary account of but, which encodes as a 
general procedure that constrains the implicatures by reducing the processing 
effort in recovering the intended interpretation of the clause it introduces. I have 
pointed out that the application of this procedure enables the hearer to recover 
four different meanings communicated in but-utterances. These meanings are 
‘denial’, ‘contrast’, ‘correction’ and ‘cancellation’. These four meanings 
recovered in but-utterances are represented by four different lexical items in SA. 
4.3.3. The case of ‘fa’ 
4.3.3.1. Fa as a coordinating conjunction 
Fa in SA is used as a coordinating conjunction. It grammatically behaves as wa 
(and) in the sense that it links two or more clauses and/or phrases. However, it 
differs from wa in two aspects: morphology and semantics. On the morphological 
side, unlike wa, fa is used as a prefix (bound morpheme) attached to the first noun 
or verb in the second conjunct: 
 
(63)       a. ra’ait-u         ah

mad-an            fa-hālid-an    
                  saw-I            Ahmad                fa-Khaled 
                            “I saw Ahmad fa Khaled.” 
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             b. ra’ait-u          ah

mad-an            wa        hālid-an 
                 saw-I            Ahmad                and       Khaled 
                            “I saw Ahmad and Khaled.” 
 
(64)       a. dahala        ah

mad-un        fa-
ğ
alasa        ‘ala      al-kursī    
                 came in      Ahmad            fa-sat down     on        the chair  
                        “Ahmad came in fa sat down on the chair.” 
              b. a. dahala        ah

mad-un        wa      
ğ
alasa           ‘ala      al-kursī  
                      came in      Ahmad            and     sat down       on        the chair  
                          “Ahmad came in and sat down on the chair.” 
 
 On the semantic level, fa encodes further meanings not encoded by wa 
such as ‘sequentiality’, ‘immediacy’, ‘non-intervention’ and ‘causality’. As 
regards ‘sequentiality’ (temporal ordering), fa indicates that the events (or actions) 
described in the two conjuncts linked by fa take place in a chronological order. 
Consider the following examples: 
 
(65)       a. 
ğ
a’a            ‘umar-un            fa-zaid-un       ’ila            al-h

afla    
                  came           Omar                 fa-Zaid             to              the party 
                              “Omar fa Zaid came to the party.” 
 
             b. 
ğ
a’a          ‘umar-un            wa      zaid-un        ’ila            al-h

afla 
                 came         Omar                 and    Zaid              to              the party 
                              “Omar and Zaid came to the party.” 
 
On the syntactic level, there is no difference between (65a) and (65b); both fa and 
wa function as coordinating conjunctions. However the difference lies on the 
semantic level. The difference in meaning between (65a) and (65b) is very clear to 
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native speakers of Arabic. Wa in (65b) does not semantically give any indication 
of sequentiality (temporal ordering). In other words, wa does not semantically 
specify any temporal ordering of the events. In this sense, an utterance of (65b) 
can have three interpretations: 
 
 (66)        a. Omar came before Zaid.    
                b. Omar came after Zaid. 
                c. Omar and Zaid came at the same time. 
 
However, fa in (65a) semantically encodes a temporal ordering of the two actions: 
the action in the first clause takes place before the action in the second clause. 
Given that, (65a) can only have one interpretation: 
 
(67)       Omar came before Zaid.      
 
Another piece of evidence that fa in SA encodes ‘sequentiality’ is that it is 
used to link events (or actions) but not ideas (or states). Consider the following 
examples: 
 
(68)     a. tanawala   ah

mad-un   
ā
ada’a-hu   fa-šariab-a     ka’san     min      al-šāi  
               had            Ahmad       lunch-his    fa-drank-he    cup          of          tea 
                            “Ahmad had his lunch fa drank a cup of tea.” 
 
          b. tanawal  ah

mad-un    
ā
ada’a-hu    wa   šariab-a       ka’san    min      al-šāi 
              had        Ahmad         lunch-his     and    drank-he    cup        of         tea 
                             “Ahmad had his lunch and drank a cup of tea.” 
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As can be noticed, fa in (68a) indicates that there is a sequential relationship 
between two actions: ‘having lunch’ and ‘drinking a cup of tea’; that the action in 
the first clause takes place before the action in the second clause. 
Fa, in such uses, has the meaning of the English then which has three 
meaning 34 : ‘sequentiality’, ‘immediacy’ and ‘contiguity’. As regards 
‘sequentiality’, then indicates that actions occur next in order of time. Concerning 
‘immediacy’, it indicates that one action takes place at the moment immediately 
following another action. Regarding ‘contiguity’ (non-intervention) then indicates 
that an action takes place directly after another action. 
The concept of sequentiality can also be communicated in (68b). The two 
actions in this sentence can be interpreted as taking place in temporal ordering, i.e. 
the action in the second clause takes place after the action in the first clause. 
However, sequentiality in this case is not encoded by wa, it is rather pragmatically 
derived. It can simply be denied by adding the phrase ‘but not in this order’ after 
(68b): 
 
 (69)       a. Ahmad had his lunch wa drank a cup of tea /but not in this order/.    
             *b. Ahmad had his lunch fa drank a cup of tea /but not in this order/. 
 
By contrast, fa cannot be used to link ideas or states. Compare the acceptable uses 
of fa in (64a) and (68a) to the unacceptable uses of it in (70) and (71): 
                                                 
34
 Picked up from OED at the following link: 
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50250557?query_type=word&queryword=then&first=1&max_
to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=1&search_id=p1Ta-FaVYKe-
2172&hilite=50250557 Retrieved on Saturday 28/03/2008 at 3.30 pm.   
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(70)       *al- 
ğ
aw-wu         bārid-un       fa-al-kahrabā’u       maqtū‘a    
             *the weather         cold              fa-the electricity      off  
                     *“The weather is cold fa the electricity is off.” 
(71)       *yat

fu        al-hašab       ‘ala      al-mā’      fa-tatamaddad       al-ma‘ādin     
              *float          the wood      on       the water   fa-expand               metals   
               bil-h

ar
ā
rah           
               by heating                   
                            *“Wood floats on water fa metals expand by heating.” 
 
As can be noticed, fa cannot be used in (70) and (71) because ideas and states do 
not have sequential relations. For connecting clauses or phrases expressing ideas 
or states, wa is used in SA. (70) and (71) can correctly be used with wa but not fa: 
 
(72)       The weather is cold wa the electricity is off.   
(73)       Wood floats on water wa metals expand by heating.    
  
It can be noticed that sequentiality is communicated in both wa an fa-utterances. 
The difference is that in fa-utterances, it is linguistically encoded while in wa-
utterances it is pragmatically conveyed. 
Grice (1967) argues that and (wa35) in natural language is identical to the 
truth-functional logical counterpart ‘&’, which means that the two conjuncts in 
and-utterances have the same truth-conditional status. Any other assumptions 
communicated in and-utterances would be considered as conversational 
implicatures pragmatically conveyed. For instance, the temporal ordering 
                                                 
35
 Unlike wa, fa in SA is not truth functional. There is a difference between the truth-conditional 
content of the two conjuncts linked by fa. In ‘Ahmad had his lunch wa drank a cup of tea’, the two 
conjuncts can be put in any order because they are equal in truth conditions. However in ‘Ahmad 
had his lunch fa drank a cup of tea’, the only possible order is that the event in the second conjunct 
follows the event in the first conjunct.  
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communicated in and-utterances is analysed by Grice as conversational 
implicature due to the manner submaxim ‘orderliness’. Given that, an utterance 
such as (69a) implicates (74) below: 
 
(74)       Ahmad had his lunch and then drank a cup of tea.    
 
For Grice, the and then interpretation of and is not a part of the truth-conditional 
content of the utterance in which and is used simply because it is not encoded by 
the linguistic form of the utterance but rather pragmatically derived. 
Francois Recanati (1989, 1993, 2004), Kent Bach (1994, 2000), Anne 
Bezuidenhout (1997, 2002), and Stephen Neale (2000) generally agree with Grice 
that and in natural language is equivalent to the truth-functional logical operator 
‘&’. However, they disagree with him as regards the analysis of the temporal 
ordering and causal relations communicated by and-utterances. Unlike Grice, 
these pragmatists argue that the temporal and causal relations communicated by 
and-utterances (though pragmatically conveyed) are not conversational 
implicatures. According to them, such relations are the outcome of the 
development of the logical form of and-sentences. Since they are inferred by 
developing the logical form, these relations are analysed as contributing to the 
truth-conditional propositional content of the utterance in which and is used. This 
is known in RT as ‘explicature’ where pragmatics plays a role in determining the 
truth-conditional content of the utterance. 
To show that temporal and causal relations communicated in and-
utterances contribute to the propositional content of the utterances, researchers in 
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RT use the ‘embedding’ test (Cohen 1971) or the Scope Criterion as (Recanati 
1989, 1993) calls it: 
 
A pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is part of what is 
said36 (and, therefore, not a conversational implicature) if - and, 
perhaps, only if – it falls within the scope of logical operators such 
as negation and conditionals. 
 
According to this criterion, temporal ordering and causal relations communicated 
by and-utterances contribute to the explicature ‘what is said’ because they can fall 
under the scope of negation and/or conditionals: 
 
(75)      a. Ahmad did not have his lunch and drank cup of tea, but (he) drank a 
                cup of tea and had his lunch.    
Or:   b. Ahmad had his lunch and drank a cup of tea (but not in this order). 
 
(76)       If Ahmad had his lunch and drank a cup of tea, then he would have come 
             back to work now.   
 
According to the negation scope criterion, the explicature in (74) that has been 
pragmatically inferred by developing the logical form of (68b) is cancellable as 
can be noticed in (75a-b). This is compatible with Carston’s (2002) notion of 
cancellable explicatures, in which she argues that what is pragmatically conveyed 
can be cancelled no matter whether is it is communicated on the explicit or 
implicit level. By contrast, temporal ordering expressed in fa-utterances is not 
pragmatically conveyed, but rather linguistically encoded by fa. It is part of the 
                                                 
36
 The notion of explicature in RT is referred to as ‘what is said’ by Recanati and Levinson. 
  
 
242 
truth-conditional propositional content of the utterance. In other words, it 
contributes to the explicature (what is said) by the utterance and thus it can come 
under the scope of logical operator such as conditionals: 
 
(77)       If Ahmad had his lunch fa drank a cup of tea, then he would have come  
              back to work now.    
 
The sequential relation communicated in fa-utterances is different from 
that communicated in wa-utterances. In the latter, this relation could not be 
cancelled because it is linguistically encoded and not pragmatically inferred, as 
was demonstrated in (69b) repeated here as (78). 
 
(78)       *a. Ahmad had his lunch fa drank a cup of tea (but not in this order). 
     
The sequentiality linguistically encoded by fa can be understood in two 
ways: ‘immediate sequentiality’ and ‘non-interventional sequentiality’. I refer to 
the former as ‘immediacy’ and to the latter as ‘non-intervention’ treating both 
meanings as two subcases of ‘sequentiality’. Regarding the first subcase 
‘immediacy’, fa indicates that there is a very short time span between the event 
described in the first conjunct and the event described in the second conjunct. 
Consider the following example: 
 
(79)          d

arab    zilzāl-un      ‘anīf-un   al-balada       fa-tahaddamat    al-‘adīd  
                 hit       earthquake     strong     the country    fa-collapsed        many 
  
                 min        al-manāzil   
                 of            buildings  
 
                 “A strong earthquake hit the country fa many buildings collapsed.” 
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Fa, in (79), indicates that there is very short time separating between the two 
events, namely ‘an earthquake hitting the country’ and ‘many buildings collapsed’. 
The short-time span encoded by fa is not defined, but it is very short, as can be 
noticed in (79). It is generally known that in cases of strong earthquakes, 
buildings collapse in few seconds or minutes. Given that, fa in SA cannot be used 
with temporal adverbs such as ‘immediately’ or ‘promptly’ since the short-time 
span or the ‘immediacy’ meaning is already encoded by fa: 
 
(80)     *A strong earthquake hit the country fa many buildings collapsed 
              immediately.   
 
(81)     *A strong earthquake hit the country fa many buildings collapsed promptly.   
 
The meaning of ‘immediacy’ encoded by fa is not ‘punctual’. The 
linguistic import of fa does not give a specific point of time in which the second 
event or action takes place. Given that, fa cannot be used with punctual time 
adverbials such as on Monday or at 10.30 am.  
 
(82)       *A strong earthquake hit the country on Sunday fa many buildings   
              collapsed on Tuesday. 
 
(83)       *A strong earthquke hit the conutry at 10:00 am fa many buildings 
                collapsed at 10:30 am.  
 
 However the meaning enocded by fa in this use can be understood as ‘durational’. 
In other words, fa indicates that the second event takes palce shortly (or 
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immediately) after the first event and lasts for a relatively long time. Building on 
that, fa can be used with durational time adverbials: 
 
(84)        A strong earthquake hit the country fa many buildings collapsed over the  
               next few days.   
 
(85)       A strong earthquake hit the country fa many buildings collapsed during 
             the  following few hours.    
 
(86)       A strong eartherquake hit the country on Monday fa many buildings 
              collpased till Tuesday.    
 
The short-time-span meaning encoded by fa can be contrasted with the 
long-time-span meaning encoded by another coordinating conjunction, tumma. 
Unlike fa, tumma indicates that there is a long period of time separating between 
two events or actions.  
 
(87)          a. natara         al-fallah

u          al-budura         tumma       azhar-at 
                    sow           the farmer          the seeds         tumma         flowered-they 
                                “The farmer planted the seeds tumma they flowered.”   
                 
                b. * natara            al-fallah

u           al-budura         fa- azhar-at 
                       sow               the farmer          the seeds         fa- flowered-they 
                                “*The farmer sow the seeds fa they flowered.” 
 
The use of fa is not acceptable in (87b) because the period of time separating 
between ‘planting of seeds’ and ‘flowering of seeds’ is relatively long compared 
to the period of time separating between the two events described in (79). By the 
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same token, tumma cannot be used instead of fa in (79) because the period of time 
separating between the two events is very short: 
 
(88)       a. *d

arab  zilzāl-un    ‘anīf-un   al-balada    tumma  tahaddamat   al-‘adīd 
                  hit      earthquake  strong  the country      tumma  collapsed      many  
 
                  min        al-manāzil   
                  of            buildings      
 
       “*A strong earthquake hit the country tumma many buildings 
           collapsed.” 
 
The short-time span cannot be encoded by wa. However it can be 
pragmatically communicated in wa-utterances by developing the logical form of 
the sentence containing wa: 
 
(89)          d

arab    zilzāl-un     ‘anīf-un    al-balada       wa   tahaddamat     al-‘adīd 
                 hit         earthquake   strong      the country  and  collapsed        many  
 
                 min        al-manāzil   
                 of            buildings     
 
                   “A strong earthquake hit the country and many buildings collapsed.” 
 
 
Given general knowledge of the world, the hearer will be able to infer that there is 
a very short period of time separating between the two events in (89). Thus what 
is communicated by (89) is the explicature given in (90): 
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(90)       A strong earthquake hit the country and immediately after that many  
              buildings collapsed.    
 
Since wa does not encode ‘immediacy’, and the explicature in (90) is 
pragmatically conveyed via free enrichment, then this explicature is cancellable: 
 
(91)            A strong earthquake hit the country wa many buildings collapsed on 
                   the next day /the forthcoming week/a year later/. 
 
This cannot be the case in fa-utterances because ‘immediacy’ is not pragmatically 
inferred in fa-utterances but rather linguistically encoded. Thus the explicature is 
uncancellable: 
 
(92)       *A strong earthquake hit the country fa many buildings collapsed on 
              the next day /the forthcoming week/a year later/. 
 
Regarding ‘non-intervention’, it could be argued that the two conjuncts in 
fa-utterances represent two events that take place directly after each other in the 
sense that no other similar events intervene. Consider the following example: 
 
(93)       zara        ’umar-un         dimašqa           fa-ba
ā
dāda          
              visited       Omar           Damascus       fa-Baghdad     
                        “Omar visited Damascus fa Baghdad.”   
 
Fa in (93) encodes that Omar’s visit to Baghdad took place directly after his visit 
to Damascus, only in this sense that no other visits took place in between. In this 
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respect, fa can be contrasted with tumma where other comparable actions can take 
place in between: 
 
 (94)       Omar visited Damascus tumma Baghdad.   
 
Tumma in (94) indicates that visiting Damascus does not take place directly after 
visiting Baghdad; it could be that Omar visited another country before visiting 
Baghdad.  
The non-intervention meaning linguistically encoded by fa can be 
pragmatically communicated in wa-utterances. Thus (95) can communicate the 
explicature in (96). However, this explicature is cancellable as can be seen in (97): 
 
(95)      Omar visited Damascus wa Bagdad.   
(96)      Omar visited Damascus wa directly after that (he) visited Baghdad.   
(97)      Omar visited Damascus wa Baghdad/but he visited some other capitals in 
             between/.    
 
The last meaning encoded by fa when used as a coordinating conjunction 
is ‘causality’. In this use, fa indicates that there is a cause-effect relationship 
between two actions joined by fa. Consider the following examples: 
 
(98)       saqat

a       Zaid-un   ’ard

an    fa-’as

aba     rukbata-hu 
              fell           Zaid           down    fa-hurt           leg-his   
                         “Zaid fell down fa (he) hurt his leg.”      
 
(99)       ’ahana       hālid-un    mona       fa-taraka-t      al-h

afla     
              Insulted    Khaled      Mona       fa-left-she      the party 
                          “Khaled insulted Mona fa she left the party.”  
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Fa in (98) indicates that the action expressed in the second conjunct ‘Zaid’s 
hurting his leg’ happens as a result to the action expressed in the first conjunct 
‘Zaid’s falling down’. The same goes for (99) where the second action (Mona left 
the party) is a result of the first action (Khaled insulted Mona). 
Causality can also be pragmatically communicated in the counterpart wa-
utterances; (98) and (99) can also be uttered with wa: 
 
(100)      Zaid fell down wa (he) hurt his leg.    
(101)      Khaled insulted Mona wa she left the party.    
 
(100) and (101) communicate that the action in the second conjunct happens as a 
result of the action in the first conjunct. However the cause-effect relationship 
communicated in these two utterances can be cancelled: 
 
(102)     No, Zaid did not fall over and hurt his leg. He hurt his leg and fell over  
(103)     No, Khaled did not insult Mona and she left the party. She left the party   
              and he insulted her.   
 
When used as a coordinating conjunction, it is quiet hard to find a word-
to-word translation of fa in English. This is due to the syntactic difference 
between fa in SA and the corresponding expressions in English namely, then and 
so. Unlike fa, so and then in English are not used as coordinating conjunctions. So 
the challenge is to find a linguistic expression whose meaning is equivalent to the 
meaning of fa and functions as a coordinating conjunction. The only way to get 
out of this problem is to consider a two-word translation of fa. For instance, in 
order to show that fa is a coordinating conjunction, behaving like and in  English 
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and highlight the extra meanings it encodes, we should translate it as and then in 
the case of ‘sequentiality’, ‘immediacy’ and ‘non-intervention’ and and so in the 
case of ‘causality’. Building on that, a translation of fa in (68), (79), (93) and (99) 
could be given in (104), (105), (106) and (107) respectively: 
 
(104)       Ahmad had his lunch fa drank a cup of tea.     
              “Ahamd had his lunch and then drank a cup of tea.”   
 
(105)       A strong earthquake hit the country fa many buildings collapsed.   
              “A strong earthquake hit the country and then many buildings 
                 collapsed.”  
 
(106)       Omar visited Damascus fa Baghdad.     
              “Omar visited Damascus and then Bagdad.” 
 
(107)       Khaled insulted Mona fa she left the party.     
              “Omar insulted Mona and so she left the party 
 
As far as the truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional distinction is 
concerned, it can be noticed that the four meanings encoded by the coordinating 
conjunction fa contribute to the truth-conditional (propositional) content of the 
utterances in which fa is used. The relations of ‘sequentiality’, ‘immediacy’, ‘non-
intervention’ and ‘causality’ can fall under the scope of a logical operator such as 
‘if then’: 
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(108)       If Ahmad had his lunch fa drank a cup of tea, then he would have come 
               back to work.   
 
(109)       If a strong earthquake hit the country fa many buildings collapsed, then 
                the new government would have been in a real challenge.   
 
(110)       If Omar visited Damascus fa Baghdad, then he would have spent all his  
                savings.   
 
(111)       If Khaled insulted Mona fa she left the party, then Khaled would have 
               put himself in trouble.   
 
4.3.3.2. Can ‘fa’ encode a procedure? 
It is not clear whether the conceptual/procedural distinction can apply to the four 
meanings encoded by fa (when used as a coordinating conjunction). Two of 
Wilson and Sperber’s criteria show that the meaning encoded by fa is procedural. 
These are ‘accessibility to consciousness’ and ‘semantic compositionality’. As for 
the first criterion, it is noticed that native speakers of Arabic find it hard to come 
up with a conceptual representation of fa. They would struggle to answer a 
question such as ‘what does fa mean?’. They will not be able to give an 
explanation of (or paraphrase) this linguistic expression. However, they will find 
it much easier to demonstrate by example how fa is used. My own analysis of its 
meaning has been arrived at after considerable thought and research. 
Regarding the second criterion, it is known that conceptual representations 
can combine together to form larger complex conceptual representations. For 
instance, the concept ZILZ
Ā
L ‘EARTHQUKE’ can combine with ‘ANĪF 
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‘STRONG’ to form the larger concept ZILZ
Ā
L ‘ANĪF ‘STRONG 
EARTHQUAKE’. In fact, it is not clear whether fa can enter this sort of semantic 
compositionality or not. The reason behind that could be the morphological nature 
of fa. It is known that fa in SA is used as a prefix (bound morpheme) with nouns 
and verbs, which means that it can combine with other linguistic expressions. For 
example, fa in (63) combines with the noun ‘hālid’ (Khaled): fa-hālid and in (64) 
it combines with the verb ‘
ğ
alasa’ (sat down), fa-
ğ
alasa. But the question that 
arises now: does this sort of combinations exhibited by fa lead to complex 
conceptual representations in the same way ZILZ
Ā
L and ‘ANĪF do. The answer 
would definitely be ‘No’. The combination of fa with other linguistic expressions 
does not result in larger complex representations. It is a mere morphological 
combination due the morphological nature of fa which is always used as a bound 
morpheme. Fa does not add any conceptual import to the verb ğalasa in the 
combination fa- ğalasa. The same goes for the combination of fa-hālid. This is 
not a larger complex combination of fa and ğalasa, but rather a morphological one. 
By contrast, Wilson and Sperber’s third criterion shows that the meaning 
encoded by fa is conceptual. According to their truth-evaluability test, if a 
linguistic expression contributes to the truth-conditional (propositional) content of 
the utterance in which it occurs, then this linguistic expression is conceptual. We 
have seen that the four meanings encoded by fa contribute to the truth-conditional 
content of the utterances in which fa occurs. The relations encoded by fa can fall 
under the scope of logical operators as has been demonstrated in (108), (109), 
(110) and (111).  
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If we assume that the conceptual/procedural distinction applies to the 
linguistic expression fa, then the claim would be that fa encodes a procedural 
meaning that instructs the hearer to derive the four concepts expressed in fa 
utterances, namely ‘sequentiality’, ‘immediacy’, ‘non-intervention’ and 
‘causality’. In this respect, the four concepts expressed in fa-utterances are not the 
conceptual encoding of the linguistic expression fa but rather the outcome of the 
implementation of the general procedure encoded by fa. This general procedure 
can be put as follows: 
 
(112)        Treat both conjuncts in fa-utterances as related constituents in a higher 
                 cognitive super-ordinate topic where the event expressed in the first 
                 conjunct precedes37 and/or causes the event expressed in the second  
                 conjunct.      
 
This general procedure encoded by fa put constraints on the explicature of 
the utterances since the four concepts generated by this procedure contribute to 
the truth-conditional content of the utterances in which fa occurs. By contrast, 
there is no such procedure encoded by wa. The four concepts are pragmatically 
conveyed in wa-utterances by developing the logical form of the sentence 
containing wa as shown in the figure below: 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 ‘Precedes’ here stands for ‘sequentiality’ including the two subcases of ‘immediacy’ and ‘non-
intervention’.  
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          A           wa            B                                     A             fa             B 
 
   
        Con1    Con3     Con2                                  Con1       Con3      Con2 
 
 
   sequentiality and causality                              sequentiality and causality 
 
                       immediacy                                                       immediacy  
 
                       non-intervention                                             non-intervention 
  
         
 
 
       FREE ENRICHMENT                                PROCEDURAL  ENCODING 
 
Figure 9: Free enrichment vs. procedural encoding in wa and fa-utterances 
 
To sum up, fa in SA is syntactically used as a coordinating conjunction. 
Like wa, it connects two or more phrases (or clauses). However, fa is 
morphologically and semantically different from wa. It is used as a prefix (bound 
morpheme) with the first noun and verb in the second conjunct. Furthermore, it 
encodes a general procedure that instructs the hearer to derive some extra 
meanings not encoded by wa. As far as the truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional 
distinction is concerned, all the meanings derived by implementing the general 
procedural meaning encoded by fa contribute to the propositional content of the 
utterances in which fa occurs.  
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4.3.3.3. ‘Fa’ as encoding an inferential procedure 
Fa in SA is not always used as a coordinating conjunction. There is one use where 
fa does not conjoin two phrases or clauses as we have in (63) and (64). In this use, 
fa introduces an independent sentence which involves some sort of relation with 
the previous sentence. In this use, fa is always preceded by a full stop. Consider 
the following examples:  
 
(113)       yas

t

at

ī
‘u       ‘umar-un        al-tas
ğ
ī la         fi    ’ayati      mubarāt.  
                can                Omar             scoring            in     any       game 
 
                fa-huwa       lā‘ib-un         mumtāz 
                fa-he            player           excellent   
 
                “Omar can score in every game. Fa he is an excellent player.” 
 
(114)       yas

t

at

ī
‘u        ah

mad-un      al-qiyāda       bi-dūni    murafiqen     ’al-’ana.   
                can                Ahmad           driving        without     supervisor      now.  
 
                fa-huwa    h

as

ala  ‘ala   ruhs

ati    al-qiyāda         al-dā’ima   
                fa-he         got         on   license    the driving       the full      
 
             “Ahmad can drive without a supervisor now. Fa he has got his full 
               driving licence.”      
 
As can be noticed, fa in (113) and (114) is not used as a coordinating conjunction. 
It is rather used to introduce a new sentence the proposition of which is related to 
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the proposition expressed in a previous sentence. In this respect, tumma cannot be 
used instead of fa: 
 
(115)       *Omar can score in every game. Tumma he is an excellent player.   
(116)       *Ahmad can drive without a supervisor now. Tumma he has got his 
                  full driving license recently.   
 
This use of fa corresponds to the inferential use of so referred to in the 
relevance-theoretic procedural analysis of linguistic expressions. Blakemore 
(1988:184) points out that so in English can either be used to express a causal 
relation between two events or states of affairs or indicate an inferential relation 
between two propositions in discourse. Consider the following examples: 
 
(117)       a. David fell down. So he broke his arm.     
               b. John drank three glasses of vodka. So he got intoxicated.  
 
(118)       a. There was some porridge in the fridge. So the guy hadn’t eaten 
                    everything.     
               b. Omar is your friend. So he must help you. 
 
In (117a-b), the proposition introduced by so is interpreted as a causal 
consequence of the state of affairs expressed by the proposition in the first clause. 
In other words, the proposition of the so-clause is interpreted as an ‘effect’ to the 
‘cause’ referred to by the proposition expressed in the first clause. However, in 
(118a-b), the proposition introduced by so is interpreted as a logical consequence 
of the proposition expressed in the first clause. The proposition expressed in the 
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so-clause is interpreted as a ‘conclusion’ to the ‘premise’ referred to by 
proposition expressed in the first clause. 
Blakemore (1988) argues that meaning of so (in the inferential use) cannot 
be analysed in terms of the contribution it makes to the proposition expressed by 
the utterance containing it, but should be analysed as a constraint on the relevance 
of that utterance. The meaning encoded by so minimises the hearer’s processing 
effort by guaranteeing that the information communicated by the utterance 
containing it is relevant in a specific context. For instance, the meaning encoded 
by so in (118b) indicates that the hearer is expected to process the utterance in a 
context where the proposition introduced by so is interpreted as a ‘conclusion’ to 
the ‘premise’ in the first proposition. To put that differently, the meaning encoded 
by so indicates that the relevance of the proposition so introduces lies in the fact 
that it is a contextual implication of the first proposition (Blakemore 1988:188). 
The effect of using linguistic expressions such as so in (118b) is to constrain the 
hearer’s choice of context during the process of the utterance interpretation. For 
instance, for the hearer to achieve an interpretation consistent with the principle of 
relevance, he must apply another assumption such as the following:  
 
(119)      Friends must help each other.     
   
In (118a-b) the meaning encoded by so, does not contribute to the truth-
conditional content of the utterance in which it occurs. A & B is true in only if A 
is true and B is true no matter whether there is an inferential relation between the 
propositions or not.  
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Like so in (118a-b), fa in (113) and (114) encodes a procedural meaning 
that contributes the inferential phase of the utterance interpretation by instructing 
the hearer to interpret the proposition introduced by fa as a contextual implication. 
The meaning encoded by fa puts constraints on the relevance of the utterance in 
which it occurs by pointing to the hearer that the proposition expressed by the 
clause introduced by fa is relevant as a ‘conclusion’ to a ‘premise’ expressed by 
the proposition communicated in the first clause. In this use, like the inferential so, 
fa does not contribute to the truth-conditional (propositional) content of the 
utterance. In other words, the inferential connection encoded by fa does not affect 
the truth of falsity of the two propositions in the utterance. Thus Pro1 (Omar can 
score in every game) and Pro2 (he is an excellent player) are true regardless 
whether Pro2 follows form Pro1 or not. In this respect, it can be argued that the 
procedure encoded by the inferential so put constraints on the implicit side (the 
implicature) of the utterance interpretation by introducing a contextual implication: 
 
(120)       a. An excellent player can score in every game. (Pre 1) 
                b. Omar can score in every game. (Pre 2)    
                c. Omar is an excellent player. (Con) 
 
For the hearer to reach an interpretation consistent with principle of relevance, he 
has to supply an extra premise given in (120a) which is not linguistically encoded 
in (113) but inferentially derived by applying the procedural meaning encoded by 
fa. 
Another linguistic expression—‘ala ’ayati h
 
āl encodes a procedure that 
provides the hearer with a different line of reasoning: 
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(121)       Omar can score in every game. ‘Ala ’ayati h

āl, he is an excellent player. 
 
 This procedure encoded by ‘ala ’ayati h
 
āl38 in (121) indicates that the proposition 
expressed in the clause introduced by ‘ala ’ayati h
 
āl is analysed as a ‘premise’ to 
the ‘conclusion’ expressed by the proposition in the first clause. The line of 
reasoning in this case is different: 
 
(122)       a. An excellent player can score in every game. (Pre 1) 
                b. Omar is an excellent player. (Pre 2) 
                c. Omar can score in every game. (Con)      
 
To sum up, fa in both uses39 (causal and inferential) encodes procedural 
meaning. It gives instructions to the hearer during the process of the utterance 
interpretation. In the causal case, fa guides the hearer to reach the concept of 
causality which is not conceptually encoded by fa but rather by implementing the 
procedural meaning encoded by fa—both conjuncts are related constituents in a 
general cognitive topic where the second conjunct is seen a consequence of the 
first. The procedure encoded by this use of fa40 puts constraints on the explicature 
of the utterance because it contributes to the truth-conditional content of the 
utterance in which fa occurs. The procedure encoded by the inferential fa is 
                                                 
38
 It is equivalent to after all in English. 
39
 This claim is compatible with Blakemore (1988) where she argues that both uses of so instruct 
the hearer in the process of the utterance interpretation: “This is not to say that so is ambiguous 
between the non-truth-conditional sense discussed in the previous section and a further truth-
conditional sense. The use of so, as always, instructs the hearer to establish an inferential 
connection. The fact that this connection is interpreted as part of the propositional content of (23) 
is due to the same factor that leads any hearer to enrich the content of a conjoined utterance—the 
assumption that it expresses a conjoined proposition consistent with the principle of relevance.”  
(Blakemore 1988:193)  
40
 This is a departure from Blakemore (1988) where she argues that so constrains the implicit 
(inferential) level of the utterance interpretation. Carston (1993:47) argues that so can constrain 
either the implicit (inferential) or the explicit (representational) side of the utterance interpretation.  
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slightly different. It instructs the hearer to find a cognitive inferential relation 
between two propositions as ‘premise’ and ‘conclusion’ (Pro1= premise & Pro2 = 
conclusion). By contrast, this procedure encoded by the inferential fa constrains 
the implicit side of the utterance interpretation because it does not contribute to 
the truth-conditional content of the utterance in which fa occurs. 
4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has argued, contrary to what Al-Khalil (2005) claims, that DMs are 
used in both standard and non-standard forms of Arabic as a matter of the 
diglossic situation. We have seen that DMs such as lakinna, bainama, lakin, bal 
and fa are only used in SA, while other DMs such as bass, la-heik, la-ha-sabab, 
ma‘n
ā
t-o and bi-ittālī are only used in SYA as we will see in the next chapter. 
The most important claim in this chapter is that CA is not the only 
framework for studying DMs in SA and SYA. The relevance-theoretic procedural 
account proposed by Blakemore (1987, 2002) is and ideal and more appropriate 
account to analyse DMs in both SA and SYA.  
Building on the data given from SA, this chapter has argued that the DMs 
lakinna, bainama, lakin and bal all correspond to but in English, which illustrates 
that but encodes a general procedure the implementation of which leads to the 
recovery of four different interpretations. It has been also argued that fa (in all its 
uses) encodes procedural meaning which controls either the explicit or the 
implicit side of the interpretation of the utterance in which it occurs 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5. Procedural Expressions in Syrian Arabic 
5.1. Introduction 
Discourse markers in SYA have been little studied in the literature. To my 
knowledge, there is one single PhD (Al-Khalil 2005) on the use of DMs in SYA. 
The study was conducted within the CA framework. Al-Khalil (2005:54) claims 
that none of the approaches (e.g. coherence and relevance approaches) used for 
studying DMs in the last 20 years are appropriate to the study of DMs in SYA: 
 
These studies mentioned above partially focussed on the 
relationship between the markers and the surrounding context but 
what is more important here is to pay more attention to stretches of 
discourse in order to be able to grasp the exact mechanism of how 
speakers use discourse markers to signal an activity and how that 
activity corresponds to the activities preceding and following it. It 
is crucial, therefore, to use a framework which allows the detailed 
analysis of turns at talk, and which has the ability to show us how 
conversants do activities with words.                                               
                                                           
                                                                            (Al-Khalil 2005:54) 
                                
Al-Khalil’s main purpose is to show how DMs used in SYA affect the 
relationship between the preceding and the following turn constructional unit 
(TCU). So, it is crucial for him to study at what point of conversation DMs are 
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placed and how their activities depend on the placement. For example, if the DM 
t
 
ayyeb is used TCU-initially then it is a request for explanation (t

ayyeb, what do 
you mean by that?) and if it is used TCU-finally then it is a request for action (be 
patient, t
 
ayyeb!). 
Al-Khalil’s claim that CA is the only framework for studying DMs in 
SYA is controversial. It can account for some (but not all) DMs used in SYA. For 
instance, it cannot account for DMs such as bass, la-heik, la-ha-sabab, ma‘nāt-o 
and bi-ittālī which cannot occur TCU-finally in CA terms. This chapter offers an 
alternative framework for studying DMs in SYA, namely the relevance-theoretic 
procedural analysis developed by Blakemore (1987, 2002). Unlike CA, the new 
framework is not concerned with the point of conversation at which a certain DM 
is used but rather the role played by the DM in determining what is communicated 
by the utterance. It is generally known that the main concern of CA is turn-taking 
and how DMs are used by speakers to organise conversation. In other words, the 
role of DMs in this theoretical framework is organisational. However, for RT, it is 
not necessary to consider turn-taking in order to understand and interpret 
discourse. What matters in RT are the contextual effects carried by discourse units 
and not how these discourse units are organised or how turns in a conversation are 
distributed between participants. Building on that, the role of DMs in RT is to 
constrain the choice of contextual effects which eventually contributes to the 
understanding and interpretation of discourse. Moreover, in restricting itself to 
turn-taking, CA only takes account of issues that arise in one kind of discourse, 
namely conversations (i.e. discourses in which several speakers make alternating 
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contributions), whereas RT is concerned with discourse in a more general sense, 
one that includes, but is not exhausted by, the turns taken in a conversation. 
This chapter is structured as follows: section 5.2 gives a brief introduction 
to SYA as one representative of the non-standard form of SA and highlights some 
syntactic, morphological and semantic differences between SYA and SA. Section 
5.3 discusses the procedural meaning encoded by bass. It argues that bass encodes 
a general procedure that can be implemented to derive different interpretations 
similar to the procedure encoded by but in English. Section 5.4 offers some 
conceptual uses of the DM bass which can also encode the meanings of ‘enough’, 
‘stop it’ and ‘only’. Section 5.5 investigates the procedural meaning encoded by 
the DMs: la-heik, la-ha-sabab, ma‘nāt-o and bi-ittālī in SYA. Section 5.6 is a 
conclusion 
5.2. Syrian Arabic as a distinct language 
In the Arabic diglossic situation, the standard and the non-standard forms of 
Arabic are quite different. This difference makes it necessary to treat them as two 
different languages. Cowell (1964) points out that the grammatical structure of 
Syrian Colloquial Arabic (as one of the non-standard forms) is autonomous and 
must be described in its own right. For instance, the word order in SA is VSO, 
while it is SVO in SYA: 
 
(1)       a. qara’a                    al-walad-u        al-dars-a                      (SA)              
                  V                               S                     O 
               read+Pas               the boy             the lesson  
                               “The boy read the lesson. 
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            b. al-walad               ’ara                   al-dars                         (SYA) 
                    S                        V                         O 
                  the boy            read+Pas             the lesson  
                                “The boy read the lesson.” 
 
The difference also involves phonology and lexis. On the phonological level, 
many words which might be regarded as the same word in SA and SYA are 
pronounced differently in the two. Consider some examples: 
 
(2)         SA                       SYA                       
           [waraqa]               [wara’a]                  (a paper)  
           [’tnān]                  [tnein]                     (two)  
           [dahab]                 [dahab]                   (gold)  
           [danb]                   [zanb]                     (sin) 
 
On the lexical level, a large body of vocabulary is used in SYA but not in SA. 
Here are some examples: 
 
(3)        SA                   SYA                         
           dahaba               maša                       (to go) 
           sayyida              sitt                          (lady) 
           zalameh             ra
ğ
ul                       (man)  
           h

irmeh              ’imra’a                    (woman)       
                
As we have seen in chapter 4, SYA is a Levantine variety of Arabic, spoken in 
Syria. This variety has three dialectal zones: Central Syrian which is spoken in 
Damascus, Homs and Hama, Northern Syrian, spoken in Aleppo and Idleb and 
Eastern Syrian, spoken in Al-Hasakah, Al-Raqqah and Deir Al-Zor. There are no 
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significant differences between the Central and Northern dialects of Syrian Arabic; 
they are similar in many aspects. However, the Eastern dialect is crucially 
different. It is much closer to Iraqi Arabic than to Syrian Arabic. As far as the 
study of DMs is concerned, the concentration will be on one dialectical variety of 
SYA, namely Central Syrian Arabic and more specifically the one spoken in 
Damascus and the surrounding areas. It is the dialect that will be referred to in this 
thesis as SYA.  
In section 4.2.3, I have discussed the influence of diglossic situation in 
Arabic on the use of DMs. It has been claimed that certain DMs are used in one 
form but not in the other. In section 4.3, I presented a set of DMs whose use is 
limited to SA. This set includes lakinna, bainama, lakin, bal and fa. In this 
chapter, I present another set of DMs which are only used in SYA. These are bass, 
la-heik, la-ha-sabab, ma‘nāto and bi-ittālī. Let us start with bass.     
5.3. The case of ‘bass’ 
Bass is a DM which is only used in SYA (not in SA). It is equivalent to but in 
English in the sense that it encodes a general procedure that constrains the 
inferential phase of the interpretation of the utterance in which it occurs. As with 
but, the general procedure encoded by bass is implemented in different ways to 
derive different interpretations: ‘denial’, ‘contrast’, ‘correction’ and ‘cancellation’. 
It will be argued that the different implementations of the general procedure 
encoded by bass results in recovering meanings that correspond to the meanings 
of the four DMs used in SA, namely lakinna, bainama, lakin and bal. 
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The general procedure encoded by bass could be treated as an abstract 
instruction that leads the hearer/reader to derive further contextual meanings. This 
is compatible with Borderia’s (2008:1419) monosemy analysis of procedural 
elements. Borderia argues that discourse connectives with procedural meanings 
are not polysemic (ambiguous) but rather monosemic (sense-general). According 
to this analysis, a procedural element has one basic meaning which undergoes 
contextual modulation resulting in different (but related) contextual meanings. As 
far as bass is concerned, it would be argued that bass encodes a general procedure 
(an abstract instruction) that leads the hearer/reader to derive different meanings 
in different contexts. The general procedure encoded by bass could be put as 
follows: 
(4)       Treat the proposition communicated in the bass-clause as a ‘contrast’ of an 
            assumption communicated in the preceding clause.  
 
The procedural meaning of ‘contrast’ encoded by bass could be considered a 
general umbrella under which further sub-meanings (‘denial’, ‘correction’ and 
‘cancellation’) come. These sub-meanings are related in the sense that they can all 
be analysed in terms of ‘contrast’. What I seek to point out here is that ‘contrast’ 
is a general term that can take the more specific forms of ‘denial’, ‘correction’ and 
‘cancellation’ in appropriate contexts, as we will see in the discussion of the 
different implementations of the general procedure encoded by bass. The relation 
between the general procedure encoded by bass and its different implementations 
is given in the figure below: 
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                                                Bass (SYA) 
                                            GP = ‘contrast’ 
 
 
                                                     CM 
 
 
 
                                Imp1             Imp2             Imp3              Imp4 
                             ‘denial’        ‘contrast’       ‘correction’   ‘cancellation’ 
                            (lakinna)      (bainama)          (bal)               (lakin) 
 
Figure 10: Bass: general procedure and different implementations 
 
On the polysemy side, Silva (2006) gives a polysemic analysis of the 
discourse marker, pronto in spoken Portuguese. He argues that pronto is a 
polysemic linguistic expression which has different meanings and functions in 
discourse. According to Silva (2006:2188), pronto can be used in spoken 
Portuguese to indicate ‘concluding’, ‘agreeing’, ‘explaining’, ‘imposing’ and 
‘summarising’. 
As far as this monosemy/polysemy debate in discourse markers research is 
concerned, I claim that discourse markers in Standard and Syrian Arabic used in 
this thesis, especially fa and bass are best analysed in monosemic terms. As we 
have seen, fa in Standard Arabic has one general meaning (a single procedural 
instruction) that can be implemented differently in different contexts, thereby 
yielding different understandings of the use of those expressions.  But these 
different understandings are not different meanings of the expressions themselves 
(i.e. those expressions are not ambiguous).  More generally my claim is consistent 
with the fact that, given its focus on context and use, pragmatic theory is able to 
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explain how an expression (more strictly, the use of an expression) can be 
understood in more than one way without being ambiguous. The same goes for 
bass which encodes a general meaning of contrast, but this general meaning is 
understood in different ways as we will see in the next section. Before moving to 
that, I provide a very short syntactic description of the discourse markers bass. 
5.3.1. Syntactic analysis 
The linguistic expressions Blakemore (1987,2002) analyses as semantic 
constraints on relevance vary syntactically from coordinating conjunctions such as 
but, to subordinating conjunctions such as although to adverbs such as so and 
therefore. No matter what the syntactic identity of such expressions is, they have 
been treated (by Blakemore) as DMs that encode procedural encoding. 
Most of the DMs used in SA and SYA belong to the three categories given 
by Blakemore. As far as bass is concerned, it is syntactically classified as a 
coordinating conjunction41. Consider the following examples: 
 
(5)       ’š-šms       t

āl‘a            bass        ’
ğ
-
ğ
aw              barid  
            the sun      shining       but          the weather       cold 
                   “The sun is shining but the weather is cold.” 
 
(6)       ‘umar         bi-yišrab       šāi       bass      zaid      bi-fad

d

el      ‘as

ī
r 
            Omar         drinks           tea       but       Zaid      prefers           juice 
                            “Omar drinks tea but Zaid prefers juice.” 
 
                                                 
41
 Bass can also have utterance-initial uses as in (15) where the bass-clause is uttered by a different 
speaker and in (21) and (22) where bass encodes a concept.  
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As can be noticed, bass in the above two sentences is used as a coordinating 
conjunction. It links the two clauses: ‘’š-šms t
 
āl‘a’and ‘’ğ-ğaw barid  in (5): and 
the two clauses: ‘drinks tea’ and ‘prefers juices’ in (6). 
What distinguishes bass as a coordinating conjunction is that it cannot be 
pre-posed to initial position in the sentence. Unlike the subordinating conjunction 
in (7), which can occur in both medial and initial position in the sentence, bass in 
(8) can only be used in medial position: 
 
(7)        a. ba‘            bet-o               la-’inn-o           fallas 
                sold-he    house-his         because-he      got bankrupt  
                    “He sold his house because he got bankrupt.”  
 
              b. la-’inn-o           fallas                  ba‘            bet-o                
                  because-he     got bankrupt        sold-he   house-his 
                 “Because he got bankrupt, he sold his house.” 
 
(8)       *bass        ’
ğ
-
ğ
aw              barid        ’š-šms       t

āl‘a       
            *but          the weather       cold        the sun      shining             
                    *“But the weather is cold, the sun is shining.” 
 
As a coordinating conjunction, bass cannot co-occur with other coordinating 
conjunctions in the same sentence: 
 
(9)       a. kan             h

ar
ā
m
ī
           bass         ’albo              t

ayyeb 
               was-he        thief               but           his heart        good 
                            “He was thief but good-hearted”  
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            b. *kan             h

ar
ā
m
ī
           w      bass         ’albo              t

ayyeb 
                *was+he       thief              and   but           his heart        good 
                            “*He was thief and but good-hearted” 
 
As can be noticed, (9a) is ungrammatical; bass and w42 cannot occur in the same 
sentence because they are both coordinating conjunctions. 
5.3.2. ‘Bass’ as encoding a procedure 
Due to the diglossic situation in Arabic, the four DMs referred to in section 4.3.1, 
i.e. lakinna, bainama, lakin and bal are not used in SYA. Instead, there is bass—a 
single DM, the different implementations of its general procedure result in 
recovering meanings equivalent to those carried by these four DMs, ‘denial’, 
‘contrast’, ‘correction’ and ‘cancellation’. This section is devoted to discuss how 
this procedure is implemented to reach these different meanings.  
5.3.2.1. ‘Bass’ and contrast  
It has been argued in section 5.3 that ‘contrast’ is the general procedural meaning 
encoded by the DM bass in SYA. In most cases, bass is used in its basic meaning 
to indicate a ‘contrast’ between two states of affairs. In this sense, the meaning 
encoded by bass corresponds to the meaning carried by the DM bainama used in 
SA. Consider the following example: 
 
(10)      mona  profesora   bi-
ğ
ami‘t      al-qāhira  bass  zo
ğ
-a       s

ā
ne‘   ah

diyeh  
             Mona  professor   at university   Cairo      but   husband-her  maker  shoes 
                                                 
42
 Wa in SA is used as w in SYA. 
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            “Mona is a professor at Cairo University but her husband is a shoemaker.”  
 
Syntactically speaking, bass in the above sentence is a coordinating conjunction 
that links two clauses ‘mona profesora bi-
ğ
ami‘t al-qāhira’ and ‘zo
ğ
-a            
s

ā
ne‘ah

diyeh’. In this sense, bass has the truth functional characteristic of and 
here.  However, bass controls the relationship between the two clauses. The use of 
bass in (10) plays a crucial role in the process of the utterance interpretation. It 
guides the hearer to interpret the proposition in the bass-clause as a contrast to the 
explicature communicated in the first clause. In other words, the procedural 
meaning encoded by bass would show the hearer/reader that bass-clause is 
relevant as a contrast of the proposition given in the preceding clause.  
The procedural meaning encoded by bass does not contribute to the 
explicit truth-conditional content of (10). The utterance is true if and only if the 
two propositions ‘Mona is a professor at Cairo University’ and ‘her husband is a 
shoemaker’ are true. So, on the explicit, truth-conditional level, (10) would be 
equivalent to (11): 
 
(11)     mona   profesora   bi-
ğ
ami‘t       al-qāhira   w   zo
ğ
-a            s

ā
ne‘   ah

diyeh  
            Mona  professor  at university   Cairo      and   husband-her  maker  shoes 
           “Mona is a professor at Cairo University and her husband is a shoemaker.”  
 
The procedural encoding of bass, rather contributes to the implicit side of the 
utterance interpretation. It leads to the implicature that there is a sense of contrast 
between the two propositions. This sense would not be clear without the use of 
lexical indicator such as bass.  
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5.3.2.2. ‘Bass’ and denial  
‘Denial of expectation’ is one of the meanings recovered by implementing the 
general procedure encoded by bass in SYA. In this sense, this implementation 
results in recovering a meaning that corresponds to the meaning carried by 
lakinna in SA. Like lakinna, bass controls the implicit side of the utterance 
interpretation. It indicates that the speaker has reasons to think that the optimally 
relevant interpretation yields a proposition which is inconsistent with the 
assumption held by the speaker. This implementation of the general procedure 
encoded by bass could be put as follows: 
 
(12)       Implementation 1: 
             The proposition communicated in the bass-clause denies and replaces an 
             assumption communicated in the preceding clause. 
 
Consider the following example: 
 
(13)       hāled         mūsiqī           bass       mano        sam‘an       b-mozārt 
              Khaled      musician      but         not            hearing      about Mozart  
                      “Khaled is a musician but he has not heard of Mozart” 
 
The implication communicated by the utterance of (13) is that ‘Khaled 
should have heard of Mozart because he is a musician’. This implication is 
derived by pairing the old contextual information ‘any musician should have 
heard of Mozart’ and the given contextual information ‘Khaled is a musician’: 
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(14)       a. Contextual information: Any musician should have heard of Mozart. 
              b. Newly presented information: Khaled is a musician. 
              c. Conclusion: Khaled should have heard of Mozart.  
 
On the basis of the contextual information in (14a) and the newly presented 
information given in (14b), the implication in (14c) is denied by the proposition 
communicated in the bass-clause ‘mano sam‘an b-mozārt’. 
5.3.2.3. ‘Bass’ and correction  
The second implementation of the general procedure encoded by bass, in SYA, 
guides the hearer to derive the meaning of ‘correction’ which is carried by bal in 
SA. Consider the following example:  
 
(15)       Ahmad: šlon        kan       fahs

        ’in-nah

ū
          mbārih

? 
                            How       was       exam       syntax           yesterday? 
 
              Khaled: bass      ’ana     ma       kan    ‘indī         fah

s

       mbārih

 
                            but        I          not       was     have      exam     yesterday 
 
             “Ahmad: How was your syntax exam yesterday?” 
             “Khaled: But I did not have an exam yesterday.” 
 
In the above example, Ahmad is asking his friend Khaled about his syntax exam, 
thinking that he did it yesterday. Khaled’s reply, which is started by using bass, 
shows that Ahmad’s assumption is not correct. This implementation can be put as 
follows: 
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(16)       Implementation 2: 
             The proposition communicated in the bass-clause corrects and replaces an 
             assumption communicated in the preceding clause. 
 
 Like bal in SA, bass in SYA works as a correction marker which is used by the 
speaker to correct a previous assumption in discourse. The procedure encoded by 
bass in (16) helps the hearer/reader interpret Khaled’s reply as a correction and 
replacement of the assumption communicated by Ahmad’s question. The other 
three DMs in SA, lakinna, bainama and lakin cannot be used here because they do 
not carry the meaning of correction: 
 
(17)       *lakinna I did not have an exam yesterday. 
             *Bainama I did not have an exam yesterday. 
             *Lakin I did not have an exam yesterday. 
 
Unlike the first implementation of the general procedure encoded by bass, this 
implementation does not involve a denial-of-expectation meaning. Khaled is not 
denying the assumption communicated by Ahmad’s question, but rather 
correcting it.  
Similar to the meaning encoded by bass in (10) and (13), the meaning 
encoded by bass in (15) does not contribute to explicit side of the utterance 
interpretation but rather to the implicit side. The notion of correction is 
inferentially worked out by implementing the procedure encoded by bass. Apart 
from the lexical meaning of bass, nothing in what is said tells us that Khaled’s 
reply is a correction of Ahmad’s assumption. 
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5.3.2.4. ‘Bass’ and  cancellation  
Bass in SYA, can be used in an initial position in discourse in a similar way to 
lakin in SA. Like lakin, bass in this use introduces a clause which communicates a 
proposition that cancels and replaces another proposition in the previous discourse. 
This leads us to the third implementation of the general procedure encoded by 
bass: 
(18)       Implementation 3: 
             The proposition communicated in the bass-clause cancels and replaces an 
             assumption communicated in the preceding clause. 
 
Consider the following example:  
 
(19)       a. ah

mad     šāb      kwayyes    kl         yom     bi-rūh

     ‘ala       ši
ā
lo    
                 Ahmad    chap    nice           every    day      go           on         his work 
                   
                 ’is-sā‘a       tmāneh       ’is

-s

ibih

      w       bir 
ğ
a‘          is-sā‘a      tlāteh 
                   o’clock       eight         morning      and   come back    o’clock      three 
 
                 il-masā     kl         rif’āt-o              bi-h

ibb-o           w      bi-h

tirmū            
                 o’clock    all         his colleagues    loves him        and   respect him 
     
                 mudīro         biš-ši
ā
l       s

araflo        mukafa’a       3000    lera     sūrī  
                 his manger   at work       gave           a reward        3000    pound  Syrian  
 
                 la-’inno         kān       mabs

ū
t       minn-o           ktīr        kl        hamm-o     
                 because          was      happy         from him      a lot        all       his care 
 
                 yihdom     wat

ano      w       ykūn   ‘ns

or         fa‘‘al        fī-h    il-h

a’
ī
’a 
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                 serve         his home   and     be       member    effective   in it   in fact  
 
                 ah

mad        namoda
ğ
       liš-šab   is-souri      il-muhlis

 
                 Ahmad       exammple          chap       Syrian      sincere      
            b. bass     ah

mad      halla’ tarak    balado         w        safar         lal-halī
ğ
  
                but       Ahmad     now  left       his country   and    travelled   to the Gulf   
             
                b-‘’id       ‘amal        il-h

a’
ī
’a      r
ā
tbo            b-sūrya       ktīr      ’alī l  
                contract    job            in fact        his wage      in Syria       very     low  
 
                iz-zalameh     baddo     yizzawa
ğ
      w       yiftah

       beit     w        yištiri  
                the man           needs       marry         and     open       house   and     buy  
 
               sayyarah    w         ir-rātteb       il-lī         bi-yahd-o      bi-sūrya     lāzem             
               car            and      the salary    which     takes it         in Syria      must  
 
               ywaffir       rātbo           tlātīn      sineh        la-yi’dir         ye’mil        heik 
               save           his salary    thirty     years         to be able       do              this       
  
a. Ahmad is a good guy. He goes to work everyday at 8:00 am and comes 
back at 3:00 pm. All his colleagues love and respect him. His manager paid him 
an extra 3000 Syrian Pounds as a reward because he is happy about his 
performance at work. All what Ahmad cares about is to be good and active 
member in the society. Ahmad is really an example for the Syrian sincere guy.  
 
b. But Ahmad has left the country now and headed to the Gulf region after he 
got a job contract. In fact, his salary in Syria was very low. He wants to get 
married, buy a house and have children. If he wants to do so in Syria, he has to 
save all his salaries for 30 years.  
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As can be noticed, bass in (19b) introduces a new paragraph. The proposition(s) 
in this paragraph relates to other proposition(s) in the previous discourse. Unlike 
the first and the second implementations of the general procedure encoded by bass, 
this implementation does not involve a ‘denial of expectation’ or ‘correction’. The 
proposition(s) in (19b) does not deny expectation or correct proposition(s) 
communicated in (19a) but rather cancels the contextual implications of this 
proposition(s) because the information provided by the speaker in this 
proposition(s) is either insufficient or not what is expected by the hearer. 
It has been argued that bass encodes a general procedural meaning of 
‘contrast’ which can be implemented in different ways to derive further sub-
meanings: ‘denial’, ‘correction’ and ‘cancellation’. If this argument is true, then 
these three further sub-meanings should have something in common because they 
are derived from the same procedure. It can be noticed that these three sub-
meanings can be analysed in ‘contrast’ terms. For example, it could be argued that 
the proposition communicated in the bass in (13) contrast with assumption 
communicated in the preceding clause. The correction meaning derived in (15) 
can also be analysed as a contrast between the proposition communicated in the 
bass-clause and the one in the preceding clause. The same goes for the 
cancellation meaning derived in (19).  
5.4. Other uses of ‘bass’  
What it is interesting about bass is that it can encode conceptual meaning as well. 
There are three extra meanings encoded by bass in SYA, which are not encoded 
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by any of the four equivalent DMs in SA, namely lakinna, bainama, lakin or bal. 
In addition to the procedural meaning of bass discussed in section 5.3, bass can 
encode the meaning of ‘only’ and ‘enough’ (or ‘stop it’). Consider the following 
examples: 
 
 (20)       ‘ind-o         tlat         ’t

fāl            bass    
               has-he       three       children     only 
               “He has three children only.”  
 
 
(21)       bass        šabāb          il-wa’it    hilis,     ’da   samah

to     h

it

t

o    ’lāmkon. 
              enough   guys          time          over        if   you please  put     pens-your 
                “Enough guys! Time is over. Please put your pens down!”  
 
(22)       bass          ya       walad        naza‘-t            mubāyl-ī  
              Stop it!     oh       boy           broke-you       my mobile 
                 “Stop it boy! You broke my mobile phone.”   
  
Bass in (20), (21) and (22) does not encode procedural meaning. It does not 
contribute to the inferential implicit part of the interpretation of these utterances as 
it does in (10), (13), (15) and (19). In (20), (21) and (22), it has a conceptual 
encoding; it carries the meaning of ‘only’, ‘enough’ and ‘stop it’. This conceptual 
meaning contributes to the truth-conditional content of the utterance in which bass 
occurs. In this respect, bass can stand alone as an utterance. 
In this respect, bass in SYA is different from the four equivalent DMs in 
SA in the sense that the four DMs are purely procedural while bass in SYA is 
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conceptuo-procedural linguistic expression. None of the four DMs in SA can 
encode the conceptual meaning encoded by bass: 
 
(23)       a. *He has three children lakinna (bainama, lakin or bal). 
              b. *lakinna (bainama, lakin or bal) guys! Time is over. Please put your 
                     pens down! 
              c. *lakinna (bainama, lakin or bal) boy! You broke my mobile phone. 
 
To sum up, the meaning encoded by bass in SYA is conceptuo-procedural. 
On the procedural level, bass encodes a general procedure that can be 
implemented to derive different meanings—equivalent to the meanings encoded 
by the four DMs in SA. On the conceptual level, unlike the four DMs in SA, bass 
in SYA has conceptual meaning which contributes to the truth-conditional 
propositional content of the utterance in which it occurs. 
5.5. ‘la-heik’, ‘la-ha-sabab’, ‘ma‘n t-o’ and ‘bi-itt l ’ 
These are four DMs used in SYA. The first two markers encode ‘causality’ 
between the two elements they connect, while the second two encode ‘logical 
(inferential) consequence’ between two propositions in discourse, as we will see 
in the course of this section. It could be argued that these four DMs together are 
equivalent to fa in SA, in the sense fa encodes both ‘causal’ and ‘logical’ 
(inferential) consequence between two propositions. The claim is that, like fa, 
these four DMs encode procedural meaning that constrains the interpretation of 
the utterances in which they occur. 
  
 
279 
The argument will be that the procedural meaning encoded by the first two 
markers la-heik and la-ha-sabab is slightly different from the procedural meaning 
encoded by second two markers ma‘nat-o and bi-ittālī. With the first two markers, 
the procedure encoded leads the hearer to derive the concept of ‘causality’ which 
contributes to the explicit propositional truth-conditional content of the utterance. 
With the second two markers, the procedure encoded constrains the choice of 
contextual effects to reach the intended interpretation consistent with the principle 
of relevance. Unlike the first type of procedural meaning, this type does not 
contribute to the explicit propositional truth-conditional content of the utterance 
but rather to the implicit side as will be demonstrated in section 5.5.2 and 5.5.3.  
The claim that DMs have different types of procedural meaning is 
acknowledged by Blakemore (2002:148). She maintains that the DM well does 
not encode a procedure in the same way as but and so do. According to 
Blakemore (2002:143), the procedure encoded by well encourages the hearer to 
renegotiate the context (look for contextual assumptions he has not looked for). 
Consider her example (108) used here as (24): 
 
(24)       A: Anna’s much taller than Verity. 
              B: Well, she is two years older. 
 
 Blakemore argues that the ‘renegotiation’ of context is a consequence of 
the hearer recognition of the speaker aiming at optimal relevance. The use of well 
encourages the hearer to recognize a contextual assumption the speaker believes 
the hearer should recognize as relevant but he did not. 
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It is noticed that the procedure encoded by well in the above example 
differs from that encoded by but and so in the sense that it does not put constraints 
on the cognitive effects of ‘contextual implication’ or ‘contradiction and 
elimination’. Given that, Blakemore (2002:122) acknowledges that her account of 
semantic constraints on relevance should be broadened to incorporate constraints 
on context as well as on cognitive effects. 
 I believe that Blakemore’s account of procedural meaning should be 
broadened to account for the non-inferential uses of some conceptually-empty 
linguistic expression such as so. So has been extensively analysed and quoted in 
the literature as encoding a procedural meaning of contextual implication. It 
guides the hearer to infer that the proposition communicated in the following 
clause is a ‘conclusion’ to the proposition in the preceding clause. However, the 
other use of so (causal so) is non-inferential. It does not guide the hearer to follow 
any inferential routes in deriving the cognitive relations between the two clauses. 
Causal relations as such are non-inferential. Consider the following example to 
show the subtle difference between the two procedures encoded by so: 
 
(25)       a. He fell off his bike. So he broke his leg.   
             b. He broke his leg. So he fell off his bike. 
 
So is procedural in both utterances (25a) and (25b). However, no one can deny 
there is a difference in meaning between the two utterances. In the first utterance, 
so encodes a non-inferential procedure which helps the hearer to reach the 
‘concept of causality’ communicated in the utterance. There is nothing inferential 
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here because the proposition communicated in the second clause is a natural 
‘result’ of the ‘cause’ given the first clause. By contrast, the procedure encoded by 
so in the second utterance is inferential. There is no natural cause-effect 
relationship between the two propositions communicated in the first and second 
clause. The procedure encoded by so guides the hearer to establish the cognitive 
relationship between the two propositions. As far as the four DMs (la-heik, la-ha-
sabab, ma‘nāt-o and bi-ittālī) used in SYA are concerned, it would be claimed 
that the procedure encoded by the first two is non-inferential while the procedure 
encoded by the second two is inferential: 
 
(26)       a. He fell off his bike. La-heik (la-ha-sabab) he broke his leg. 
             b. *He fell off his bike. Ma‘nāt-o (bi-ittālī) he broke his leg.  
 
(27)       a. He broke his leg. Ma‘nāt-o (bi-ittālī) he fell off his bike. 
             b. *He broke his leg. La-heik (la-ha-sabab) he fell off his bike.  
 
In Blakemore’s account of procedural meaning, a sort of parallelism was 
assumed between ‘procedural’ on the one hand and ‘inferential’ on the other. The 
procedural meaning encoded by the linguistic expressions she uses puts 
constraints on the inferential phase of the utterance interpretation. However this 
parallelism does not hold in all cases. In the case of causal so, the procedure does 
not constrain the inferential relation between two propositions but rather directs 
the hearer to derive the concept of causality; what is represented by the 
proposition communicated in the second clause is a direct result to the cause 
represented by the first clause. This can account for the claim that the procedure 
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of la-heik and la-ha-sabab on the one hand and the procedure of ma‘nāt-o and bi-
ittālī are not encoded in the same way. The latter is inferential while the former is 
non-inferential.  
As is the norm in this thesis, I provide a brief syntactic description of these 
linguistic expressions before moving to discuss their procedural meaning.   
5.5.1. Syntactic analysis 
These four DMs have one thing in common, i.e. they are all compound 
expressions. The first DM la-heik consists of two morphemes: la43 which is a 
preposition used in SYA equivalent to for or to in English and heik which is a 
complementiser (translated as that in English). The second DM la-ha-sabab 
consists of three morphemes: the preposition la (for or to), the demonstrative 
pronoun ha44 (this) and the word sabab (reason). The third DM ma‘nāt-o consists 
of two morphemes ma’nat (means) and the pronoun o (it). The fourth DM bi-ittalī 
consists of the preposition bi (by) and the word ittālī (consequence). Given that, 
the literal translation of these four DMs is the following: 
 
(28)       a. la-heik = for that 
             b. la-ha-sabab = for this reason 
                                                 
43
 This corresponds to li in SA: 
 
   i. ’a’t  a    ‘umar      al-qalma       li-zaid 
       gave    Omar      the pen         to-Zaid 
       “Omar gave the pen to Zaid.” 
 
   ii. s  araft-u      kull     nuqud-ī           li-‘ağli-ka 
        spent-I       all      money-my      for-sake-your 
         “I spent all my money for your sake.” 
 
44
 This corresponds to hada in SA.  
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             c. ma‘nāt-o = it means 
             d. bi-ittālī  = by consequence 
 
We will see that each of these four DMs, regardless of its compound 
nature, works syntactically and semantically as one unit, equivalent to fa in SA 
and so in English. On the semantic level, it will be argued that each one of these 
markers puts constraints on the inferential part of the utterance interpretation; on 
the syntactic level, these expressions will be treated as adverbs.  
As far as the syntactic status of these DMs is concerned, they cannot be 
used as sub-ordinating conjunctions. Unlike sub-ordinating conjunctions, these 
expressions cannot be preposed with their clauses to the initial position in the 
sentence they are used in. Consider the following examples: 
 
(29)       a. wa’a‘       il-fāres         min      h

s

ā
n-o      la-heik    ’inkasar     kāh

l-o 
                 fell           the knight    off       horse-his   so             broke        ankle-his 
                        “The knight fell off his horse. So, he broke his ankle.” 
 
             b. wa’a‘    il-fāres        min    h

s

ā
n-o      la-ha-sabab  ’inkasar     kāh

l-o 
                 fell       the knight    off     horse-his   so                  broker        ankle-his 
                        “The knight fell of his horse. So, he broke his ankle.” 
 
(30)       a. ‘umar      musiqi        ma‘nāt-o   huwe     sam‘ān    b-mozārt 
                  Omar      musician     so              he          hearing   by-Mozart 
                        “Omar is a musician. So, he has heard of Mozart.” 
 
              b. ‘umar      musiqi        bi-ittālī    huwe    sam‘ān    b-mozārt 
                     Omar      musician     so          he        hearing   by-Mozart 
                        “Omar is a musician. So, he has heard of Mozart.” 
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The clauses introduced by these four DMs cannot be preposed to initial position 
as can be noticed below: 
 
(31)       a. *La-heik he broke his ankle, the knight fell off his horse. 
              b. *La-ha-sabab he broke his ankle, the knight fell off his horse. 
              c. *Ma‘nāt-o Omar is a musician, he has heard of Mozart.  
              d. *Bi-ittālī  Omar is a musician, he has heard of Mozart.  
These four DMs are not coordinating conjunctions either; they can be used 
side by side with another coordinating conjunction such as w. Consider the 
following examples for illustration:     
 
 (32)       a. The knight fell off his horse w la-heik he broke his ankle. 
              b. The knight fell off his horse w la-ha-sabab he broke his ankle. 
              c. Omar is a musician w bi-ittālī  he has heard of Mozart.  
              d. Omar is a musician w ma‘nāt-o he has heard of Mozart.  
 
As can be noticed, these DMs are neither sub-ordinating conjunctions nor 
coordinating conjunctions. The best category describing such expressions is 
‘adverbs’. Such expressions can be used with other adverbs (such as immediately 
and possibly) in the same sentence: 
 
(33)       a. The knight fell off his horse. La-heik, immediately, he broke his ankle. 
              b. The knight fell off his horse. La-ha-sabab, immediately, he broke his 
                  ankle. 
              c. Omar is a musician. Bi-ittālī , possibly, he has heard of Mozart.  
              d. Omar is a musician. Ma‘nāt-o, possibly, he has heard of Mozart. 
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5.5.2. ‘la-heik’ and ‘la-ha-sabab’ as procedures 
As we have seen in the previous chapter ‘causality’ and ‘logical consequence’ are 
two meanings (among other meanings) derived by the implementation of the 
general procedure encoded by fa in SA. In this respect, I claimed that fa is 
equivalent to so in English, which is known to encode these two types of meaning. 
As far as these four DMs used in SYA are concerned, it will be argued that they 
encode procedural meaning in the same way so and fa do. La-heik and la-ha-
sabab encode a procedural meaning which leads the hearer to recover the concept 
of ‘causality’ in the utterance in which these two markers are used. In this sense, 
the contribution made by these two markers affects the truth-conditional 
(propositional) content of the utterance and thus, they will be analysed as putting 
constraints on the explicit side of the utterance interpretation (explicature) in a 
similar way to what we have in the case of ‘causal so’. The other two markers 
ma‘n
ā
t-o and bi-ittālī encode a procedural meaning which does not affect the 
truth-conditional content of the utterance in which they occur, but rather 
constrains the inferential implicit side of the utterance interpretation (implicature). 
This section discusses the procedural meaning encoded by la-heik and la-ha-
sabab and the next section is devoted to investigate the procedural meaning 
encoded by the other two DMs.  
The procedure encoded by the two DMs la-heik and la-ha-sabab instructs 
the hearer to recover the concept of ‘causality’, which is not conceptually encoded 
by the DMs la-heik or la-ha-sabab but rather derived by applying the procedure 
encoded by these two markers: 
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(34)       Treat the proposition communicated by the la-heik (la-ha-sabab)-clause 
              as an ‘effect’ to the ‘cause’ represented by the first clause.  
 
Consider the following example: 
 
(35)       a. The knight fell off his horse. La-heik, he broke his ankle. 
              b. The knight fell off his horse. La-ha-sabab, he broke his ankle. 
The procedure encoded by la-heik and la-ha-sabab in (35a) and (35b) instructs the 
hearer to interpret the proposition in the second clause as an effect to the cause 
represented in the first clause. The procedure in this case is non-inferential; it 
contributes to the truth-conditional content of the utterance and thus constrains the 
explicit side of the interpretation (explicature). Utterances containing such DMs 
can come under the scope of logical operators such as ‘if then’: 
 
(36)       a. If the knight fell off his horse and la-heik he hurt his ankle, then he 
                 should be taken to hospital.  
 
              b. If the knight fell of his horse and la-ha-sabab hurt his ankle, then he 
                  should be taken to hospital.  
 
5.5.3. ma‘nāt-o and bi-ittālī as procedures 
The procedure encoded by ma‘nāt-o and bi-ittālī is slightly different from that 
encoded by la-heik and la-ha-sabab. This procedure instructs the hearer to find 
the cognitive inferential relation between the two propositions it connects. In other 
words, it guides the hearer to see how the proposition communicated by the clause 
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these two markers introduce achieves relevance towards the proposition 
communicated in the first clause. In this sense, the procedure is inferential: 
 
(37)       a. Omar is a musician. Bi-ittālī , he has heard of Mozart.  
              b. Omar is a musician. Ma‘nāt-o, he has heard of Mozart.  
 
The procedure encoded by bi-ittālī and ma‘nāt-o in (37a) and (37b) instructs the 
hearer to interpret the proposition in the clause they introduce as a ‘conclusion’ 
derived on the basis of the proposition expressed in the first clause and an 
assumption supplied by the hearer from context: 
 
(38)      a. Omar is a musician. (Pre1: communicated in the first clause) 
             b. All musicians must have heard of Mozart. (Pre2: supplied by hearer) 
             c. Omar has heard of Mozart. (Con: derived from Pre1 and Pre2) 
 
By combining these two premises—the proposition given in (38a) and the 
assumption given in (38b), the hearer will be able to derive the conclusion given 
in (38c). Thus, the procedure encoded by ma‘nāt-o and bi-ittālī constrains the 
hearer’s choice of contextual information to reach the cognitive effect. The use of 
these two markers guides the hearer to supply the external assumption in (38b) in 
order to reach the conclusion and eventually the interpretation which is consistent 
with the principle of relevance.  
There are three main differences between la-heik (and la-ha-sabab) on the 
one hand and ma‘nāt-o (and bi-ittālī) on the other hand. The first difference is that 
unlike ma‘nāt-o, la-heik cannot occur without an immediate linguistic antecedent. 
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Compare the acceptable use of ma‘nāt-o in (39a) with the unacceptable use of la-
heik in (40b): 
 
(39)       a. There is five pounds in my wallet. 
             b. Ma‘nāt-o, you did not spend all the money 
  
(40)       a. There is five pounds in my wallet. 
              b.*La-heik, you did not spend all the money  
The acceptability of ma‘nāt-o in (39b) and the unacceptability of la-heik in (40b) 
can be attributed to the fact that la-heik is only used to encode the representational 
(propositional) concept of ‘causality’, while ma‘nāt-o encodes inferential 
consequence. The second difference is that in some situations, the use of ma‘nāt-o 
is acceptable, whereas the use of la-heik is not. Consider the following example: 
 
(41)       a. Take the first turn on your right hand. 
             b. Ma‘nāt-o I should walk for about three minutes. 
 
(42)      a. Take the first turn on your right hand. 
             b.*La-heik, I should walk for about three minutes. 
 
The unacceptability of la-heik in (42b) can be attributed to the fact la-heik is only 
used representationally not inferentially. By contrast, ma‘nāt-o in (41b) is used 
inferentially in the sense that it confirms (or strengthens) the relevance of 
proposition expressed in the previous utterance. The third and the last difference 
between la-heik and ma‘nāt-o is that the latter (but not the former) is used in 
situations where the hearer is unable to see the significance of what the speaker 
says. In this use, ma‘nāt-o communicates the meaning of ‘so?’ or ‘so what?’:  
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(43)      S1: Omar will not be able to attend the party tonight. 
             S2: Ma‘nāt-o? 
 
(44)       S1: Omar will not be able to attend the party tonight 
             S2: *la-heik? 
 
 5.5.4. Some differences between ‘fa’ and these markers 
Although the meanings encoded by the four DMs la-heik, la-ha-sabab, ma‘nāt-o 
and bi-ittālī in SYA can be derived by the implementation of the general 
procedure encoded by fa in SA, there are some morphological, syntactic and 
semantic differences between fa and these four DMs. On the morphological side, 
we have seen that fa is used as a bound morpheme (prefix) attached to the first 
word in the second conjunct or clause. However, these markers are free 
morphemes. Consider the following examples repeated here for convenience: 
 
(45)       Ahmad had his lunch fa-drank a cup of tea. 
 
(46)       a. The knight fell off his horse. La-heik, he broke his ankle. 
              b. The knight fell off his horse. La-ha-sabab, he broke his ankle. 
 
(47)       a. Omar is a musician. Ma‘nāt-o, he has heard of Mozart. 
              b. Omar is a musician. Bi-ittālī , he has heard of Mozart. 
 
On the syntactic level, we have seen in the last chapter that fa is often used 
as a coordinating conjunction. However, it can be used as an adverb which 
introduces an independent clause. By contrast, these four DMs cannot be used as 
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coordinating conjunctions. They are only used as adverbials. Given this, these 
four DMs cannot be used instead of fa in (63) and (65) of chapter four: 
 
(48)        a. *I saw Ahmad la-heik Khaled. 
               b. *I saw Ahmad la-ha-sabab Khaled. 
               c. *I saw Ahmad ma‘nāt-o Khaled. 
               d. *I saw Ahmad bi-ittālī  Khaled. 
(49)        a. *Omar la-heik Zaid came to the party.  
               b. *Omar la-ha-sabab Zaid came to the party. 
               c. *Omar ma‘nāt-o Zaid came to the party.  
               d. *Omar bi-ittālī  Zaid came to that party.  
 
On the semantic level, not all the meanings encoded by fa are encoded by 
these four DMs. As it has been argued, fa in SA encodes a general procedure that 
can be implemented by the hearer to derive the meanings of ‘sequentiality’, 
‘immediacy’, ‘non-intervention’ and ‘causality’ as well as the logical consequence 
encoded by fa when it is used as an adverb to introduce an independent clause. 
These four DMs just encode two of these meanings encoded by fa namely 
‘causality’ and ‘logical (inferential) consequence’ as has been demonstrated in 
examples (29) and (30) of this chapter. Given that, (99) and (113) of chapter 4 can 
be used with these four DMs instead of fa. 
 
(50)       a. Khaled insulted Mona. La-heik, she left the party. 
              b. Khaled insulted Mona. La-ha-sabab, she left the party.  
 
(51)       a. Omar can score in every game. Ma‘nāt-o, he is an excellent player. 
              b. Omar can score in every game. Bi-ittālī , he is an excellent player.  
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The meanings of ‘sequentiality’ (temporal ordering), ‘immediacy’ and 
‘non-intervention’ derived by implementing the general procedure encoded by fa 
in SA, are not encoded by these four DMs. It is unacceptable to have the 
utterances of (52) (53) and (54) below with these four referred to DMs: 
 
(52)       a. *Ahmad came in la-heik sat down on the chair 
              b. *Ahmad came in la-ha-sabab sat down on the chair 
              b. *Ahmad came in ma‘nāt-o sat down on the chair 
              c. *Ahmad came in bi-ittālī  sat down on the chair 
 
(53)       a. *She handed me the knife la-heik I cut the bread.  
              b. *She handed me the knife la-ha-sabab I cut the bread. 
              c. *She handed me the knife ma‘nāt-o I cut the bread. 
              d. *She handed me the knife bi-ittālī  I cut the bread. 
 
(54)       a. *Omar visited Damascus la-heik Baghdad. 
              b. *Omar visited Damascus la-ha-sabab Baghdad. 
              c. *Omar visited Damascus ma‘nāt-o Baghdad. 
              d. *Omar visited Damascus bi-ittālī  Baghdad. 
 
5.6. Conclusion  
Bass in SYA is similar to but in the sense that both DMs encode a general 
procedure that can be implemented to derive different interpretations of the 
utterance in which it occurs. The implementation of such procedure enables the 
hearer to derive four different meanings: ‘denial’, ‘contrast’, ‘correction’ and 
‘cancellation’. These four different meanings are represented by four different 
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lexical expressions in SA, while they are not English. The big difference between 
bass and but is that bass can stand alone as an utterance whereas but cannot. 
As for the other set of DMs discussed in section 5.5, it has been claimed 
that the first two markers, la-heik and la-ha-sabab encode non-inferential 
procedure (causality) while the second two, ma‘nāt-o and bi-ittālī encode logical 
inferential consequence.   
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Conclusion 
This thesis was a scrutiny of the use of discourse markers in English and Arabic. 
The theoretical framework used in this thesis was Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) 
Relevance Theory. Discourse markers in Arabic have been analysed in line with 
Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) account of procedural meaning.  
Under the theoretical framework, several related notions have been 
discussed. Grice’s explicit/implicit distinction, developed in terms of 
explicature/implicature distinction in Relevance Theory, has been investigated in 
great length in this thesis due to its close relation to (and substantial impact on) 
the procedural meaning encoded by some discourse markers. Blakemore’s (1987) 
early work on the procedural meaning argued that some discourse markers encode 
procedural meanings that put constraints on the implicit side of the utterance 
interpretation. However, subsequent research (Wilson and Sperber 1993) showed 
that the procedural meaning encoded by some linguistic expressions, such as 
personal pronouns can constrain the explicit side of the utterance interpretation. 
This thesis even showed that some linguistic expressions can constrain both the 
explicit and the implicit side of the utterance interpretation as is the case with fa in 
Standard Arabic.  
Grice’s notion of conventional implicature was also discussed due to the 
fact that the whole notion of procedural meaning could be seen as a reaction to (or 
rather replacement of) this notion.  
The conceptual/procedural distinction and its relation to the truth-
conditional/non-truth-conditional distinction was discussed in detail. This thesis 
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argued against the alleged parallelism between these two distinctions. It agreed 
with Wilson and Sperber’s (1993) claim that what is procedural can be truth-
conditional and what is conceptual can be non-truth-conditional.  
The thesis also discussed other frameworks used for the analysis of 
discourse markers such as Coherence Theory and Conversation Analysis Theory. 
It argued that Relevance theory offers a better and more ideal framework for 
analysing discourse markers than these two theories.  
The analysis of Arabic discourse markers in this thesis benefited from 
Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) analysis of discourse markers in English as encoding 
procedural meanings. According to Blakemore, discourse markers encode 
procedural meanings that constrain the inferential phase of the interpretation of 
the utterances in which they occur. The procedure encoded by a discourse marker 
controls the choice of context under which the utterance, containing it, is relevant. 
That is why she calls them ‘semantic constraints on relevance’.  
As far as Arabic is concerned, the discussion dealt with discourse markers 
used in Standard Arabic as well as Syrian Arabic. The reason is that some 
discourse markers used in Standard Arabic are not used in Syrian Arabic and vice 
versa. For example, lakinna, bainama, lakin and bal are used only in Standard 
Arabic, while bass is used in Syrian Arabic instead. The same goes for fa which is 
used only in Standard Arabic, while la-heik, la-ha-sabab, ma‘nāt-o and bi-ittālī 
are used only in Syrian Arabic.  
The purpose of discussing discourse markers in both Standard and Syrian 
Arabic was to reply to AL-Khalil’s (2005) claim that discourse markers are only 
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used in the colloquial form of Arabic. Data in this thesis show that discourse 
markers can be used both in colloquial and standard forms of Arabic. In this 
respect, Syrian Arabic was chosen as one representative of the Colloquial Arabic. 
The choice of these ten discourse markers was due to the fact that they can be 
compared and contrasted with Blakemore’s two famous discourse markers, but 
and so. In this concern, bass, lakinna, bainama, lakin and bal could be considered 
as counterparts of but. And, fa, la-heik, la-ha-sabab, ma‘nāt-o and bi-ittālī are 
counterparts of so. 
The major claim in this thesis was that fa in Standard Arabic and bass in 
Syrian Arabic encode general procedures that can be implemented to derive 
different meanings. For example, the general procedure encoded by bass can be 
implemented to derive the meanings of ‘denial’, ‘contrast’, ‘correction’ and 
‘cancellation’. By the same token, the general procedure encoded by fa can be 
implemented to derive the meanings of ‘sequentiality’, ‘immediacy’, ‘non-
intervention’ and ‘causality’.   
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